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CONCEPTUALIZING LEGAL CHILDHOOD IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Clare Huntington † & Elizabeth S. Scott ††
Forthcoming, Michigan Law Review
The law governing children is complex, sometimes appearing almost
incoherent. The relatively simple framework established in the Progressive era, in
which parents had primary authority over children, subject to limited state oversight,
has broken down over the past few decades. Lawmakers started granting children
some adult rights and privileges, raising questions about their traditional status as
vulnerable, dependent, and legally incompetent beings. As children emerged as legal
persons, children’s rights advocates challenged the rationale for parental authority,
contending that robust parental rights often harm children. And a wave of punitive
reforms in response to juvenile crime in the 1990s undermined the state’s longstanding role as the protector of children.
We address this seeming incoherence by identifying a deep structure and
logic in the regulation of children that is becoming clear in the twenty-first century.
In our conceptual framework, the law’s central goal, across multiple legal domains,
is to promote child wellbeing. This unifying purpose has roots in the Progressive era,
but three distinct characteristics distinguish the modern approach. Today,
lawmakers advance child wellbeing with greater confidence and success by drawing
on a wide body of research on child and adolescent development and the efficacy of
related policies. This is bolstered by the clear understanding that promoting child
wellbeing generally furthers social welfare, leading to a broader base of support for
state policies and legal doctrines. Finally, there is a growing recognition that the
regulation of children and families has long been tainted by racial and class bias
and that a new commitment to minimizing these pernicious influences is essential to
both the legitimacy and fairness of the regime. In combination, these features make
the contemporary regulatory framework superior to earlier approaches.
Rather than pitting the state, parents, and child in competition for control
over children’s lives—the conception of family regulation since the 1960s—our
Child Wellbeing framework offers a surprisingly integrated regulatory approach.
Properly understood, parental rights and children’s rights, as well as the direct role
of the state in children’s lives, are increasingly defined and unified by a researchdriven, social-welfare-regarding effort to promote child wellbeing. This normatively
attractive conceptualization of legal childhood does not define every area of legal
regulation, but it is a strong throughline and should be elevated and embraced more
broadly. In short, our framework brings coherence to the complex legal developments
of the past half century and provides guidance moving forward for this critical area
of the law.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past several decades, the law’s treatment of children has
become increasingly complex and uncertain in ways that can seem to verge on
incoherence. The problem stems from a breakdown of the Progressive era
approach that governed for much of the twentieth century: In that framework,
parents had authority to make most decisions about their children, subject to
state regulation of issues such as education and child labor. The state also
intervened directly with families to protect children from parental abuse and
neglect and to rehabilitate children engaged in wayward or criminal conduct.1
Children in this regime were largely invisible as legal persons, presumed to be
vulnerable, dependent, and incapable of making self-regarding decisions. 2
Several developments in the second half of the twentieth century
complicated this approach. Beginning in the 1960s, courts and legislatures
started treating children as rights-bearing legal persons for some purposes. 3 This
challenged the traditional view of children as lacking the legal capacity for selfdetermination, while providing little clarity about the conditions under which the
law should confer rights and privileges. With the recognition of children’s rights,
legal questions increasingly were framed as a zero-sum contest in which parents,
children, and the state competed for control over children’s lives. 4 Moreover,
children’s rights scholars and advocates contested the parental authority prong
of the Progressive era approach as obsolete, contending that parental rights were
rooted in traditional notions of children as property and threatened harm to
children. 5
The overriding Progressive conception of the state as the defender of
vulnerable children also lost its way. In the 1980s and 1990s, the rehabilitative
model of juvenile justice virtually collapsed under a wave of punitive law reforms
that abandoned the longstanding goal of promoting the wellbeing of young
offenders. 6 In the twenty-first century, lawmakers retreated from this punitive
approach, and a new wave of more benevolent reforms is now underway, but
these pendulum swings have undermined the stability of the state’s regulatory
1 See infra Part I.A (detailing this approach and emphasizing that state intervention focused
primarily on low-income, immigrant families).
2 See id. (describing this legal framework and noting that to an extent, it persists: parents
continue to enjoy substantial control over their children, subject to state intervention or
preemption when child welfare and social welfare demand, and for many purposes, children
continue to be deemed dependent, vulnerable, and incapable of self-determination).
3 See infra Part I.B.1 & 2 (explaining how the children’s rights movement gained momentum in
a series of Supreme Court decisions that granted children a range of constitutional protections,
including procedural rights in delinquency proceedings, speech rights in school, and the right of
mature minors to consent to abortion).
4 See infra Part I.B.2 & 3. The regulatory framework was often depicted schematically as a
triangle. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Ecogenerism: An Environmentalist Approach to Protecting
Endangered Children, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 409, 412 (2005)
5 See infra Part I.B.2 & 3.
6 See infra Part I.B.1. As we detail, many youths were transferred to the adult justice system,
and the use of incarceration increased for children who remained in the juvenile system. See also
ELIZABETH SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 94-102 (2008). This
trend toward criminalization was described by some lawmakers, including Justice Scalia, as wholly
consistent with the recognition of youths as rights-bearing persons. See Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 615-19, Scalia, J. dissenting (criticizing the court for inconsistency in minors’ abortion
and juvenile sentencing opinions).
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role. 7 In the child welfare system, scholars and advocates challenged the myopic
and ineffective focus on family crises rather than on child abuse prevention and
family support. 8 And critics argued convincingly that both the juvenile justice
and child welfare systems were highly racialized and skewed against families in
poverty. 9 Taken together, these disruptions to the Progressive era framework
fundamentally challenge the rationality and stability of the law’s conception of
childhood.
In this Article, we show that the legal regulation of children is not
incoherent. Indeed, in what we call the Child Wellbeing framework, there is a
deep unifying structure and logic to the regulation of children that is emerging
across multiple domains, including systems of state intervention, parental rights,
and children’s rights, as well as, to a much lesser degree, policies of state support
for families. The core principle and goal of promoting child wellbeing shapes
regulation ex ante and should not be confused with the individualized best
interest of the child standard, applied in some legal settings. 10 Three features
distinguish the contemporary approach from that of the Progressive era. First,
twenty-first-century regulation increasingly is based on psychological and
biological research on child and adolescent development, as well as growing
evidence about the effectiveness of policy interventions. This broad body of
knowledge makes it possible to advance child wellbeing with much greater
confidence, sophistication, and effect. 11 Second, lawmakers and the public
increasingly appear to recognize the social welfare advantages of promoting child
wellbeing, thereby broadening support for contemporary policies. 12 And third, a
7 See infra Part II.A (describing the emergence of the Child Wellbeing framework). There have
been similar swings in the status-offense system, which addresses noncriminal misconduct by
children. See infra notes 43 & 157.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 84-98 (demonstrating that, despite policy swings, family
intervention and assistance has largely been limited to crisis situations; lawmakers have eschewed
an active state role in supporting families by promoting healthy child development, with
unsatisfactory results.).
9 See infra text accompanying notes __ (describing racial disproportionality at every stage of the
juvenile justice system); see infra text accompanying notes 40 & 87-90 (describing racial
disproportionality in the child welfare system).
10 The best interest standard is applied, inter alia, in child custody disputes. See Robert
Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 226 (Summer 1975) (describing the best-interests standard and its indeterminacy). In some
contexts, a rule defined in accord with the Child Wellbeing framework may sometimes result in a
decision in an individual case that is contrary to the child’s interest. See discussion of third-party
contact, infra Part III.
11 Emily Buss has argued that the law should function as a developmental agent with the aim
to promote healthy development in children. See Emily Buss, Developmental Jurisprudence, 88 TEMPLE
L. REV 741, 751-52 (2016). In many regards, her argument is compatible with our framework. For
cautionary notes about the use of social science evidence, see infra Part V.
12 In the juvenile justice system, for example, recent developmentally based reforms have
effectively reduced recidivism and are cost-effective. See generally SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note
6, at 181-222; see infra Part II.A. Traditional Progressives often ignored the public interest in crime
protection, with devastating consequences when apparent conflicts arose. See SCOTT & STEINBERG,
supra note 6, at 84-88; infra Part I.B.1. As we discuss throughout the article, sometimes social
welfare concerns drive legal reform and other times a concern for social welfare is implicit in the
reasoning.
Social welfare in this article is calculated by weighing the costs of a policy or doctrine to society
against its benefits to society. This article describes doctrines and policies as advancing social
welfare when the benefits to society of a given doctrine or policy exceed the costs. Benefits vary
in different contexts. In justice policy, for example, social welfare is advanced when recidivism is
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growing acknowledgment of embedded racial and class bias in state regulation
of children has led to tentative steps toward reducing these pernicious influences,
even if these efforts are at an early stage.
The elements of the Child Wellbeing framework—reliance on research,
recognition of social welfare benefits, and acknowledgment of systemic racism—
are clearest in sweeping twenty-first-century juvenile justice reforms. 13 Rejecting
the punitive reforms of the 1990s, which largely targeted youth of color,
lawmakers have acted to promote adolescent wellbeing, drawing on
developmental knowledge and focusing on the social welfare benefits of
reducing recidivism and helping delinquent teenagers transition to productive
adulthood. With these goals in mind, lawmakers have closed institutional
facilities and expanded community-based programs tailored to the needs of
young offenders. Across the political spectrum, supporters have endorsed these
changes as cost-effective policies that serve the interests of both young offenders
and society. 14 The reforms are far from complete and have not eradicated racial
disparities, to be sure, but lawmakers have begun to recognize the harms of the
system and the ways in which it disproportionately impacts youth of color. 15
By identifying and crystallizing the core components of this framework,
it becomes clear that it also undergirds other aspects of the regulation of
children; 16 indeed, the central aim of this Article is to identify these common
themes across domains of legal regulation. The Child Wellbeing framework is
apparent, for example, in more nascent systemic reforms that expand the
obligation of the state to support parents in raising children to productive
adulthood. 17 These reforms reflect an understanding that research-driven
policies, such as universal pre-kindergarten, not only benefit children, but also
promote social welfare. 18 And the framework is evident in a growing awareness
that decisions about state intervention in families often are tainted by racial and
other biases. 19 The framework thus provides a contemporary rationale for state
action under its parens patriae and police power authority.
At a structural level, the Child Wellbeing framework sheds light on the
current allocation of decisionmaking authority over children. Instead of a zerosum conception, with state authority, parents’ rights, and children’s rights pitted
reduced through cost-effective programs. See infra text accompanying notes 143-144. In family
intervention, social welfare is advanced when children develop healthily and become productive
adults, through cost effective interventions. See infra text accompanying notes __. Costs generally
include financial costs and other harms incurred by the regulation. See infra text accompanying note
364 (describing the social costs of withholding contraception from sexually active teens and social
benefits of availability).
13 See infra Part II.A.
14 See infra text accompanying notes ___.
15 See infra Part II.A.2.
16 This Article focuses primarily on the traditional components of the legal regulation of
children: juvenile justice and child welfare regulation, parents’ rights, and children’s rights; it also
touches on policies of state support for families. Legal regulation of children could be defined far
more broadly to include almost every aspect of law and policy that has any impact on children. See
CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS
58-68 (2014) (defining family law broadly to include not only the traditional areas but also criminal
law, housing law, employment law, zoning law, etc.). In light of the ambitious scope of this article,
we cabin our analysis to the identified topics.
17 See infra Part II.B.
18 See id.
19 See id.
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against one another, the legal regulation of children is grounded in the
overarching goal of promoting child wellbeing, which knits together the interests
of parents, children, and the state. Understood this way, the regime of strong
parental rights and the opaque pattern of children’s rights can be unified and
rationalized. In both domains, the law generally promotes child wellbeing,
increasingly is informed by developmental research, and usually enhances social
welfare. 20 Parental rights also serve a particularly important protective function
for families of color and low-income families, who have been the focus of
zealous state intervention. 21
The approach we offer thus elevates the promotion of child wellbeing
as the key justification for parental rights—a rationale that is too often ignored
by children’s rights advocates. 22 Extensive research establishes that the stability
of the parent-child relationship is essential to healthy child development, and
restricting the state’s authority to intervene in families promotes the constancy
of this core relationship. Parental authority is not absolute, however, and the
modern rationale for parental rights is self-limiting, providing a sounder basis
for restricting parental authority than the Progressive era approach: In a regime
in which parental rights are justified as protecting child wellbeing, parents are
not free to inflict serious harm on their children, even on the basis of religious
beliefs.23
The Child Wellbeing framework also provides a logic for laws granting
some rights to young persons and withholding other rights. 24 Children, and
particularly adolescents, have an emerging interest in exercising agency as they
prepare for adult roles, so long as their choices do not threaten harm to
themselves or others. 25 First Amendment speech rights in school, for example,
allow students to prepare for citizenship. 26 More urgently, withholding rights
sometimes threatens serious harm as individuals mature. For example, denying
young people the right to make decisions about contraception and substance
abuse treatment can directly harm minors’ wellbeing; conferring these rights
allays these harms. 27 Consistent with the logic of the Child Wellbeing framework,
lawmakers increasingly rely on developmental and other research when deciding
which rights and privileges to extend or withhold, distinctions that often serve
to promote social welfare. 28 The recognition of the potential for racial bias
generally plays a muted role in the pattern of granting and withholding of rights,
but some rights, such as procedural protections in the justice system, are
understood to particularly benefit youth of color, who are disproportionately

See infra Part III.A.
See infra text accompanying notes 87-90.
22 See infra Part III.A; see also infra text accompanying notes 224-225, 229-230 (explaining that
advocates and scholars have long argued that parental rights can promote child wellbeing, but
further showing that children’s rights advocates often dismiss this rationale).
23 See infra Part III.B (discussing corporal punishment, third-party contact with children,
medical decisionmaking, and homeschooling).
24 See infra Part IV.
25 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 89-90 (1981)
(describing adolescence as a “learners permit”).
26 See infra Part IV.B.1.b.
27 Access to particular medical treatments under minors’ consent statutes and to procedural
protections in delinquency proceedings are in this category. See infra Part IV.B.1.a.ii & IV.B.2.
28 See infra Part IV.A.
20
21
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represented in the system. 29
In addition to elucidating current legal regulation, 30 our framework is
more normatively appealing than either the dyadic approach of the Progressive
era or the approach growing out of the 1960s, which tended to place parents,
children, and the state in competition. To be sure, the framework itself is
grounded in values, which can be contested, but, in general, the values on which
it rests are widely endorsed. 31 Our framework clarifies the core principle of legal
regulation—child wellbeing—and by relying on a clear evidence base and
accounting for social welfare interests, it is sturdier and more comprehensive
than the alternatives. Moreover, the framework elevates the goal of promoting
racial justice as essential to a legitimate and just scheme of regulation.
In addition to elucidating the current regulation of children, the Child
Wellbeing framework also guides law reform by highlighting areas that have yet
to conform to this contemporary approach and offering direction for change. In
particular, we are far from realizing the goal of eradicating racial disparities in the
juvenile justice and child welfare systems, and lawmakers have focused little on
how to address the structural inequalities that influence child outcomes. 32 Our
framework recognizes that these aspirations must be front and center. The child
welfare system remains stubbornly problematic in other ways, continuing to
focus on crisis intervention, with little benefit for either children or society. 33
Our approach underscores these deficiencies and identifies a path forward. The
framework also points to areas of doctrine that potentially thwart child
wellbeing, such as the limited regulation of homeschooling in many states. 34 The
framework by no means defines or informs all legal doctrines affecting
children, 35 but it rationalizes much contemporary law, identifies those areas in
need of reform, and offers a blueprint for change.
The framework we propose grows out of the American Law Institute’s
new Restatement of Children and the Law, on which we are Reporters,36 but it does
not simply recapitulate that project. Like a good Restatement, the article clarifies
an evolving area of law.37 But, as we have emphasized, the Article also has
See infra id.
As we elaborate throughout the Article, in the domains of parental rights and children’s
rights, lawmakers often do not explicitly invoke the rationales we articulate. Rather, our claim is
that the framework is implicit in modern doctrine and policy and that it provides a more
normatively appealing explanation for the current allocation of authority.
31 See discussion of this issue infra Part V.
32 See NANCY DOWD, REIMAGINING EQUALITY: A NEW DEAL FOR CHILDREN OF COLOR 9-50
(2018) (describing this failure).
33 See infra text accompanying notes 84-__.
34 See infra text accompanying note 311.
35 See infra Part III.B.2 & 4 (describing exceptions to the framework: some state rules governing
third-party contacts with children and homeschooling regulation in many states) & Part V
(describing the limits of the framework).
36 See THE ALI ADVISER, CHILDREN AND THE LAW, http://www. thealiadviser.org/childrenlaw/ (describing the Restatement and listing the reporters, who include Elizabeth Scott, Chief
Reporter, and Richard Bonnie, Emily Buss, Clare Huntington, Solangel Maldonado, and David
Meyer, Associate Reporters). This Article particularly has drawn on the Restatement work of
Solangel Maldonado, who drafted the sections on children’s contact with third parties, including
de facto parents, and medical decisionmaking, (infra t.a.n. _ to _ ) and Emily Buss, who drafted
the sections on students’ free speech rights (infra t.a.n._ to _).
37 The goal of a Restatement, in part, is to provide coherence both by “restating” the law with
clarity, but also by identifying and amplifying underlying themes and emerging reform trends. See
THE ALI ADVISER, HOW THE ALI WORKS, http://www.thealiadviser.org/how-ali-works/. In
29
30
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normative ambition; and this ambition is beyond the appropriate aims of a
Restatement.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets the stage by sketching key
developments that have complicated and destabilized the Progressive era
framework of legal regulation of children. Part II describes the Child Wellbeing
framework—a research-grounded understanding of child wellbeing motivated
by the insight that advancing child wellbeing generally promotes social welfare
and that a just system of legal regulation must address racial and class bias. This
Part shows how the framework is embodied in recent reforms to the juvenile
justice system and nascent efforts to support families; it also contends that the
child welfare system largely has not embraced the framework. Parts III and IV
demonstrate that the framework has both explanatory and normative power in
the domains of parental rights and children’s rights. Taken together, then, Parts
II, III, and IV establish that the Child Wellbeing framework is reflected across
the multiple domains of legal regulation of children. In Part V we anticipate and
address several criticisms.

I. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE ERA FRAMEWORK
In a departure from the common law rule of near complete parental
authority, the state began to play a more active role during the Progressive era,
intervening in family life to promote children’s welfare. This led to a dyadic
model of regulation, under which parents retained much of their traditional
authority but the state stepped in when perceived parental failures threatened
harm to children. The Progressive state also preempted parental authority
generally through statutes mandating school attendance and otherwise limiting
parental authority.
This dyadic framework persisted until the second half of the twentieth
century, when several developments significantly complicated and destabilized
the approach. First, the rehabilitative model of juvenile justice came close to
collapse. Young offenders, usually youth of color, were condemned as
“superpredators” in the 1980s and 1990s and were subject to harsh punishment.
Second, lawmakers began to recognize children as legal persons and rightsholders, at least in some circumstances, transforming a dyadic model of
regulation into one in which the parents, children, and the state competed for
control over children’s lives. Finally, scholars and advocates launched a broad
attack on parental rights as inconsistent with child wellbeing. This Part traces
this historical arc, demonstrating that the legal regulation of children has become
extremely complex and seemingly less comprehensible.
A. The Rise of Progressive Paternalism
Before the Progressive era, the state’s involvement in family life was
limited. 38 The rights of nineteenth-century parents, particularly fathers, over
contrast to some legal scholarship, Restatements aim to guide judges on the state and direction of
legal doctrine; they are not intended to represent the aspirations of legal scholars. See id.
38 For a description of the state’s limited role, which dates to the colonial period, as well as a
description of the few exceptions, see CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, vol. I, 1600-1865, 27-29 (Robert H. Bremner ed., 1970); see also Barbara Woodhouse,
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their children were often described as property-like, 39 and for most white
families, the description was apt. 40 Parental authority was not absolute, but
parents determined almost every aspect of their children’s lives. Parents decided
whether and to what extent their children were educated and when children
should begin to contribute to family income. 41 They also had broad authority to
discipline their children and to guide their religious upbringing. 42
Progressives reformers aimed to change this state of affairs and, in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, achieved a remarkable
transformation in the state’s relationship to children and families. In a brief
twenty-year period beginning in 1898, almost every state established a juvenile
court with jurisdiction over maltreatment of children, status offenses, and
juvenile delinquency cases. 43 Reformers zealously invoked the state’s authority
as parens patriae to fashion a new government role as protector of children from
parental abuse and neglect and from the consequences of their own wayward
behavior. 44 Most youths charged with crimes were removed from the criminal
justice system and dealt with in this new court with the goal of rehabilitation
rather than punishment. Juvenile court judges, popularizers of the movement,
cast themselves as benign parents whose only concern was to ensure that
children received the care and guidance they needed. 45 On the legislative front,
states across the country enacted compulsory school attendance and child labor
laws, which, in tandem, went far to guarantee that children received a basic

Who Owns the Child? Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 966, 103637 (1992). But see The Etna, 8 F. Cas. 803, 804 (C.C. Me. 1838) (no. 4,542) (removing child from
parental custody and noting “[If the child] cannot be safely left in [the father’s] custody … the
protecting justice of the county will interpose and deprive” the father of custody”).
39 See Woodhouse, supra note 38, at 1041-50.
40 Not all parents received robust protection. Enslaved parents had no parental rights, and in
the first half of the nineteenth century, the state occasionally removed poor white children and
freed Black children from their homes and either auctioned them off as involuntary apprentices
or placed them in children’s institutions. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH:
LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 263-268 (1985); Michael Grossberg,
Changing Conceptions of Child Welfare in the United States, 1820-1935, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE 2, 6-19 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002).
41 Further, children’s income belonged to parents. See, e.g., Woodhouse, supra note 38, at 1064.
42 See, e.g., Reva Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L J.
2117, 2153-55 (1996) (describing the “rule of thumb,” under which a man might discipline his wife
and children with a switch as long as it was no thicker than his thumb).
43 Historically, juvenile courts did not differentiate among types of cases and instead the state
invoked its parens patriae authority to exercise jurisdiction over children who had been abused and
neglected, who had committed crimes, and who engaged in noncriminal but undesirable behavior,
such as running away from home or drinking alcohol. This latter group of cases came to be known
as status offenses—conduct that was unlawful only because of the child’s age. See, e.g., David S.
Tannenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in the Early Twentieth Century: Beyond the Myth of Immaculate
Conception, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 40, at 42, 47-50.
44 As one Progressive reformer put it, “the child of the proper age to be under the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court is encircled by the arms of the state, which, as a sheltering, wise parent,
assumes guardianship and has power to shield the child from the rigours of the common law and
from [the] depravity of adults.” MIRIAM VAN WATERS, YOUTH IN CONFLICT 3 (1926).
45 See BEN LINDSEY & RUBE BOROUGH, THE DANGEROUS LIFE (1931); Julian Mack, The Juvenile
Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 119-20 (1909) (arguing that when a child has committed the crime,
the question is not guilt or innocence but rather “[w]hat is he, how has he become what he is, and
what had best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a downward
career”).
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education, while preempting parents’ authority to send them to work in
factories. 46
Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, states also began to pass laws
prohibiting child abuse, and by the end of that century, reformers founded
private child protection societies that began to work in tandem with the newly
created juvenile courts. 47 By the early decades of the twentieth century, a child
protection network had been constructed that included public and private
agencies, juvenile courts, and government probation officers. 48
In truth, although the Progressive reformers accomplished important
institutional changes, their goals for protecting children were limited. Reformers
aimed their reforms primarily at poor and immigrant children, whose behavior,
or that of their parents, the reformers perceived as evidence that parents were
failing to raise their children to be law-abiding American citizens. 49 To be sure,
any child could be charged with an offense in juvenile court, and abusive middleclass parents could be subject to juvenile court supervision. Further, school
attendance and child labor laws categorically preempted parental authority. But
supervision of middle-class families and restriction of parental rights generally
were not key to the Progressive agenda, and the impact of school attendance and
child labor laws fell largely on working class families. 50
The upshot is that while Progressive era reforms resulted in expanded
state authority over families, parental rights continued to be robust in the
twentieth century. 51 In the 1920s, the Supreme Court issued two iconic opinions
See SAMUEL DAVIS ET AL., CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 17, 32-37 (2014).
of this nineteenth-century approach to child welfare and its extensive reach
into the lives of low-income and particularly immigrant families, see ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC
TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM
COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 69-87 (2004); LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES:
THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE: BOSTON 1880-1960, at 8, 14-15 (1988). For a
description emphasizing the complexities of the child protection movement, explaining that it
cannot be told as a simple story of either benevolence or social control, and neither is it a uniform
story of external control of families (because family members sometimes sought out state
intervention), see Michael Grossberg, “A Protected Childhood”: The Emergence of Child
Protection in America, in AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE AND THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION 213-39
(Wendy Gamber et al., eds. 2003).
48 See supra note 43 (describing the blurred lines between delinquency, status offense, and child
abuse and neglect cases in the juvenile court).
49 Historians propose that although Progressives generally acted on benign motivations, the
movement was in part an effort to retain social control over working class and immigrant families,
whose numbers were rapidly expanding. See ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE
INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY xx-xxii (1969). Progressives did not focus their efforts on Black
families, see ANDREW BILLINGSLEY & JEANNE M. GIOVANNONI, CHILDREN OF THE STORM: BLACK
CHILDREN AND AMERICAN CHILD WELFARE 34-38, 76-80 (1972), at least in part because during
the early Progressive era, reformers were predominantly in the North and the migration of Blacks
from the South to the cities of the North did not begin until the 1920s, see ISABEL WILKERSON,
THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS. Infra t.a.n. _ to _. A more complex account of the role of class is
presented by Mary Odem. Infra note 52.
50 Middle class children were already attending school and not working in factories. For more
information on this Common School Movement, see DAVIS, supra note 46, at 32-37; Woodhouse,
supra note 38, at 1062-63.
51 Indeed, some Progressive reforms actually aimed to reinforce parental control over their
children. Mary Odem has argued that Progressive reformers had parental support in seeking to
control teenage girls’ sexual activity by bringing it within the juvenile court’s delinquency
jurisdiction. MARY ODEM, DELINQUENT DAUGHTERS: PROTECTING AND POLICING ADOLESCENT
FEMALE SEXUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1885-1920 (1994).
46

47 For a description
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clarifying that parental authority to make decisions about their children’s
education was constitutionally protected under the Fourteenth Amendment; the
opinions underscored that the new muscular role of the state in children’s lives
had not greatly diminished parental authority, at least for most parents. 52 The
Court rationalized the right of parents to raise their children in terms of
individual liberty—the freedom of citizens, i.e., parents, from excessive state
intrusion in their private lives. 53 Although the opinions did not explicitly endorse
the position that parents “owned” their children, scholars have offered
substantial evidence that this assumption shaped the justices’ views. 54 The Court
did not consider the implication for children’s welfare of strong parental rights
protection. Parental rights were not absolute, of course, and, as the Court noted,
these rights were joined with the responsibility of parents to care for their
children and to raise them to adulthood. 55 State authority to intervene in families
was legitimately invoked when and if parents failed to fulfill their obligations or
their conduct harmed children. 56
In the wake of the newly active role of the state in family life in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a framework of regulation was
established that persisted for decades. In this framework, authority over children
resided either in their parents, grounded in parents’ constitutionally protected
liberty interest, or in the state, acting as parens patriae to protect individual children
or under its police power authority to promote children’s (and society’s) interest
generally. 57 The interests of parents and the state were understood to conflict;
disputes were zero-sum, centering on whether the state, in seeking to override
parental authority on a particular issue, excessively burdened parental authority
in light of the state’s purpose. 58 In making this determination, courts balanced
the importance of the state’s interest in protecting children from harm and
promoting child wellbeing against the extent of the intrusion on parental rights. 59
In this dyadic framework of regulation, the interests of children were
assumed to be furthered either by parents or the state; children themselves were
not thought to have independent interests. This assumption, which was relatively
uncontroversial for decades, reflected a conventional understanding of
52 Not surprisingly, the Court’s announcement that parental rights deserved special protection
came in response to Progressive reforms; it would have been unnecessary in an earlier era. The
Nebraska and Oregon statutes challenged in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce
v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), expanded state
authority to require compulsory school attendance—which the plaintiffs did not challenge.
53 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35 (recognizing “the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control”); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (“Without
doubt, [the liberty interest guaranteed under the 14th Amendment] denotes …the right of the
individual to … establish a home and bring up children”).
54 See, e.g., Woodhouse, supra note 38, at 1041-50.
55 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535 (“[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture
him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations”).
56 See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) (holding that parents’ authority
to choose their child’s religious upbringing does not include the “liberty to expose the community
or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death”).
57 See id.; Woodhouse, supra note 38, at 1039 (“Influential courts in the mid-1800’s, however,
began to articulate a theory that parental control was not an absolute power conferred by God,
but a civic duty conferred and regulated by the state, in the interests of children and of the public.”).
58 Prince, 321 U.S. at 165-66 (describing the state as competing with parental authority).
59 See id.
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childhood as a period of innocence, vulnerability, and dependence, in which
immature individuals are incapable of making self-interested decisions. 60 This
conception applied to toddlers and teenagers alike, and parental or state control
was presumed appropriate for all legal minors. The Progressives insisted that
older youths, like young children, deserved the state’s benign concern. 61 In this
scheme, it followed that children were entitled to parental care and support and
were not held to adult standards of accountability, but they also were not granted
adult rights and privileges. 62
This conception of childhood fit comfortably for younger children, and,
in some legal contexts, for adolescents as well. Many legal protections and
restrictions directed at minors continued to be uncontroversial—the right to
parents’ financial support, protection from abuse and neglect, and restrictions
on child labor, for example. But in some areas, the fit was awkward. Progressive
reformers insisted that youths charged with criminal violations were innocent
children who bore no responsibility for their offenses, and that the state’s only
interest in a delinquency proceeding was to further the youth’s best interests by
providing rehabilitation. Judge Ben Lindsay, an early leader of the juvenile court
movement, made the point in language jarring to modern ears: “[O]ur laws
against crimes are as inapplicable to children as they would be to idiots.” 63 This
characterization of delinquent teenagers as children served the political purposes
of juvenile court proponents aiming for transformative institutional change in
the sanctioning of young offenders, 64 but ultimately, as we discuss in the next
section, it contributed to the near collapse of the rehabilitative framework of
juvenile justice.
B. The Framework under Pressure
The Progressive project made far-reaching changes to the regulation of
children. By the 1920s, the reformers firmly established an institutional model
that assured an active role for the state in family life that endures to this day. But
despite laudable ambitions, this approach ultimately was not successful.
Reformers lacked an understanding of how to achieve the goal of promoting
child wellbeing, and both the rehabilitative model of juvenile justice and the
“child saving” approach that motivated the child welfare system were ultimately
revealed to be deeply flawed.
Beginning in the 1960s, the Progressive era’s simple dyadic framework
of regulation was challenged from several directions. First, the well-defined role
for the state proposed by the Progressives functioned far less successfully than
the optimistic early reformers envisioned. Critics on the left and right assailed
the juvenile justice system. This led to fundamental reforms, including
60 Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 550–51
(2000).
61 This approach advanced the Progressive objective of expanding the age boundary of
childhood. Thus, reformers evoked images of children working under horrendous conditions in
factories to generate support for child labor and school attendance laws. See SCOTT & STEINBERG,
supra note 6, at 62-65.
62 An exception to this was criminal responsibility; juveniles could be punished as adults for
serious crimes in every state. See id. at 84-85.
63 See BEN LINDSAY & HARVEY HIGGINS, THE BEAST 133 (1909).
64 See Van Waters, supra note 44.
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procedural due process rights for juveniles in delinquency proceedings, but also,
subsequently, to sweeping punitive changes in the 1980s and 1990s. In both the
juvenile justice and child welfare systems, critics challenged the harmful impact
of state intervention on families and children of color. Second, courts began
recognizing children as rights-bearing persons with autonomy interests
independent of their parents and the state. Finally, advocates and scholars
challenged parental authority, arguing that strong parental rights are inimical to
the emerging personhood of children and to child wellbeing. In combination,
these legal developments have undermined the relatively simple Progressive era
framework of family regulation.
1. Challenging the Progressive Era Model of Juvenile Justice
The Progressive era model of juvenile justice began to decline in the
mid-twentieth century, and beginning in 1967, the Supreme Court responded by
extending procedural protections to youths facing delinquency adjudication. In
several opinions, the Court identified and sought to remedy what it deemed a
serious defect in the rehabilitative model of juvenile justice. 65 The Progressive
reformers who established the juvenile court system had insisted that
delinquency proceedings were not adversarial in nature because the state’s only
purpose in responding to youth crime was to act in the child’s interest; therefore,
young offenders had no need for defense counsel or for other protections
enjoyed by criminal defendants.66 This was always a shaky premise. Young
offenders cause social harm through their conduct; thus, the state’s interest is
not always aligned with that of delinquent youths. Instead, the state’s interest
inherently includes public safety—a reality that is well understood in the adult
criminal justice system.67 By the 1960s, liberal activists vigorously challenged the
fairness of informal juvenile delinquency proceedings, arguing that the interests
of many youths, and particularly youth of color, were harmed by a system
purportedly committed to their welfare. 68 Despite the insistence that the only
purpose of delinquency proceedings was rehabilitation, many youths were sent
to secure facilities more like prisons than treatment programs. 69
In In re Gault in 1967, the Court acknowledged that youths in
delinquency proceedings had “the worst of both worlds,” 70 receiving neither the
treatment promised under the rehabilitative model, nor the procedural
protections that adult defendants enjoy. In Gault and subsequent opinions,
juveniles were accorded the right to counsel, the right to confront witnesses, the
right to receive notice of charges, the privilege against self-incrimination, and
other due process protections. 71 The Court insisted that the juvenile court could
continue in its purpose of serving the interests of delinquent youths, but must

65 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Breed v. Jones, 421
U.S. 519 (1975).
66 See generally LINDSAY & HIGGINS, supra note 64 (articulating rehabilitative model of juvenile
justice).
67 See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 91-92.
68 See id. at 89-91.
69 See id.
70 Gault, 387 U.S. at 18 n.23.
71 See Winship, 397 U.S. at 368; Breed, 421 U.S. at 541.
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provide them with procedural rights as defensive tools against a state that, at
best, had mixed goals in responding to youth crime.
The challenge from the right, which reached full force in the late 1980s
and 1990s, posed a far more serious threat to the rehabilitative model than did
the earlier wave of procedural reforms. Conservatives attacked the rehabilitative
model itself and its core premise that promoting the interests of delinquent
youths was the juvenile court’s sole aim. These critics argued that the system
coddled young offenders, failing in its only legitimate goals of punishing
criminals and protecting the public. 72 An increase in violent youth crime
triggered a wave of public fear and hostility toward young offenders.
What ensued can fairly be described as a moral panic, in which
politicians, the media, and the public joined in attacking a system that was
perceived to be far too lenient and insufficiently concerned about public safety. 73
A new group of reformers, eager for radical change, embraced the mantra “adult
time for adult crime.” 74 In response, many state legislatures enacted laws
expanding the category of youths eligible for adult prosecution and
punishment. 75 In the juvenile system, the use of institutional placement increased
dramatically. 76 The core premise of the Progressive era system—that young
offenders were children and not criminals, and that they should be treated in a
separate justice system tailored to their needs—seemed to be forgotten.
Many factors contributed to this punitive legal response. Juvenile
recidivism rates generally were high, 77 providing strong evidence that the system
was failing in its promise of rehabilitation. This opened the door to critics who
argued that the naïve premise at the heart of the rehabilitative model had resulted
in a system that failed to recognize or accommodate society’s interest in public
safety and crime prevention. 78 Moreover, when these youths (especially older
72 See Alfred S. Regnery, Getting Away With Murder: Why the Juvenile Justice System Needs An
Overhaul, 34 POL’Y REV. 65, 65 (1985); Laura Stepp, The Crackdown on Juvenile Crime: Do Stricter Laws
Deter Youth?, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1994, at A1 (quoting a Maryland legislator to have said that,
“[i]f they want to do adult-type crimes, we're going to treat them like adults”); see also SCOTT &
STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 94-95 and accompanying footnotes (describing this view).
73 One 1989 study found that 70 percent of those questioned believed leniency in the juvenile
system was a contributing factor to violent youth crime. See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 157 (Timothy Flanagan & Kathleen Maguire eds., 1990); see also Elizabeth S. Scott,
Miller v. Alabama and the (Past and) Future of Juvenile Crime Regulation, 31 J. LAW & INEQUALITY 535,
537-41 (2013) (discussing moral panic surrounding juvenile crime).
74 See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 99.
75 During the three-year period between 1992 and 1995, eleven states lowered the age for
transfer, and ten states added crimes to judicial waiver statutes. See PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUV. JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PROGRAMS, STATE RESPONSES TO
SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME 3-8 (1996); see also discussion in SCOTT & STEINBERG,
supra note 6, at 96-99, and accompanying footnotes.
76 See Bradford Smith, Children in Custody: 20-Year Trends in Juvenile Detention, Correctional, and
Shelter Facilities, 44 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 526, 533 (1998) (documenting 45 percent increase in
juvenile detention from 1975 to 1995).
77 See VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, CHARTING A NEW COURSE: A BLUEPRINT FOR TRANSFORMING
JUVENILE JUSTICE IN NEW YORK STATE 10 (2009) (describing the high recidivism rate in New
York as one of the factors influencing the decision to move away from juvenile detention and
instead invest in more effective and cost-efficient community-based programs).
78 See, e.g., New Juvenile Code Would Come Down Hard on Teens, LUDINGTON DAILY NEWS, Jan. 15,
1996, at 1 (quoting Michigan Governor John Engler suggesting that the current juvenile justice
system was designed “for kids stealing hubcaps in the ‘50s, not for some of the things we see
today”).
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teens) caused serious harm, the narrative of wayward children in need of
guidance rang hollow, contributing to widespread disparagement of the system.
To be sure, the state’s interest included reforming young offenders so that they
might become productive adults, and if correctional interventions had been
effective, dissatisfaction likely would have been muted. But because the lenient
approach often was not effective, the failure to acknowledge society’s interest in
public safety corroded confidence. 79
Racial bias and fears also played a key role in the moral panic
surrounding youth crime—and in the legal reforms. By the 1990s, the image of
wayward children had been supplanted by frightening depictions of young
“superpredators” prowling inner-city streets in gangs, bent on murder and
mayhem. 80 These racialized images suggest a particularly ugly aspect of the
attitudes fueling the moral panic surrounding youth crime. The push for punitive
reforms was infused with racist assumptions about the identity of the youths
threatening society. 81 Research indicated that the public and legal actors
perceived youth of color as more mature, threatening, and deserving of harsh
punishment than their white counterparts. 82 In this racialized environment,
politicians and the public viewed teenagerss involved in crime not as children
but as criminals, who should be punished as such. 83
The second challenge to the Progressive rationale for state intervention
arose in the child welfare system. In that context, the goal of protecting children
from harm has been constant since the Progressive era, but the state generally
has been ineffective in attaining this goal, and intervention has focused
disproportionately on low-income families of color. Parental abuse and neglect
pose significant dangers to children, 84 but it is far from clear that the child
welfare system has improved outcomes, 85 particularly for the 443,000 children
in foster care. 86 Consistent with its historic practice of focusing on low-income
See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17-25 (1967).
See John DiIullio, The Coming of the Super-Predators, WKLY. STANDARD (Nov. 27, 1995, 12:00
AM), https://www.weeklystandard.com/john-j-dilulio-jr/the-coming-of-the-super-predators.
81 See DiIullio, id. (describing inner city youth in threatening terms). Ads aimed at generating
public support for a California referendum to increase the category of youths eligible for transfer
to criminal court were criticized as racist. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note _ at 102-108. See, also
Tamar R. Birkhead, The Racialization of Juvenile Justice and the Role of the Defense Attorney, 58 B.C. L.
REV. 379, 388 (2017(describing extent to which imagre and fear of youth crime were racialized).
82 See Sandra Graham & Brian Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent
Offenders, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 491-502 (2004)
83 The status offense system faced similar pressures to the juvenile justice system in the 1980s
and 1990s. See Lee Teitelbaum, Status Offenses and Status Offenders, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE, supra note 40, at 159, 159-72 (describing increased pressure to place status offenders in
detention under the “valid court order exception”).
84 See Child Abuse and Neglect: Consequences, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/childabuseandneglect/consequences.html.
85 U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., CHILD WELFARE OUTCOMES i-iii (2015),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cwo2015.pdf; Joseph J. Doyle, Jr., Causal effects of
foster care: An instrumental-variables approach, 35 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 1143 (2013). A recent
case underscores this ongoing problem. See M. D. by Stukenberg v. Abbott, 907 F.3d 237, 271-88
(5th Cir. 2018) (upholding much of trial court’s determination that Texas had violated the
constitutional rights of the approximately 13,000 children in foster care, including by exposing
them to abuse and neglect while in care; further, upholding much of a sweeping remedial order to
address the systemic problems).
86 See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 18 (2016); see U.S. DEP’T
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT #25 (2018).
79
80
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immigrant families, 87 Black, Native American, and Native Alaskan families are
overrepresented in the child welfare system today, and these children have worse
outcomes once they are removed from their homes. 88 The causes of the
disproportionality and disparate outcomes are disputed, 89 and numerous factors
likely play a role, 90 but this concern has led critics to challenge the legitimacy and
fairness of state regulation in this realm. 91
The child welfare system thus remains stubbornly problematic and, as
detailed in Part II, currently does not embody the Child Wellbeing framework.
An emerging consensus holds that the failures are due in large part to the
system’s focus on crisis intervention rather than on broad-based prevention and
family support.92 This reactive approach has marked the modern child welfare
system since Congress first considered federal funding in the early 1970s. 93
Cognizant of the growing unpopularity of anti-poverty programs, Congressional
supporters of a strong federal role strategically and effectively framed child
maltreatment as a problem of bad parenting, obscuring the strong correlation
between poverty and child maltreatment. 94 Substantial federal funding
See supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
For an overview of the racial disproportionalities in the child welfare system, see U.S. DEP’T
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUR., RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY AND DISPARITY IN
CHILD WELFARE, ISSUE BRIEF 3-5 (2016) (documenting the racial disproportionality index (RDI)
for Black children as 1.8 and Native American and Native Alaskan children as 2.8, as compared
with 0.9 for Latino children, 0.8 for white children, and 0.1 for Asian children); see id. at 3
(describing a reduction in the RDI for Black children, “from 2.5 in 2000 to 1.8 in 2014,” but an
increase for Native American and Native Alaskan children, “from 1.5 in 2000 to 2.7 in 2014”). For
an overview of the racial disparities in the child welfare system, see id. (showing that Native
American and Native Alaskan children as well as Black children exit foster care and are adopted
at lower rates than other racial and ethnic groups, but further showing that this RDI is somewhat
lower than the foster-care-entry RDI).
89 See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUR., supra note 88, at 5-6 (describing
the competing accounts and the evidence for each).
90 See ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., DISPARITIES AND DISPROPORTIONALITY IN CHILD WELFARE:
ANALYSIS OF THE RESEARCH (2011), http://www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/AECFDisparitiesAndDisproportionalityInChildWelfare-2011.pdf; ANDREA J. SEDLAK ET AL., U.S.
DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSES OF RACE DIFFERENCES IN
CHILD MALTREATMENT RATES IN THE NIS-4 (2010).
Although most low-income parents do not abuse or neglect their children, there is substantial
evidence that abuse and, especially, neglect are strongly correlated with poverty. See ANDREA J.
SEDLAK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOURTH NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY
OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (NIS-4): REPORT TO CONGRESS 12 (2010) (“Children in low
socioeconomic status households … [are] more than 3 times as likely to be abused and about 7
times as likely to be neglected” as children in other socioeconomic brackets).
91 See DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 267-76
(2003). But see Elizabeth Bartholet, The Racial Disproportionality Movement in Child Welfare: False Facts
and Dangerous Directions, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 871, 899-923 (2009) (arguing that racial disproportionality
for Black children reflects the underlying rate of child maltreatment of Black children, not racial
bias, and thus the solution is to address the risk factors present in Black families rather than the
child welfare system).
92 See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 175-212 (2005);
Clare Huntington, Mutual Dependency in Child Welfare, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1485, 14891505 (2007).
93 This approach has even deeper roots, beginning with the Progressive era child-savers. See
sources cite in supra note 47.
94 See supra note 90 (describing the correlation between socioeconomic status and child
maltreatment); see also BARBARA J. NELSON, MAKING AN ISSUE OF CHILD ABUSE: POLITICAL
AGENDA SETTING FOR SOCIAL PROBLEMS 15, 101-03 (1984
87
88
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followed, 95 but the problematic framing became embedded and is still firmly in
place. 96 Instead of preventive efforts to address poverty and promote family
functioning, most state intervention occurs only when maltreatment is
suspected—responding with either late-in-the-day family preservation services
or the removal of children, at substantial cost to taxpayers, child wellbeing, and
family autonomy. 97 This orientation has persisted across multiple policy swings;
in each iteration, federal and state policies dealing with child maltreatment have
emphasized crisis intervention, while subordinating proactive strategies aimed at
supporting families in need. 98 In short, the Progressivist rationale for state
intervention—protecting children from harm—has led to policies that most
observers agree have not promoted child wellbeing.
2. Children’s Rights: Conceiving of Children as Legal Persons
In the 1960s and 1970s, a children’s rights movement emerged, inspired
in part by the civil rights movement. 99 Advocates began to argue for recognition
of children as rights-bearing persons, with independent legal interests not
represented by their parents or the state. In re Gault, the landmark 1967 Supreme
Court opinion granting procedural rights to youths in delinquency proceedings,
heralded the movement. After Gault, the Court issued a series of opinions
granting constitutional rights to public school students. In Tinker v. Des Moines
Public School District, the Court proclaimed that students do not “shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech … at the schoolhouse gate,” 100 in
upholding the right of students to engage in silent, symbolic protest against the
Viet Nam war as an exercise of free expression. Although the Court qualified
this pronouncement in later opinions, restricting certain forms of student speech
in some contexts where the speech is found to undermine important educational
purposes,101 pure political expression in public school continues to receive
95 See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4, 7
(1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5103–5104).
96 See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 92, at 184-85.
97 See Clare Huntington, The Child-Welfare System and the Limits of Determinacy, 77 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 231-48 (2014); Emily Buss, Parents’ Rights and Parents Wronged, 57 OHIO ST.
L.J. 431, 440 (1996).
98 See Huntington, supra note 97, at 226-29 (describing these swings, from the 1970s to the
mid-1990s, with some statutory schemes prioritizing family preservation and others child
permanency, but arguing that neither approach is a meaningful attempt to prevent child abuse and
neglect and both reflect a crisis orientation). Most recently, as the opioid crisis created another
influx of foster children, Congress adopted legislation again prioritizing family preservation and
the provision of mental health and drug treatment services for parents. See Family First Prevention
Services Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-123, 132 Stat. 64 (2018).
99 See Henry H. Foster, Jr. & Doris J. Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343, 356
(1972). This Article focuses on children’s rights under American law, but the movement has been
global, with many other countries embracing children’s rights—both autonomy rights and
affirmative rights to state support—to a far greater degree than the United States, which is the
only country not to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. See
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx.
100 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
101 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007) (“[S]chools [may] restrict student expression
they reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use.”); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260, 272, 273 (1988) (holding that educators may exercise editorial control over the style and
content of a student newspaper “so long as their activities are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns”); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (holding that “The
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substantial protection. 102 Students also enjoy a right of religious exercise in
school, generally protected to the extent that other expression is protected, and
modest due process protection when facing school discipline. 103
Mature minors today also have the right to consent independently to a
range of medical treatments. The mature minor doctrine authorizes minors to
consent to routine, beneficial treatment, while under Minors’ Consent Statutes,
teenagers have access to treatment for substance abuse, sexually transmitted
diseases, and some reproductive health treatments. 104 But the most radical
departure from the law’s conventional view of childhood and of parental
authority was the recognition by the Supreme Court that a mature minor has a
right of access to abortion without parental involvement or state interference. 105
To be sure, minors’ reproductive rights are qualified as compared to those of
adults. The state can require parental consent but it must provide an alternative
means of access: A minor who chooses not to involve her parents can
demonstrate her maturity in a legal proceeding and thus legally consent to the
procedure. 106 But as a consequence of the Supreme Court’s abortion decisions,
parents are disqualified from participating in, or even knowing about, this
decision unless their mature child chooses to inform them.
The granting of rights to children over the past half century has
unsettled the early Progressive framework and raised many questions. First, it
made children more visible as legal persons, with interests not necessarily aligned
with those of their parents or served by the state’s paternalistic oversight. This
complicated the dyadic framework of family regulation, introducing the child
herself as a party whose autonomy interest and authority to make some decisions
is acknowledged. Indeed, children’s rights were understood conventionally as

first amendment does not prevent the school officials from determining that to permit a vulgar
and lewd speech such as respondents would undermine the school’s basic educational mission.”
and distinguishing Tinker because the penalties were unrelated to a political viewpoint).
102 See, e.g., Guiles ex rel. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 330 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the
First Amendment protected a student wearing a shirt that mocked President George W. Bush and
contained images of cocaine); Chandler v. McMinville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 530 (9th Cir.1992)
(holding that students wearing “scab” buttons to support a teachers’ strike were engaging in
protected speech). Some courts have allowed schools to regulate speech if it is deemed offensive.
See In The Interest of Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725, 732-33 (Wisc. 2001) (holding that the content
of a student’s story about the murder of their English teacher gave the school sufficient reason to
discipline the student).
103 See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 111-12 (2001); Bd. of Educ.
v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 235 (1990). The Court granted other constitutional rights to students,
although in a limited form. Thus, in New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Court held that public school students
have a legitimate expectation of privacy against unreasonable searches by school officials but
concluded that this interest is more limited than that of citizens outside of the school context. See
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985) (school search justified by reasonable suspicion
that it would produce evidence of an infraction or crime by the student). The Court also held that
a student facing a suspension from school of ten or fewer days is entitled to limited procedural
due process protection, an easily satisfied requirement. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975).
As a matter of statutory law and school district policy, some states and localities states provide for
more substantial procedural protections in the school disciplinary context than are required by
Goss. See, e.g, Restatement of Children and the Law, Sect. Council Draft 4. Sect. 8.10, Students
Right of Personal Expression in School (2019].
104 See infra Part IV.B.1.
105 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979); infra Part IV.B.1.a.
106 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643.
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liberty interests that inevitably compete with parental and state authority. 107 On
this view, children, like other groups who have struggled for civil rights,
represent a disadvantaged class of persons that has been subject to wrongful
subordination. 108 Some advocates and scholars embrace this characterization
and view the trend toward recognition of children’s rights as a battle against the
authority of traditional entities with power over children lives. 109 To an extent,
of course, this view of children’s rights is correct. When the law recognizes a
minor’s liberty interest—the right to make a reproductive health decision or
engage in political speech, for example—the control of her parents or the state
over this decision is diminished.
Second, the logic by which lawmakers extend some rights and privileges
to minors and withhold others until adulthood seems quite opaque. Minors enjoy
the right to consent to some medical decisions, but other healthcare decisions
require parental consent. 110 Public school students are granted the First
Amendment right of free expression, but this right often is restricted when
school officials suggest the state’s educational purposes might be undermined. 111
And youths enjoy many procedural rights in the justice system, but sometimes
are restricted in exercising those rights. 112 Also adult privileges are extended to
minors with minimum age requirements that sometimes seem puzzling. 113
Further, many adult rights and privileges are simply off the table. Minors cannot
execute a contract, lease an apartment, sign a will, vote, or (in many states)
marry. 114 Why are some rights conferred on minors and others withheld? The
law has not yet articulated a rationale to guide the determination of when
children will be recognized as rights-bearers and when they will continue to be
subject to parental and state authority.
Third, granting legal rights eroded the conception of childhood as a
nearly monolithic category. Legal regulation is now tailored based on age and
maturity for some purposes, while for others, all minors continue to be subject
to uniform treatment. This points to a more complex understanding of
childhood itself as a legal construct, suggesting that the interests and status of
adolescents sometimes differs from those of younger children. Rights and
privileges implicating an individual’s interest in self-determination usually apply
formally or functionally only to adolescents, 115 but what determines when,
107 See Robert B. Keiter, Privacy, Children, and Their Parents: Reflections On and Beyond the Supreme
Court’s Approach, 66 MINN. L. REV. 459, 460 (1982) (“The claimed right of a child to privacy in
individual matters inevitably clashes with the longstanding parental right of authority in directing
the child’s life.”) (internal citations omitted).
108 See Foster & Freed, supra note 99, at 356 (arguing that the rights of children are subject to
“[t]he same arguments that were advanced over the issues of slavery and the emancipation of
women”).
109 See Anne Dailey & Laura Rosenbury, The New Law of the Child, 127 YALE L.J. 1448, 1456
(2018); Katherine Hunt Federle, Children’s Rights and the Need for Protection, 34 FAM. L.Q. 421, 42140 (2000); James Dwyer, Parents’ Religion and Children’s Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents’ Rights,
82 CAL. L. REV. 1371, 1426-39 (1994); Keiter, supra note 107; Christopher Berk, Children,
Development, and the Troubled Foundations of Miller v. Alabama, 43 L. & Soc. Inquiry (2019).
110 See infra Part IV.B.1.c.
111 See supra text accompanying note 103.
112 See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
113 See infra Part IV.A
114 See infra Part IV.B.2.
115 This is true of reproductive rights and rights to make other medical decisions, and, in
practice it is also true of procedural rights in delinquency proceedings and even of free speech
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during children’s minority, particular rights are conferred? And even adolescents
depend on their parents for support and care, require special state protections,
and are not fully independent, responsible citizens. Thus, although some
advocates have favored categorical recognition of children as citizens entitled to
the rights enjoyed by adults,116 this move strikes most observers as impractical.
In short, there is considerable uncertainty about the contours of legal childhood.
Finally, the absence of a clear principle for extending and withholding
rights opened the door to criticism. Conservative detractors of children’s rights
have disparaged the notion that the law deems minors to be mature enough to
make independent abortion decisions without informing their parents, while
coddling them as children when they commit crimes. 117 These critics, including
Justice Scalia, have dismissed the law’s stance as illogical and chastised child
advocates as hypocrites, whose depiction of the attributes of legal minors shifts
to suit their political purposes. 118 To Scalia and others, it made no sense to treat
minors as adults in one context and as children in need of protection in another.
3. Parental Rights under Siege
The recognition of children as legal persons has been an important
catalyst for critical scrutiny of parental rights, adding further instability to the
regulatory framework of the late twentieth century. Some critics have argued that
the law’s excessive deference to parental authority is an outdated vestige of an
era when parents effectively owned their children. 119 On this view, strong
parental rights give parents a license to act in ways that further their own interests
and not those of their children. Moreover, parental rights continue to be
grounded primarily in biology, adoption, or marriage, often affording little
protection to the relationships between children and adults who do not fall into
these categories but who nonetheless have a parent-child relationship with the
child. 120
A modern understanding of the family rejects the view of the legal
family as a social entity in which members’ interests are aligned and represented
by parents. Instead, scholars often depict the contemporary family as a loose
rights in school, where litigation has involved almost exclusively middle- and high-school students.
See infra text accompanying notes 360-361 & 373.
116 See JOHN HOLT, ESCAPE FROM CHILDHOOD 18-19 (1974) (advocating for equal legal
treatment for children in all areas); Gary Melton, Children’s Law: Towards a New Realism, 25 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 3, 9 (2001); Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking Ahead: An Empowerment Perspective on the
Rights of Children, 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 1585, 1593-99 (1995).
117 See, e.g., Brief Amici Curae of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops and Roman
Catholic Bishop of Manchester in Support of Petitioner, p. 15, Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of
Northern New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006) (arguing that parental involvement in decisionmaking
on abortion is critical due, in part, to the Court’s comments as to the susceptibility and
impetuousness of adolescents in Roper). See generally Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less
Mature Than Adults? Minors’ Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “FlipFlop,” 64 AM. PSYCHOL. 583 (2009).
118 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 617-21 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing fellow
justices and the American Psychological Association for selective use of research in opinions
holding that minors were as capable as adults to make abortion decisions, but too immature to be
held fully responsible for a capital crime).
119 See, e.g., Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 109, at 1457-58; Woodhouse, supra note 38, at 111317; Dwyer, supra note 104, at 1373.
120 See infra text accompanying notes 133-135.
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association of self-interested individuals. 121 When the family is constructed in
this way, parental control and authority over children become problematic.
James Dwyer, a particularly vocal critic of parental rights, has questioned why
the subjugated legal status of children continues to be acceptable in a country in
which the idea of one person’s ownership of another should be highly offensive.
Dwyer observes that outside of the parent-child relationship, an individual is
seldom subject categorically to the control of another person; 122 for example, he
notes that legal guardianship of an incapacitated person is highly regulated and
only permissible under narrow circumstances. 123
A recent critique by Anne Dailey and Laura Rosenbury also targets
parental rights as a core element of legal regulation that privileges state and
parental control over children. 124 On their view, this “authorities framework”
reduces the question of legal regulation to a battle between parents and the state,
with children’s interests portrayed simply as dependency and the attainment of
autonomy. 125 Dailey and Rosenbury expand the range of children’s interests and
propose a tripartite framework for legal regulation focusing on relationships
(between the child and a range of other persons), responsibilities (of adults to
provide for children and satisfy their needs), and rights (of both children and
parents, but mostly affirmative rights of children to relationships, goods, and
services). 126 Their approach de-emphasizes parental rights, except for very young
children, and elevates children’s interests. 127
Some legal contexts have generated particular concern about parental
authority over their children’s lives. For example, parents have broad authority
to make medical decisions for their children and the obligation to provide
necessary treatment. 128 But parents are protected when they decline to seek
medical treatment for religious reasons: In the 1970s, in response to a lobbying
campaign by Christian Science groups, most states enacted religious
accommodation statutes that protect parents from findings of medical neglect
when they decline medical treatment for their children on religious grounds. 129
These laws were enacted with little opposition, a testament to the lack of
controversy surrounding parental rights when asserted by parents with social and
political clout. 130 Controversy arose only when children with treatable medical

121 See, e.g., JOANNA GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE
FAMILY IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 22-23 (2011); William Galston, Liberal Virtues, 82 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 1277, 1282 (1988).
122 See Dwyer, supra note 104, at 1373.
123 See id.
124 See Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 109, at 1470, 1506-07.
125 See id. at 1467-77.
126 See id. at 1506-36.
127 See id. at 1471-72, 1508-11 (arguing that parental rights are an important protection for the
stability of the parent-child relationship during a child’s “early years,” but more generally
contending that parental rights “are a circuitous and unreliable means” of furthering children’s
interests). As we show in Part III, critics, including Dailey and Rosenbury, fail to acknowledge that
restricting parental rights means that the state will have an expanded role as decision maker when
a surrogate is required, a move that we argue is unlikely to promote child wellbeing.
128 See infra Part III.B.3.
129 Allison Ciullo, Prosecution Without Persecution: The Inability of Courts to Recognize Christian Science
Spiritual Healing and a Shift towards Legislative Action, 42 NEW ENG. L. REV. 155, 170 (2007).
130 See Scott St. Amand, Protecting Neglect: The Constitutionality of Spiritual Healing Exemptions to
Child Protection Statutes, 12 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 139, 147–48 (2009); Janna C. Merrick, Spiritual
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conditions died due to lack of treatment, and some courts held that these civil
statutes protected parents from criminal liability for the deaths. 131 These cases
and others in which children suffered harm due to their parents’ failure to
provide necessary treatment became a catalyst for intense criticism of the law’s
protection of broad parental authority. 132
A different critique of parental rights flows from the significant changes
in family form over the last several decades, particularly the growing number of
families with same-sex parents. Strong parental rights protect a parent who has
either a biological or legal relationship to the child, but these rights have also
allowed that parent to exclude a co-parent who is not biologically or legally
related to the child but who functions as a parent. 133 Thus, scholars have
contended that the traditional legal definition of parent grounded in biology,
marriage, or adoption is unduly restrictive, excluding relationships in families
headed by same-sex parents from full legal protection and thereby sacrificing
child wellbeing. 134 Scholars have also criticized legal rules that treat unmarried
fathers differently from married fathers. 135
Despite these challenges, parental rights continue to receive substantial
deference in American law. In 2000, the Supreme Court in Troxel v. Granville
affirmed the constitutional status of parental rights, citing the foundational
opinions from the 1920s. 136 Moreover, many scholars and advocates defend
parental rights as a shield against excessive state intervention based on racial and
cultural biases against parenting practices that offend middle class sensibilities
but do not threaten serious harm to children. 137 And proponents who seek the
protection of the relationship between de facto parents and their children
challenge only the definition of parent, not parental rights per se. 138 But
advocates of parental rights today do not justify those rights by arguing parents
own their children, and the libertarian rationale, while valid, does not adequately
account for children’s interests or establish a limit on parental authority. The
legitimacy of robust parental rights depends on a comprehensive rationale that
is compatible with contemporary values.

Healing, Sick Kids and the Law: Inequities in the American Healthcare System, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 269,
278 (2003).
131 See, e.g., Hermanson v. State, 604 So.2d 775, 782-83 (1992) (holding that allowing
prosecution was a violation of due process).
132 See Dwyer, supra note 104, at 1400; Woodhouse, supra note 38, at 1110-11. For a discussion
of compulsory vaccination laws and the criticism that religious and philosophical exemptions
endanger public health, see infra notes 298-301.
133 See Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1185,
1212-29 (2016). As we explain below, see infra Part III.B.3, many states have addressed this through
the recognition of de facto parents, but this is a relatively recent development.
134 See Nancy Polikoff, Concord With Which Other Families?: Marriage Equality, Family Demographics,
and Race, 164 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 99, 101 (2016); Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood,
126 YALE L.J. 2260, 2264 (2017); Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal
Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 394-409 (2008).
135 See, e.g., Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for Nonmarital Families, 67
STAN. L. REV. 167, 224-31 (2015) (arguing that unmarried fathers should have similar default rules
for both parentage and custody as married fathers).
136 530 U.S. 57, 65-67 (2000).
137 See ROBERTS, supra note 92, at 51-67; GUGGENHEIM, supra note 92, at __; Wendy A. Bach,
Flourishing Rights, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1061, 1073-76 (2015).
138 See supra note 134.
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***
Legal developments in the late twentieth century have destabilized the
Progressive era dyadic framework governing legal regulation of children and
families and generated uncertainty about assumptions and principles that at one
time were seldom challenged. First, although the state’s role of promoting child
wellbeing continues to have strong intuitive appeal, the failures of both the
juvenile justice and child welfare systems have made clear that benign intentions
can falter and are inadequate as the foundation for law and policy. Moreover, in
both systems, racial and class bias have infected policies and practices and
undermined the legitimacy of the state’s role. Parental authority, the other pole
supporting the framework, is under attack and appears to stand on weaker
ground than in earlier times. Finally, the children’s rights movement has
complicated the law’s conception of childhood, and no clear principles have
guided the process of extending rights and privileges to children and withholding
others until adulthood. In sum, by the dawn of the twenty-first century, the
regulation of children since the Progressive era had become more complex, less
stable, and in need of comprehensive revision.
II. AN EMERGING FRAMEWORK: REVIVING CHILD WELLBEING
In this Part, we demonstrate that a new legal framework governing the
regulation of children and families has begun to emerge—what we call the Child
Wellbeing framework. We identify and explicate the core elements of this
framework in twenty-first-century juvenile justice reforms, and we note that it
has also begun to influence family-support policies. Ultimately, however, the
importance of this framework is far broader. As we show in Parts III and IV, it
brings a measure of coherence to the complex legal developments of the past
half century, uncovering a deep structure and logic of modern regulation of
children across multiple domains.
The animating principle of the framework is that the goal of legal
regulation is to promote child wellbeing. This may seem unpromising as a
starting point—a naive and nostalgic revival of the Progressive era ideal that
continues to be widely endorsed but has proved to be fragile as a principle
governing regulation. But three features of the contemporary framework
distinguish it from its predecessor and reinforce its stability. First, modern childcentered attitudes do not rest on the simplistic view of childhood that shaped,
and ultimately undermined, the Progressive era goals. 139 Instead, twenty-firstcentury regulation increasingly is based on a large body of psychological and
biological research on child and adolescent development, as well as research on
effective policies. This empirical knowledge makes it possible to further child
wellbeing with much greater sophistication and effect than was possible during
the Progressive era. Second, lawmakers and the public increasingly have
embraced laws and policies that promote child wellbeing on the ground that
139 The Progressives embraced the new science of adolescence, but the state of knowledge was
rudimentary and speculative a century ago. G. STANLEY HALL, ADOLESCENCE (1904). Progressives
also lumped adolescents with younger children for strategic purposes in furtherance of their goal
of expanding the boundary of childhood. See MIRIAM VAN WATERS, YOUTH IN CONFLICT 3 (1925);
Mack, supra note 45, at 107.
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these policies also promote social welfare. This recognition that effective policies
not only promote children’s interest but also advance social welfare seems
unremarkable, but historically, society’s interest received surprisingly little
attention. Early Progressives focused optimistically on children’s welfare in
advocating for reform, often ignoring the public interest, with devastating
consequences when apparent conflicts arose. Today it seems clear that a
foundation reinforced by collective self-interest is more solid than one based on
benign paternalism alone. And third, the Child Wellbeing framework recognizes
the serious threat of racial and class bias to the fairness and legitimacy of state
regulation of children. Although we are far from eradicating these insidious
influences, there is a growing awareness of the ways that the law has failed
children and families of color. The Child Wellbeing framework thus underscores
the need to address systemic bias and structural inequality.
A. Juvenile Justice Reform: The Embodiment of the New Framework
This section sketches the emergence of the Child Wellbeing framework
in juvenile justice reforms in the early twenty-first century. We first describe the
now familiar factors that contributed to the dramatic legal changes in the juvenile
justice system during this period and then elaborate on how the reforms embody
the elements of the Child Wellbeing framework: incorporation of developmental
knowledge, convergence of adolescent wellbeing and social welfare, and
recognition of the pernicious role of racial bias.
1. Catalysts for Reform
The moral panic surrounding juvenile crime in the 1990s began to
subside in the early years of the twenty-first century, as juvenile crime rates
declined steadily. 140 This calmer climate, in turn, made possible the reemergence
of more benign attitudes toward youth and an openness to reform of punitive
policies. Observers pointed to the offensive racist underpinnings of the response
to youth crime in the 1990s, when the youth of juvenile offenders was largely
ignored in a climate of fear and outrage. 141 Other factors also contributed to the
trend away from punitive policies. First, economic developments played a key
role; as the recession of 2008 strained state budgets, lawmakers were forced to
confront the high cost of incarceration-based policies, which diverted funds
from education and other critical state services. 142 Second, evidence mounted
that costly punitive policies were ineffective at reducing recidivism in juvenile
offenders, one of their primary objectives. Many studies showed that youths sent
to institutions were more likely to re-offend than those who remained in their
140 The decline in juvenile crime began in the mid-1990s but was acknowledged only after the
trend was well established for several years. In 2000, for example, California voters approved a
referendum facilitating prosecution of juveniles as adults, despite the fact that crime rates in the
state had been declining for several years. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 109-112.
141 See generally DARNELL HAWKINS, OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN: CONFRONTING RACIAL
INEQUITIES IN AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE (2005).
142 Secure placement in juvenile institutions was expensive; in some states upward of $215,000
a year for each youth subject to placement, while community-based programs were far less
expensive, often $5,000 per youth. See Elizabeth Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Social Welfare and
Fairness in Juvenile Crime Regulation, 71 LA. L. REV. 35, 45, 77 (2010).
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communities. 143 Moreover, a substantial body of research showed that not only
were some community-based correctional programs for juveniles very effective
at reducing recidivism, but they did so at a fraction of the cost of incarceration. 144
Another important catalyst for reform was the Supreme Court, which
signaled powerfully in a series of opinions that lawmakers should attend to
differences between youths and their adult counterparts. Most important were
four Eighth Amendment opinions, beginning in 2005, dealing with challenges to
harsh adult sentences (the death penalty and life without parole) imposed on
juvenile offenders under state laws. 145 The Court held that these laws violated
the Constitution as applied to juveniles, finding that a sentence that might be
appropriate for an adult criminal was disproportionate for a juvenile, due to the
youthful immaturity of young offenders. 146
These opinions directly affected only a small category of young
offenders convicted of the most serious crimes, but their impact on justice
system reform has been far broader. Our nation’s highest court announced that
“children are different” from adults,147 signaling a changed view of teenagers
involved in crime than the dominant trope a decade before; under “evolving
standards of decency,” 148 young offenders are not incorrigible criminals, but
immature and reckless adolescents. 149 Moreover, the Court increasingly drew on
scientific research to explicate how developmental factors influence teenage
offending and explained that because of these differences, children in the justice
system should be subject to more lenient sanctions than adults.
Courts and legislatures across the country have cited the sentencing
opinions and the underlying developmental research in support of a broad range
of reforms that recognize the special status of young offenders: These include
143 See National Research Council, Reforming Juvenile Justice: A Developmental Approach
414-429 (2013); Jeffrey Fagan, Aaron Kupchik & Akiva Liberman, Be Careful What You Wish for:
The Comparative Impacts of Juvenile versus Criminal Court Sanctions on Recidivism among Adolescent Felony
Offenders, Columbia Law School, Pub. Law Research Paper No. 03-61, at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=491202 (2003).
144 See supra note 142; SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 181; PETER GREENWOOD,
CHANGING LIVES: DELINQUENCY PREVENTION AS CRIME CONTROL POLICY (2006).
145 See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736-37 (2016); Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Miller,
132 S. Ct. at 2465; Roper, 543 U.S. at 573. The Court also recognized the immaturity of youth in a
different justice system context. In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Court held that the age of a youth
questioned by police must be considered to determine whether he or she is in custody, requiring
Miranda warnings. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 265 (2011).
146 See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct at 736-37; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465; Roper, 543 U.S. at 573; Graham,
560 U.S. at 68. On the basis of this proportionality analysis, the Court identified three differences
between juvenile and adult offenders: First, the criminal choices of juveniles are less culpable than
those of adult counterparts because they are driven by developmental influences associated with
adolescence. Second, because much adolescent crime is a product of youthful immaturity, juvenile
offenders have a greater potential for reform than do adults, and they should be given the
opportunity to do so. Sentences of death or life without parole foreclose any such opportunity.
Third, the Court observed that the harsh sentences received by the petitioners might be due to
juveniles’ more limited ability to navigate the justice process, as compared to adults. See Graham
v. United States, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465, 2468 (2005);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005).
147 Miller, page cite.
148 Id. at _ (applying the Eighth Amendment test).
149 Id. at 2470. For an in-depth analysis, see ELIZABETH SCOTT ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT
AND
THE
TRANSFORMATION
OF
JUVENILE
SENTENCING
(2015),
http://www.modelsforchange.net/publications/778.
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general restrictions on sentences imposed on juveniles, 150 reforms of conditions
in correctional facilities, 151 protections for youths in police interrogation, 152 and
exclusion of juveniles from sex offender registries.153
Fortuitously, the Supreme Court’s use of developmental research in the
Eighth Amendment opinions directed lawmakers’ attention to empirical studies
on adolescence at a time when the research was expanding dramatically. This
growing body of behavioral and biological research on adolescence has
profoundly influenced the direction and shape of justice system reforms in the
early twenty-first century. 154 Developmental brain research seems to be more
compelling to regulators and the public than behavioral research, perhaps
because differences between adult and adolescents’ brain functioning and
structure can be observed physically. 155 In any event, neuroscience research is
often invoked by politicians and courts in support of differential treatment of
juvenile offenders. 156
2. Modern Juvenile Justice Policy
In the twenty-first century, a new conceptual framework has begun to
define juvenile crime regulation. Youth justice policy today embraces adolescent
wellbeing as a central goal, but with particular attention to the relationship
between youth welfare and social welfare, a commitment to reducing racial bias,
and with an insistence that these objectives will be promoted most effectively by
grounding regulation in developmental knowledge. This section shows how the
contemporary framework has shaped the legal response to youth crime, reducing
institutional placement and tailoring programs to the needs of adolescents. 157
To begin, developmental brain research has played a pivotal role in
justice policy in several ways. First, the research has reinforced the premise that
See State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa 2014).
See V.W. v. Conway 236 F. Supp. 3d. 554 (N.D.N.Y 2017) (citing sentencing opinions in
granting preliminary injunction against use of solitary confinement with juveniles).
152 J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 265.
153 In re C.P. 967 N.E.2d 729, 732 (Ohio 2012).
154 The MacArthur Foundation was an important catalyst for the developmental juvenile justice
reforms, sponsoring the influential Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile
Justice from 1995 to 2005, followed by its Models for Change program, initiating reforms in several
states. The Foundation later supported developmental brain research through its Research
Network on Neuroscience and Criminal Law. See MODELS FOR CHANGE: ABOUT,
http://www.modelsforchange.net/about/index.html.
155 See Alexandra O. Cohen et al., When is an Adolescent an Adult? Assessing Cognitive Control in
Emotional and Nonemotional Contexts, 27 PSYCHOL. SCI. 549, 550, 559-560 (2016).
156 See Laurence Steinberg, The Influence of Neuroscience on U.S. Supreme Court Decisions Involving
Adolescents’ Criminal Culpability, 14 NATURE REV. NEUROSCIENCE 513, 514 (2013).
157 Significant shifts in the status offense system also reflect the Child Wellbeing framework.
States reformed the system based on research demonstrating the effectiveness of offering services
to adolescents rather than bringing youth into the court system, an understanding that promoting
adolescent wellbeing furthers social welfare, and a concern about racial disproportionality. See J.
Russell Jackson, C.H.I.N.S. Status Offender Reform in Georgia, Emory University Barton Center
(Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.slideshare.net/bartoncenter/children-in-need-of-services. States
regularly use diversion programs to keep potential status offense petitions out of court and provide
the services needed to address the issues underlying the behavior. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 1511-380 (West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 39E (West 2018). Another change
reflecting the Child Wellbeing framework is the federal reform in 2018, which sought to limit
detention of status offenders. See Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115–385, §
150

151
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juveniles are less culpable than their adult counterparts because much teenage
offending is influenced by developmental factors beyond the control of the
individual youth. 158 Courts and other regulators have pointed to several
mitigating influences on adolescent criminal choices linked to interrelated
features of brain development. Adolescents are more inclined toward sensationseeking and have a reduced capacity to control impulses or to regulate emotions
as compared to adults. 159 They also are far more susceptible to the influence of
peers than are either children or adults. 160 These tendencies are strongly
correlated with the inclination to engage in crime (and other risky activities). 161
Second, developmental research confirms that typical adolescent
offenders have the potential to reform. 162 Because juvenile crime is usually a
product of immaturity, most young offenders are likely to desist as they mature
to adulthood. In fact, the age-crime curve consistently shows that crime rates
peak at age seventeen and sharply decline thereafter, 163 debunking the 1990s
assumption that a large percentage of delinquents are incipient career criminals.
Modern lawmakers have recognized that most delinquent youths have
reasonable prospects of becoming productive adults. 164 This realization has
focused attention on the importance of correctional responses that facilitate the
transition to non-criminal adulthood.
Reinforcing this response is another body of developmental research
that confirms (unsurprisingly) that biology alone does not determine the course
of adolescent development. Social development is a process of reciprocal
interaction between the individual and her social context. 165 A healthy social
context provides the conditions for the attainment of skills and capacities that
are important to successful adult functioning in relationship and employment
roles and generally as an independent responsible individual. 166 Of course, social
223(11)(A), 132 Stat. 5123 (2018) (codified at 34 U.S.C. § 11133). The new approach has led to a
sharp decrease in the population of status offenders over the past decade. See OFFICE JUV. JUSTICE
& DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, STATISTICAL BRIEFING BOOK, PETITIONED STATUS OFFENSE
CASES, https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/court/qa06601.asp?qaDate=2015.
158 See Steinberg, supra note 156, at 516.
159 See Cohen et al., supra note 155, at 550, 559-560.
160 See id.; Jason Chein et al., Peers Increase Adolescent Risk Taking by Enhancing Activity in the Brain’s
Reward Circuitry, 14 DEV. SCI. F1, F2 (2011) (describing developments in the social brain).
161 See Elizabeth Scott, Natasha Duell, & Laurence Steinberg, Brain Development, Social Context,
and Justice Policy, 57 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 13, 16-17 (2018); Steinberg, supra note 156, at 516-16.
Neuroscientists also have found an imbalance between changes in brain development in early
adolescence that encourage impulsivity and the slower development of the parts of the brain that
govern executive functions, such as emotional regulation, which mature into early adulthood. Id.
at 559-60
162 See LAURENCE STEINBERG, AGE OF OPPORTUNITY: LESSONS FROM THE NEW SCIENCE OF
ADOLESCENCE 18-45 (2014).
163 See Alex Piquero et al., The Criminal Career Paradigm, 30 CRIME & JUST. 359, 370 (2003).
164 See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012); Graham v. United States, 560 U.S.
48, 68 (2010).
165 See Leah H. Somerville et al., A Time of Change: Behavioral and Neural Correlates of Adolescent
Sensitivity to Appetitive and Aversive Environmental Cues, 72 BRAIN COGNITION 124, 124-133 (2010).
166 See Laurence Steinberg et al., Reentry of Young Offenders from the Justice System: A Developmental
Perspective, 1 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 21 (2004). These conditions include an authoritative
parent figure, contact with pro-social peers, and opportunities for autonomous decisionmaking
and critical thinking See Laurence Steinberg, We Know Some Things: Parent-Adolescent Relationships in
Retrospect and Prospect, 11 J. RES. & ADOLESCENCE 7, 15 (2001); Bradford Brown & James Larson,
Peer Relationships in Adolescence, in 2 HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY 74, 95 (Richard M.
Lerner & Laurence Steinberg eds., 3d ed. 2009); Urie Bronfenbrenner & Pamela Morris, The
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context can also impede healthy maturation. The teen whose social context
consists of neglectful or abusive parents, anti-social peers, and a lack of engaging
educational or extracurricular activities is far less likely to make a successful
transition to adulthood. 167
For young offenders, correctional programs and facilities constitute
their social context, and modern justice system regulators increasingly have
embraced the lessons offered by this research. One key lesson is that prison-like
institutional settings constitute toxic developmental contexts; and in most states,
policymakers have reduced incarceration of juvenile offenders dramatically. 168
The combination of hostile adult custodians, anti-social peer and adult role
models, limited educational and other programs, and a highly restrictive setting
together undermine healthy maturation. Instead, lawmakers across the country
have shifted resources to localities to support community-based programs that
seek to provide the conditions and interventions that support healthy
development. 169 These programs allow young offenders to remain in or close to
home and, thus, are far more humane than placement in institutions far from
young offenders’ communities. In short, modern correctional programs are
tailored to provide what has been missing from many delinquent youths’ lives—
a social context that can assist them in attaining maturity and pursuing pro-social
goals.
Social welfare is also advanced by the recent justice system reforms.
Contemporary juvenile correctional programs have been shown to be more
effective in reducing recidivism at a lower cost than more costly interventions in
the 1990s, which often involved incarceration and did little to reduce
offending. 170 Several evidence-based programs have repeatedly been found to
reduce recidivism when compared to both incarceration and traditional
probation programs. 171 Further, cost-benefit analyses of the most popular
programs have shown that investments produce a substantial return in dollars
saved through crime reduction. 172 The success of these programs confirms that
justice policies aimed at furthering the wellbeing of teenage offenders also
promote the interests of society in reducing crime and conserving public
resources.
Finally, the intersection of race and juvenile justice policy has become a
more salient focus of policy concern in the twenty-first century than it was in
earlier times. Research has found disproportionate treatment of youth of color
Bioecological Model of Human Development, in 1 HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 793, 822 (6th rev.
ed. 2006).
167 See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 58.
168 Reforming Juvenile Justice: A Developmental Approach (2013), National Academy of
Science at nap.edu.
169 The most effective programs seek to empower parents to fulfill their role more effectively
and when that is not possible to substitute other adult parent figures who can provide structure
and support to delinquent youths. These programs facilitate pro-social peer interactions as well,
providing youths with the tools to avoid the influence of anti-social peers in school and in the
community setting. They also provide a range of other interventions that support youths, respond
to their needs and assist them in acquiring the skills they need to make the transition to adulthood.
See Steinberg, supra note 166, at 15-16.
170 See STEVE AOS ET AL., WASH. ST. INST. PUB. POL’Y, THE COMPARATIVE COSTS AND
BENEFITS OF PROGRAMS TO REDUCE CRIME 8 (2001).
171 See id.
172 Studies of Multisystemic Therapy, one of the most established and successful correctional
programs for youth, have found savings of six dollars for each dollar invested. See id.
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at every stage of the justice system process. They are more likely than white
counterparts to have police contact, to be arrested, charged, and subject to
delinquency proceedings; once formally adjudicated, they are more likely to be
confined and removed from their communities. 173 Moreover, youth of color
disproportionately enter the justice system from school under tough school
discipline policies, sometimes mandated under state law. 174 In recent years,
lawmakers and advocates have sought to reduce racial and ethnic disparities
through training and the use of decision models that expose and reduce racial
biases in deliberations and choices by system actors and school officials.175
At this point, progress has been limited. The modern period has seen
dramatic reductions in the numbers of youth who are subject to justice system
intervention, and less punitive treatment of most youth in that system. These
trends have benefited youth of color, who were disproportionately represented
in the justice system of the 1990s. But patterns of racial disproportionality
continue to exist, despite the reforms. The aspiration to reduce racial disparity
and commitment to finding the means to attain this goal define a critical
challenge that lies ahead. For now, the problem is increasingly front and center,
amplified by advocates, and demanding the attention of lawmakers, system
actors, and the public.176
In these ways, youth justice policy today increasingly embodies the
essential elements of the Child Wellbeing framework, promoting the interests of
youths in the justice system more effectively than the Progressive-era approach
or the punitive response of the 1990s. Current law and policy also offer the
173 See Joshua Rovner, Racial Disparities in Youth Commitments and Arrests, THE SENTENCING
PROJECT (2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/racial-disparities-in-youthcommitments-and-arrests; see also J.L. Lauritsen, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Juvenile Offending, in
OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN
JUVENILE JUSTICE, 83-104 (D.F. Hawkins & K. Kempf-Leonard, eds., 2005).
174 See, e.g., Allison R. Brown, Federal Spotlight on School-to-Prison Pipeline, 32 No.2 CHILDLP 31,
31 (2013) (“The school-to-prison pipeline is a cacophonous mash-up of numerous factors,
including zero-tolerance student-discipline policies, that contribute to (1) in the short term, the
exclusion of children, disproportionately children of color, from the regular classroom
environment as a means of punishment; and (2) in the long term, the entanglement of children,
disproportionately children of color, in the criminal-justice system.”); Judith A.M. Scully,
Examining and Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline: Strategies for A Better Future, 68 ARK. L. REV.
959, 959–60 (2016) (describing how school-disciplinary policies push youth of color into justice
system and out of public school); Danielle Dankner, No Child Left Behind Bars: Suspending Willful
Defiance to Disassemble the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 51 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 577, 577 (2018) (similarly
describing impact of harsh school discipline policies).
175 To reduce racial bias in decisions about pre-adjudication detention, for example, some states
have adopted protocols aimed to reduce detention, with particular impact on youth of color. See
generally ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., JUVENILE DETENTION ALTERNATIVES INITIATIVE: INSIGHTS
FROM THE ANNUAL RESULTS REPORT (2017) (hereinafter JDAI); see also National Juvenile Justice
Network, Reducing Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Juvenile Justice System (2004),
http://www.njjn.org/uploads/digital-library/RED-Policy-Update-0914-FINAL.pdf. The Obama
administration issued a directive that schools monitor and record the race of youths subject to
discipline. This directive was reversed by the Trump administration. See discussion infra note 354.
176 See Juvenile Law Center, Youth in the Justice System, https://jlc.org/youth-justice (“Racism
pervades our justice system, leading to the arrest, prosecution, adjudication and incarceration of
disproportionately greater numbers of youth of color than white youth, even while youth offending
patterns are relatively similar. Moreover, fines and fees imposed on youth create an unfair system
of “justice by income,” where children in poverty face an increased risk of incarceration, while
more affluent youth receive effective community-based treatment. Justice should not be based on
the color of a child’s skin, where a child lives, or the family’s income.”).
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promise of greater stability than earlier regimes because they achieve two social
welfare goals essential to long term viability—crime reduction and cost
effectiveness. It is not surprising that the Koch brothers and groups such Right
on Crime have lined up in support of developmentally-based policies. 177
Responses to youth crime that attend to the realities of adolescence offer the
best prospect of attaining social goals that have broad appeal across the political
spectrum—reducing crime and facilitating the transition of delinquent teenagers
to productive adulthood. Finally, the reality that racial disproportionality in the
justice system exists and must be addressed is no longer obscured. In the current
climate, the message that racial justice is an essential component to a fair and
legitimate response to juvenile crime is being heard, even if it has not yet been
successfully effectuated.178
The upshot is that reforms have resulted in substantial improvements
and in a shrinking of the justice system, but some sobering notes must be
sounded. Youths continue to receive harsh sentences in the adult system in some
jurisdictions, and, in the juvenile system, many states have undertaken only
modest reforms. 179 Finally, racialized character of the modern justice system
represents the most intractable failure of reform efforts and its greatest
challenge. 180
B. Direct Regulation of Families:
Nascent Glimmers of the Child Wellbeing Framework
Although most evident in reforms to the juvenile justice system, the
Child Wellbeing framework is also embodied in other areas of regulation in
which the state plays a direct role in the lives of children: state policies supporting
families and child welfare regulation. As this section describes, recent
investments in children and families are consistent with the Child Wellbeing
framework, as are a few modest reforms to the child welfare system. As with
juvenile justice, ample research points to the individual and societal benefits of
supporting families and preventing child abuse and neglect, but in contrast to
juvenile justice regulation, the state has done little to fundamentally alter its
approach. Formidable obstacles have impeded beneficial legal changes, creating
greater challenges to reform than exist in the juvenile justice system. In these
areas, then, much work remains to be done, and the Child Wellbeing framework
offers normative guidance more than explanatory power.

177 See Juvenile Justice, RIGHT ON CRIME, http://rightoncrime.com/category/priorityissues/juvenile-justice/.
178 See Juvenile Law Center, Future Interrupted: How Juvenile Records Disproportionate Affect Youth of
Color,
https://jlc.org/sites/default/files/attachments/2018-04/FutureInterrupedYouthofColor.pdf.
179 Id. at 25 (noting this and finding substantial disparities across states in the use of juvenile
detention).
180 See JOSHUA ROVNER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RACIAL DISPARITIES IN YOUTH
COMMITMENTS AND ARRESTS (2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/racialdisparities-in-youth-commitments-and-arrests; see also JDAI at 25. Similarly, CHINS petitions for
Black children have declined at a slower rate than other groups. See Sarah Hockenberry & Charles
Puzzanchera, NAT’L CTR. JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS: 2015, at 72-75 (2018).
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1. Policies of State Support
Despite an overall lack of state support for families, 181 a few
promising—albeit modest—recent investments show the influence of the Child
Wellbeing framework. The clearest example is the dramatic increase in funding
for early childhood education. 182 States across the political spectrum—from
Oklahoma to Vermont—have embraced prekindergarten as an effective and
efficient strategy for boosting academic achievement and addressing
inequality. 183 States and the federal government have thus increased spending
substantially, 184 significantly boosting preschool enrollment rates. 185 These
investments were the result of abundant research demonstrating the
effectiveness and economic efficiency of preschool, which in turn generated
widespread and bipartisan support for preschool spending. 186
Also compatible with the Child Wellbeing framework is Medicaid
expansion under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. 187 The
expansion does not increase the number of children receiving health care
because most low-income children were already covered, 188 but it benefits
children and promotes their wellbeing by supporting parents. Research
demonstrates that Medicaid expansion improves parental access to mental health
181 See Maxine Eichner, The Privatized American Family, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 213, 220-48
(2017) (describing how the United States assumes a limited role in supporting families, unlike other
wealthy nations, which use public funds to invest in universal programs such as lengthy paid
parental leave, no-cost or low-cost childcare, health care, child allowances, and much more); see
also DOWD, supra note 32, at 9-50 (arguing that the lack of state support particularly disadvantages
low-income children and children of color). There are some exceptions, of course, notably public
education and basic safety net programs, but overall state spending on family support lags far
behind other countries. See Eichner, supra, at 221-26.
182 The federal government has funded preschool through the Head Start program since 1965,
see https://eclkc.ohs.acf.hhs.gov/about-us/article/head-start-timeline, but this funding has not
come close to meeting the need for subsidized early childhood education, see http://nieer.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/05/State-of-Preschool-2017-Full.5.15.pdf at 14. For other examples of
state investments in family support, see NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGIS., FAMILY LEAVE RESOURCES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/paid-family-leave-resources.aspx
(describing paid parental leave legislation in California, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island).
183 For a description, see Clare Huntington, Early Childhood Development and the Replication of
Poverty, in HOLES IN THE SAFETY NET: FEDERALISM AND POVERTY (Ezra Rosser, ed. 2019).
184 See Louisa Diffey et. al., State Pre-K Funding 2016-17 Fiscal Year: Trends and Opportunities,
EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES 1 (Jan. 2017) (in 2017, states spent $7.4 billion a year, a 47%
increase from 2012); CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30952, HEAD START: BACKGROUND AND
FUNDING 21-22 (2014) (Congress appropriated $9.9 billion for Head Start in 2018, a significant
increase from the $6.2 billion appropriated in 2001).
185 See ALLISON H. FREIDMAN-KRAUSS, ET AL., NAT’L INST. FOR EARLY EDUC. RESEARCH, THE
STATE OF PRESCHOOL 2017, at 26 (2018) (44% of four-year-olds were enrolled in publicly funded
preschool in 2016-17 school year, a significant increase from previous years).
186 See supra notes __; KIRP, supra note __, at 76-92 (describing the numerous forces leading to
the state-level investments, including empirical research, foundation funding for pilot programs
and evaluation, and state-level political leadership); Charles Joughin, See Just How Much Congress
Increased Funding for Early Childhood Education, FIRST FIVE YEARS FUND (Mar. 23, 2018),
https://www.ffyf.org/see-just-much-congress-increased-funding-early-childhood-education/
(describing the bipartisan support for the 2018 increase in Head Start spending).
187 Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
188
See Health Insurance Coverage of Children 0-18, KAISER FAM. FOUND.,
https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/children-018/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22
asc%22%7D.
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services and substance abuse treatment, two conditions linked to child abuse and
neglect as well as poor family functioning generally. 189 Further, Medicaid
expansion has improved the finances of low-income families, 190 increased
employment rates,191 and promoted housing stability, 192 all of which benefit
children. Like investments in preschool, Medicaid expansion has been shown to
be cost-effective. 193 Despite initial resistance in politically conservative states, all
but fourteen states have now expanded Medicaid, including several states
adopting the expansion through ballot initiatives. 194
These are promising investments, but there are significant obstacles to
further reform. Entrenched libertarian values define the relationship of the state
to the family in the United States, valorizing family privacy and placing on
parents the weighty responsibility for rearing children. 195 Reforms to the juvenile
justice system do not implicate these values; a social and political consensus
exists that children’s criminal conduct necessitates a state response. Further, the
social welfare benefits of family support are both subtler and more remote than
those of effective justice policies. The average citizen is likely attuned to the costs
of juvenile crime but not the costs of kindergarten unpreparedness. Finally, the
public understands that state resources will be devoted to youth crime policy,
and thus are readily persuaded that these investments should be economically
efficient. By contrast, investments in children are politically vulnerable. 196
Notwithstanding these challenges, the reforms described in this section
are some evidence that lawmakers are beginning to redefine the state’s role,
reflecting a nascent understanding that promoting child wellbeing furthers social
welfare and equality and that research on effectiveness and cost efficiency can
See supra text accompanying note __.
See Jessie Cross-Call, Medicaid Expansion Continues to Benefit State Budgets, Contrary to Critics’
Claims,
CTR.
ON
BUDGET
&
POL’Y
PRIORITIES
(Oct.
9,
2018),
https://www.cbpp.org/health/medicaid-expansion-continues-to-benefit-state-budgets-contraryto-critics-claims .
191 See Kara Gavin, Medicaid Expansion Helped Enrollees Do Better at Work or in Job Searches, U. OF
MICH. HEALTH LAB (June 27, 2017, 9:20 AM), https://labblog.uofmhealth.org/industrydx/medicaid-expansion-helped-enrollees-do-better-at-work-or-job-searches; OHIO DEP’T OF
MEDICAID, 2018 OHIO MEDICAID GROUP VIII ASSESSMENT: A FOLLOW UP TO THE 2016 OHIO
MEDICAID
GROUP
VIII
ASSESSMENT
(2018),
http://medicaid.ohio.gov/Portals/0/Resources/Reports/Annual/Group-VIII-Final-Report.pdf.
192 See Emily Gallagher et al., The Effect of Health Insurance on Home Payment Delinquency: Evidence
from ACA Marketplace Subsidies, 172 J. PUB. ECON. (forthcoming 2019).
193 See Cross-Call, supra note 190; see also Hefei Wen, et al., The Effect of Medicaid Expansion on
Crime Reduction: Evidence from HIFA-Waiver Expansions, 154 J. PUB. ECON. 67 (2017; Jacob Vogler,
Access to Health Care and Criminal Behavior: Short-Run Evidence from the ACA Medicaid
Expansions, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3042267.
194 See Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, KAISER FAM. FOUND.,
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-medicaidunder-the-affordable-careact/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22
asc%22%7D ). But see Brian Neale, Director, Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to State
Medicaid Director re Opportunities to Promote Work and Community Engagement among
Medicaid Beneficiaries (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policyguidance/downloads/smd18002.pdf (allowing states to impose work requirements on some
recipients).
195 See Eichner, supra note 181, at 220-48.
196 See https://www.cbpp.org/research/an-update-on-state-budget-cuts (documenting the
state-level budget cuts following the 2008 recession, including cuts to health insurance for lowincome children and K-12 educational spending).
189
190
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help drive reform. The Child Wellbeing framework thus is embedded in these
emerging reforms and provides a solid blueprint for future efforts.
2. The Child Welfare System
In contrast to the significant reforms to the juvenile justice system and
the modest investments in family support, the child welfare system largely does
not embody the Child Wellbeing framework. Population-based prevention
efforts, such as Medicaid expansion, can help prevent child abuse and neglect,
but the child welfare system itself continues to focus primarily on crisis
management rather than preventing abuse and neglect. 197
The negative consequences for children that follow state intrusion can
be acute. Most concerning, state intervention can lead to the placement of the
child in foster care, temporarily or permanently disrupting the parent-child
relationship. 198 Substantial evidence demonstrates that state custody does not
generally improve child wellbeing, 199 and yet many children are currently in
foster care, 200 and the number is growing rapidly, largely as a result of the opioid
epidemic. 201 Given their overrepresentation in the child welfare system, 202 Black
and Native American children are disproportionately affected by the failures of
the system.
Despite the wide gap between the Child Wellbeing framework and the
child welfare system, two counterexamples should be noted. First, some child
welfare funding is dedicated to family-support programs, intended to serve the
wider community in an effort to strengthen families. 203 These programs offer
parenting education, social support, case management and referral services, child
care, adult education, and so on. 204 Research shows that these efforts improve
children’s cognitive development and social and emotional wellbeing, and they
improve parenting, although the impact on child maltreatment is not clear. 205
Second, the Affordable Care Act authorized federal funds for home-visiting
programs, to supplement existing state funding. 206 These programs improve
outcomes for both children and mothers, and there is some evidence that they
help reduce child maltreatment. 207
197 See Funding Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention Programs, CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY,
https://www.childwelfare.gov/topics/management/funding/program-areas/prevention/
(describing the limited available funding for prevention efforts); Clare Huntington, The Child
Welfare System and the Limits of Determinacy, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221 (2014)
(describing the durability of the crisis-orientation across multiple policy swings).
198 See supra text accompanying notes 85-98.
199 See supra text accompanying note 84.
200 See supra note 86.
201 See https://aspe.hhs.gov/child-welfare-and-substance-use.
202 See supra text accompanying note __.
203 See Promoting Safe and Stable Families Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-133, 115 Stat. 2413
(2002) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 629).
204 JEAN I. LAYZER ET AL., ABT ASSOCS., NATIONAL EVALUATION OF FAMILY SUPPORT
PROGRAMS: FINAL REPORT VOLUME A: THE META-ANALYSIS A5-1 (2001),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/fam_sup_vol_a.pdf.
205 See id. at A2-A24.
206 For a description of the original model, see About Us, NURSE-FAM. PARTNERSHIP
https://www.nursefamilypartnership.org/about/.
207 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. CHILDREN & FAM., HOME VISITING
EVIDENCE OF EFFECTIVENESS, https://homvee.acf.hhs.gov/Models.aspx.
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The child welfare system has also taken some small steps towards
reducing racial disproportionality and disparities. 208 Given their disproportionate
representation in the system, children of color benefit from overall prevention
programs, as from other reforms such as more effective models of legal
representation for parents. 209 More specifically, child welfare system reforms
such as alternative decisionmaking processes to counteract potential bias have
targeted each stage in the process. 210 For Native American and Native Alaskan
children, the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) provides statutory protections
for families, including a higher bar for the removal of children and procedural
protections to promote tribal decisionmaking, 211 but the foster-care entry rate of
these children remains troublingly high. 212
Taken together, these minimal reforms fit within the modern Child
Wellbeing framework: they improve child wellbeing, they are based in research,
they have clear social welfare benefits, including cost efficiency, and they attempt
to address racial and economic inequality. But at this point, the investments
reach a small fraction of those families who would benefit, 213 and the reforms
have had only a marginal impact on racial disproportionality. 214 In sum, there
has been little fundamental change in the child welfare system. It continues to
operate largely as a regime of crisis intervention, and racial disproportionality is
still a hallmark of the system.
3. A Blueprint for Reform
If the state fully embraced the Child Wellbeing framework, it would do
far more to support families and to prevent child abuse and neglect. The starting
point is research. Scholars in multiple fields, from psychology 215 and

208 See supra note 88 (describing the reduction in the racial disproportionality index (RDI) for
Black children entering foster care but not for Native American or Native Alaskan children, and
further noting that the RDI is lower for outcomes in care than for entry into care).
209 See Lucas A. Gerber et al., Effects of an interdisciplinary approach to parental representation in child
welfare, 102 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 42 (2019) (studying the effect of providing parents with
representation through an interdisciplinary law office, which includes social workers, parent
advocates, and attorneys, and finding that such representation significantly reduced the amount of
time a child spent in foster care without compromising safety).
210 See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 88, at 7-17.
211 For a description of ICWA, including the historical injustices towards Native American
families that led to the law, the current constitutional challenges to it, and an explanation of the
legal principles establishing that “Native American” is not considered a racial category, see Sarah
Krakoff, They Were Here First: American Indian Tribes, Race, and the Constitutional Minimum, 69 STAN.
L. REV. 491, 501-17 (2017).
212 See supra note 88.
213 See Maternal, Infant, and Early Childhood Home Visiting Program FY 2017 Formula Funding
Awards, U.S. HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., https://mchb.hrsa.gov/maternal-child-healthinitiatives/home-visiting/fy17-home-visiting-awards (last updated Sept. 2017) (only $342 million
allocated for home visiting in 2017); NAT’L HOME VISITING RESOURCE CTR., DATA SUPPLEMENT
2017 HOME VISITING YEARBOOK (2018).
214 See supra note 88 (describing the modest improvement in racial disproportionality for Black
children but worsening disproportionality for Native American and Native Alaskan children).
215 For several of the foundational texts, see URIE BRONFENBRENNER, THE ECOLOGY OF
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: EXPERIMENTS BY NATURE AND DESIGN 3-4, 21-22 (1979); JOHN
BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND LOSS 265–349 (1969); ERIK H. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY
219-34 (1950).
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neuroscience216 to economics 217 and education, 218 have established that early
childhood development lays an essential foundation for future learning and
growth and that a child’s development during this period turns on the interaction
between the child and a parent or other caregiver.219 Extensive research also
shows that supportive programs during this period, such as home visiting for
young, low-income, first-time mothers, and early childhood education for
children improve children’s long-term outcomes, including better academic
achievement, higher adult earnings, and lower rates of criminal justice
involvement.220 These programs are also are economically efficient. 221
Drawing on this research, the Child Wellbeing framework encourages
the state to invest in family support generally and especially during early
childhood. The framework supports paid parental leave, subsidized childcare,
and child allowances, and it emphasizes evidence-based programs that are costeffective. In the child welfare system, the framework favors evidence-based
policies that protect children from maltreatment, with the understanding that
these policies also further social welfare and address racial disproportionality.
Any strategy to prevent child abuse and neglect must be multi-faceted, and
substantial available research can guide investments in prevention. Broad-based
efforts to address the risk factors for child abuse and neglect—including poverty,
parental youth, single parenthood, domestic violence, substance abuse, and
mental health—are effective at reducing the rate of maltreatment;222 and more
targeted programs that teach parenting skills and provide support for parents
also have some success. 223
This is the vision. But the reality is far from this ideal, and thus the Child
Wellbeing framework remains largely a guide for future reform.
***
This Part has identified and explicated a framework of state regulation
of children taking shape in the twenty-first century, a framework based on a
216 For a summary of the neuroscientific literature, see CENTER ON THE DEVELOPING CHILD
AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY available at https://developingchild.harvard.edu/; NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL & INST. OF MEDICINE, FROM NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS: THE SCIENCE OF EARLY
CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT __ (Jack P. Shonkoff & Deborah A. Phillips eds., 2000).
217 See, e.g., Raj Chetty et al., Childhood Environment and Gender Gaps in Adulthood, 106 AM. ECON.
REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 282 (2016).

218 See Sean F. Reardon, The Widening Academic Achievement Gap Between the Rich and the Poor: New
Evidence and Possible Explanations, in WHITHER OPPORTUNITY? RISING INEQUALITY, SCHOOLS, AND
CHILDREN’S LIFE CHANCES 91, 92, 104–05 (Greg J. Duncan & Richard J. Murnane eds., 2011).
219 For a summary, see FROM NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 216, passim.
220 See HOME VISITING EVIDENCE OF EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 207; LYNN A. KAROLY et
al., EARLY CHILDHOOD INTERVENTIONS: PROVEN RESULTS, FUTURE PROMISE 55–78, 128–29
(2005).
221 See JAMES J. HECKMAN, GIVING KIDS A FAIR CHANCE 3-43 (2017); DAVID L. KIRP, THE
SAND BOX INVESTMENT 76-92 (2007).
222 See DEBORAH DARO, CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, Child maltreatment prevention: Past,
present, and future 5-11 (July 2011).
223 See id. at 6-8; see also Michael S. Wald, Beyond Child Protection: Helping All Families Provide
Adequate Parenting, in IMPROVING THE ODDS FOR AMERICA’S CHILDREN: FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN
POLICY AND PRACTICE 138-46 (Kathleen McCartney et al., eds., 2014) (describing the
importance—and challenges—of improving parenting as a strategy to prevent child abuse and
particularly neglect).
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revitalized commitment to child wellbeing. The framework incorporates the
sophisticated use of empirical evidence, recognizes that promoting child
wellbeing also promotes social welfare, and is committed to eliminating racial
bias. The framework is most evident in reforms in the juvenile justice system and
is also reflected in a few recent investments in family support and marginal
changes to the child welfare system.
Our analysis in this Part demonstrates how the framework is defining
and clarifying the state’s role in directly regulating children and families. As we
show in Parts III and IV, the framework also extends to the domains of parental
rights and children’s rights. The framework thus reveals the logic of the
regulation of children across the legal landscape, illuminating developments over
the past half century and integrating legal regulation into a more coherent and
comprehensive body of law.
III. CHILD WELLBEING AND PARENTAL RIGHTS
Beyond the realm of direct regulation, the Child Wellbeing framework
also has explanatory heft in the domain of parental rights. The framework
elevates a rationale for parental authority that some scholars and lawmakers have
endorsed,224 but that has been discounted by child advocates challenging
parental rights. 225 Analyzed in the framework, it is clear that the continued
robustness of parental authority in the twenty-first century is justified on child
wellbeing grounds. As we show, modern doctrine reflects an understanding—
sometimes explicit, but more often implicit—that deference to parental
decisionmaking typically furthers child wellbeing, serves society’s interests, and
provides an important shield against state intervention for low-income families
and families of color. This rationale for strong parental rights, which rests on
considerable empirical evidence about the importance of stability in the parentchild relationship, reinforces the traditional libertarian justification for parental
rights, but it also supplies a self-limiting principle for parental rights that is
missing in the libertarian justification. Moreover, in contrast to that justification,
which assumes that parents and the state compete for authority over children,
the modern rationale clarifies that parental rights are compatible with the state’s
interest in child wellbeing. As we demonstrate in this Part, the framework
elucidates recent developments in the law of parental rights, and it offers
guidance to lawmakers aiming to calibrate doctrine and policy to further child
wellbeing.

224 For an early formulation of the argument that parental rights promote child wellbeing, see
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1973). For more recent articulations, see, for example, GUGGENHEIM, supra note 92, at 3539, 174-212.; ROBERTS, supra note 92, at 51-67; Emily Buss, Adrift in the Middle: Parental Rights After
Troxel v. Granville, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 279, 285-90; Anne Dailey, Developing Citizens, 91 Iowa
L. Rev. 431 (2006); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV.
2401 (1995). These scholars have not, however, integrated parental rights into a larger framework
reaching across multiple domains of legal regulation.
225 See supra text accompanying notes 119-130.
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A. Interpreting Parental Rights in the Child Wellbeing Framework
In recognizing that parental rights enjoy constitutional protection, the
Supreme Court in the 1920s grounded the doctrine in the rights of citizens in a
liberal society to privacy and freedom from undue state interference. 226 The
Court reasoned that state deference to parental decisionmaking safeguards
pluralism, because numerous and competing visions of appropriate childrearing
coexist in our diverse society, and many approaches are rooted in religious beliefs
and cultural, social, and political values. As the Court stated, it is not for “the
State to standardize its children,” because “[t]he child is not the mere creature of
the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.” 227
The Court’s commitment to liberal principles thus supported constitutional
protection of parental decisionmaking.
These principles continue to support parental rights. Protection of
family privacy and of parental freedom to make childrearing choices are as
important today as they were a century ago. But these traditional justifications
cannot fully explain the continued robustness of these rights, nor do they supply
a limit to parental authority, giving weight to the claim that parental rights can
threaten child wellbeing. 228
The Child Wellbeing framework fills this gap. Analysis of modern
parental rights doctrine in our framework underscores the importance of child
wellbeing as a reinforcing rationale for the law’s continued deference to parental
authority as well as a self-limiting mechanism for these rights. Courts in affirming
parental rights are sometimes explicit about the values underlying the
framework, but these values are often implicit.
As a preliminary matter, it is important to recognize a point that is
sometimes obscured in children’s rights discourse and seldom acknowledged by
advocates such as Dwyer, Dailey, and Rosenbury: 229 Children, particularly
younger children, are often incapable of making decisions on their own behalf
about health care, education, and other critical matters. Thus, a surrogate
decisionmaker will be required—and that surrogate will be either the child’s
parents or a state actor. If parents’ authority is withdrawn or seriously restricted,
See supra text accompanying notes 52-55.
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
228 In Prince v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court recognized a limit to parental rights based
on harm to a child, see 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944), but the Court did not articulate a principle for
drawing this line. Indeed, the intervention upheld in Prince (against a Jehovah’s Witness guardian
distributing religious literature with her child) supports the concern that Prince’s broad articulation
of the principle fails to restrict biased decisionmaking by state actors.
229 See JAMES G. DWYER & SHAWN F. PETERS, HOMESCHOOLING: THE HISTORY &
PHILOSOPHY OF A CONTROVERSIAL PRACTICE 194 (2019) (dismissing the argument that parental
rights further children’s interests because “[i]f the ultimate justification for a right is the welfare of
a child, then logically the right should belong to the child” but not addressing the problem of
vindicating these rights through a nonparental surrogate); see also Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note
109, at 1471-72, 1510 (arguing that parental rights play an important protective role for very young
children but, beyond this period, proposing to limit parental rights by “situating the parent-child
relationship within a larger web of children’s relationships and interests” and weighing more
heavily “children’s interests in maintaining close ties to other children and adults, in being exposed
to new ideas, in expressing their identity, in protecting their personal integrity and privacy, and in
participating in civic life,” but not specifying who will vindicate these interests in court-based
disputes and not addressing the concern about an expanded state role).
226
227
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the state necessarily will have a larger role regulating families than under current
law. 230 To be sure, in some contexts, as we discuss in Part IV, adolescents have
the right to make their own decisions. But in those situations, which are relatively
limited, the minor makes the decision, and thus the state’s role is not expanded.
Appreciating that children typically need a surrogate decisionmaker, the question
facing lawmakers becomes whether the promotion of child wellbeing is better
served by deferring to parental decisionmaking or expanding the state’s role by
restricting parental rights. 231
The contemporary framework emphasizes two important reasons
parental rights usually promote child wellbeing and expanding state authority
does not.232 First, deference to parental authority protects the stability of the
parent-child relationship. 233 To be sure, some indeterminacy exists about how to
define and promote child wellbeing, given the complexity of children’s lives and
empirical uncertainty about the impact of different childrearing approaches. 234
But there is no controversy about the importance to children’s wellbeing of the
child’s relationship with her parent. Based on a large body of research, it is clear
that a strong, stable parent-child relationship is critical for healthy child
development, 235 and the disruption and destabilization of this relationship
threatens serious harm to the child. 236 A regime of robust parental rights is likely
the best means of satisfying this fundamental need of children because it restricts
state intervention in the family and thus reduces the child’s exposure to the
accompanying risks, 237 particularly removal of the child from the home. 238
Protection from state intervention is especially important for children of color
and low-income families in light of racial disproportionality and disparities in the
child welfare system. 239 Parental rights provide an essential shield against
excessive state intrusion driven by bias. 240
Second, deference to parental decisionmaking also promotes child
wellbeing because parents are generally better positioned than state actors, such
as judges, social workers, or other third parties, to understand their child’s needs
230 See Martin Guggenheim, The (Not So) New Law of the Child, 127 YALE L.J.F. 942, 947 (2018)
(critiquing Dailey and Rosenbury because “in too many places, their fix for current failings in the
law is to shift ultimate decisionmaking authority from parents to judges. In my view, this shift is
deeply flawed, if for no other reason than there is insufficient correspondence between giving
judges authority over children’s lives and making good decisions for the individual children
affected by the court order.”).
231 See id. at 947; Emily Buss, Children’s Associational Rights?: Why Less is More, 11 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J 1101, 1104-14 (2002).
232 See supra note 241 and accompanying text (discussing the work of scholars who have made
this argument).
233 Goldstein, Solnit, and Freud developed this rationale. See supra note 224. For an extended
discussion of this justification for parental rights, see GUGGENHEIM, supra note 92, at 35-39, 174212.
234 For a detailed discussion, see infra Part V.
235 As this research demonstrates, nearly every important aspect of child development turns
on a consistent and caring relationship between a parent and child. See supra ___.
236 For the foundational work on the importance of attachment and the harms from disruption,
see JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND LOSS: VOLUME I: ATTACHMENT 27-30, 209, 326, 330 (1969);
JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND LOSS: VOLUME 2: SEPARATION 4-16, 245-257 (1973); JOHN
BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND LOSS: VOLUME 3: LOSS 7-14, 397-411 (1980).
237 See GOLDSTEIN et al., supra note 224, at 10-30.
238 See supra text accompanying notes __.
239 See supra text accompanying notes 87-90.
240 See Bach, supra note 137, at 1073-76.
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and make decisions that will further that child’s interests. 241 This advantage is
rooted in the parent’s superior knowledge of and association with the child, as
compared with outsiders to the family. Moreover, the legal system is not wellequipped to determine what will promote the wellbeing of a particular child. 242
Deference is further justified by the well-founded assumption that parents are
intrinsically motivated to care for their children due to powerful affective
bonds. 243 The child-serving benefits of parental decisionmaking has been
recognized on occasion by the Supreme Court 244 and by scholars. 245
In addition to promoting child wellbeing, robust protection of parental
rights also advances society’s interests. In a country in which family-state
relations are governed by libertarian principles, parents are burdened with a
weighty responsibility for raising the next generation of citizens. 246 Having
placed this burden on parents, with only limited support from the state, society
has an interest in ensuring that parents discharge their obligations adequately.
Strong protection of parental rights shows respect for and deference to parents
for the important job they undertake. This deference reinforces parental
commitment to undertake the duties of parenthood and facilitates their ability to
do so without excessive interference. 247 Society then benefits when parents
perform their duties satisfactorily and children mature to healthy adulthood;
otherwise the state itself must assume responsibility at substantial cost. Even in
a society in which the state provided greater support for families, 248 respect for
parental authority would further social welfare because parents would be even
better equipped to provide for their children’s needs. Given the current
allocation of responsibility, enhancing parents’ role satisfaction and facilitating
adequate performance of their child-rearing duties takes on a special urgency.
Analysis in the framework justifies strong protection of parental rights,
but the framework also provides a more compelling rationale for restricting
parental authority than the traditional justification. The constitutional grounding
241 This argument has been well developed by scholars. See, e.g., GUGGENHEIM, supra note 92,
at 35-39; Buss, supra note 224, at 284-90; Emily Buss, “Parental” Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 647-50
(2002); Scott & Scott, supra note 224, at 2430-52.
242 For the classic account, see Mnookin, supra note 10. State decisionmaking that preempts
parental authority across all families, such as school attendance and child labor laws, see supra note
46, can be more easily rationalized than individualized intervention. Widely applicable preemption
of parental authority imposes costs on parental decisionmaking, but broad-based rules are typically
grounded in social consensus and, increasingly, in research on child development. Further, these
generally applicable rules are less susceptible to the concerns of bias and indeterminacy that
accompany individual intervention.
243 The altruistic conception of a parent’s love for a child is at least as old as Aristotle. THE
NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE bk. IX, ch. iv (J. E. C. Welldon trans., 1892) (a mother’s
love for her child is “defined as one who wishes and does what is good, or what seems to be good,
to another for the other’s sake”); see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *161 (“the
municipal laws of all well-regulated states have taken care to enforce [parental duties]: though
Providence has done it more effectually than any laws, by implanting in the breast of every parent
… [an] insuperable degree of affection”).
244 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979) (upholding a presumption that parents make
medical decisions to further their children's welfare because “natural bonds of affection lead
parents to act in the best interests of their children” and that “pages of human experience ... teach
that parents generally do act in the child’s best interests”).
245 See supra note 241.
246 See supra Part II.B.1 & 3 (describing and critiquing this approach).
247 See Scott & Scott, supra note 224, at 2430-52; Buss, supra note 224, at 290-94.
248 This is the position we argue in Part II.B.3.
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of parental rights in liberal principles, supporting family privacy and parental
freedom, provides no defined boundaries. With child wellbeing as the pole star,
our framework clarifies that parents are not free to inflict serious harm on their
children or to create a serious risk of such harm. Such actions do not further
child wellbeing and thus are not protected under this rationale for parental
authority. This is true even if the parent’s decision is motivated by deeply held
values or religious beliefs. When a parent’s action seriously threatens the child’s
welfare, state intervention overriding parental authority is justified.249 In this way,
the child-wellbeing justification for parental rights is self-limiting. 250
In sum, the Child Wellbeing framework rationalizes a regime of strong
parental rights, emphasizing a legal justification for these rights. This approach
recognizes that sometimes a parent may not act in the child’s interest, but only
if serious harm is threatened can we be confident that state intervention is
warranted. This rationale for parental rights is largely compatible with the liberal
justification that undergirds constitutional doctrine but also ensures that
children’s wellbeing is at the center of the analysis.
B. The Framework in Practice
Four doctrinal examples illustrate the descriptive and normative power
of the framework we identify. Although lawmakers may not explicitly invoke a
child wellbeing rationale for parental rights, current doctrine is compatible with
the framework, providing a normatively appealing contemporary justification.
Of course, the goal of promoting child wellbeing does not inform contemporary
parental rights doctrine in every context or in every jurisdiction. In some states,
lawmakers discount children’s interest in defining doctrine on issues such as
homeschooling, while other lawmakers fail to recognize that diluting parental
authority undermines child wellbeing. 251 But overall, as the examples
demonstrate, parental rights can be justified on child wellbeing grounds, as well
as on the basis of more abstract liberal principles.
1. Corporal Punishment
We begin with an example that is perhaps counterintuitive, showing that
the modern privilege to use reasonable corporal punishment is consistent with
the Child Wellbeing framework. The law has long recognized a parental privilege
to use reasonable corporal punishment, but the justification rested on deference
to parental rights, together with the notion that physical punishment benefitted
the child.252 By contrast, the modern privilege, which applies in both criminal
249 The Child Wellbeing framework thus supplies a rule of decision for state intervention—no
intervention unless there is serious harm—which courts then apply in individual cases.
250 See supra note __ (arguing that although the Supreme Court recognized harm to the child as
a limit on parental rights in Prince v. Massachusetts, that decision did not establish a line for
determining when the harm would be sufficient to overcome parental rights and in practice did
not provide meaningful protection for vulnerable families).
251 See infra Part III.B.4 (contending that homeschooling regulation in some states fails to
ensure that children receive an adequate education); infra Part III.B.2 (arguing that the use of a
best-interest standard to determine whether a court can order contact between a third-party and a
child is potentially harmful to children).
252 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *440 (“[a parent] may lawfully correct his
child, being under age, in a reasonable manner, for this is for the benefit of his education”).
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and civil proceedings, 253 does not endorse corporal punishment as beneficial to
children and instead is justified as a limit on state power in light of the dangers
that accompany state intervention. 254 Further, the modern privilege restricts the
understanding of reasonable corporal punishment: a parent’s use of corporal
punishment is not privileged if, in the criminal context, the punishment inflicts
serious harm or grossly degrades the child, or, in the child-protection context,
the punishment inflicts physical harm beyond minor pain or transient marks. 255
Although it may seem counterintuitive, we contend that the Child
Wellbeing framework supports the privilege, primarily because the privilege
places a critical constraint on state intervention. Without the privilege, the state
could initiate either a criminal prosecution or a child protection petition
whenever a parent used physical punishment, bringing the full force of the state
to bear on the family and potentially resulting in the incarceration of a parent or
the placement of the child in foster care—both serious disruptions to the core
parent-child relationship. By maintaining the privilege and tailoring the
reasonableness requirement to the form of state action, the privilege recognizes
the trade-off between protecting children from harm inflicted by parents and
protecting children from harm inflicted by state intervention. The privilege thus
promotes the child’s interest in the stability of the parent-child relationship and
shields the child from the risks that accompany state intervention by limiting it
to truly necessary circumstances.
Abolishing the privilege would greatly expand state power, posing a
threat to all families but particularly those who are already subject to excessive
state intervention. Parental use of physical discipline is declining, but many
parents, particularly in low-income families and families of color, still turn to
corporal punishment to discipline children.256 In light of this disproportionate
use of corporal punishment, particularly by Black parents, 257 the danger of
253 For sample criminal statutes, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-403 (2015); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-1-703(1) (2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.136b(9) (2015); and for sample civil statutes see
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-303(3)(C) (2014); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3(e) (2015).
254 In retaining the privilege, lawmakers weigh potential harm to a child from a parent’s use of
corporal punishment against the significant risks to child wellbeing that accompany state
intervention. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dorvil, 32 N.E.3d 861, 868 (Mass. 2015) (“[T]he parental
privilege defense must strike a balance between protecting children from punishment that is
excessive in nature, while at the same time permitting parents to use limited physical force in
disciplining their children without incurring criminal sanction”); In re J.A.J., 225 S.W.3d 621 (Tex.
App. 2006) (noting that the court should not hold parents to an ideal standard, and instead should
focus on the child’s welfare).
255 See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 3.24(b) TD No. 1 (2018) (in a
civil child-protection proceeding, reasonableness is “determined in part by whether the corporal
punishment caused, or created a substantial risk of causing, physical harm beyond minor pain or
transient marks”); id. at § 3.24(a) (in a criminal proceeding, reasonableness is “determined in part
by whether the corporal punishment caused, or created a substantial risk of causing, serious
physical harm or gross degradation”).
256 See PEW RESEARCH CTR., PARENTING IN AMERICA: OUTLOOK, WORRIES, ASPIRATIONS ARE
STRONGLY LINKED TO FINANCIAL SITUATION (2015); Regina A. Corso, Four in Five Americans Believe
Parents Spanking Their Children Is Sometimes Appropriate, HARRIS POLL (Sept. 26, 2013),
https://theharrispoll.com/new-york-n-y-september-26-2013-to-spank-or-not-to-spank-its-anage-old-question-that-every-parent-must-face-some-parents-may-start-off-with-the-notion-that-iwill-never-spank-my-child-bu/.
257 See Pew Research Center, Parenting in America: Outlook, Worries, Aspirations are Strongly
Linked to Financial Situation (2015) (in survey of 1,807 parents, 55 percent of white parents
reported never spanking a child, 28 percent reported rarely spanking a child, and 14 percent
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intervention is particularly acute for families at already serious risk of family
disruption through both the criminal justice and child welfare systems.
The privilege thus integrates the interests of parents, children, and the
state in avoiding unnecessary state intervention and unwarranted removal of a
child from the home. The child also has an interest in not being struck, but the
state can further this interest through less intrusive means, as discussed below.
By clarifying that the privilege does not give parents a license to use harsh
physical punishment but also restricts the state from intervening when parenting
may be suboptimal but not seriously harmful, the privilege exemplifies the selflimiting constraint on parental rights in the Child Wellbeing framework. 258
The framework also provides a response to the claims of children’s
rights advocates who seek to outlaw corporal punishment, citing evidence that
it is harmful to children. 259 Although there is considerable evidence that harsh
forms of corporal punishment harms children, 260 the law today treats this
conduct as child abuse, and it is the basis for state intervention, through a childprotection proceeding or criminal prosecution. 261 By contrast, there is not clear
evidence that spanking is harmful to children, 262 and thus any potential benefit
to children from withdrawing the privilege must be weighed against the dangers
associated with state intervention. To be sure, the privilege protects some
corporal punishment beyond spanking, 263 but by drawing the line at
reasonableness, the privilege protects children from harsh forms of corporal
punishment and the harms of unnecessary state intervention. Scholars who
endorse the abolition of the privilege typically do not account for this latter
harm. 264

reported often or sometimes spanking a child; of the black parents, 31 percent reported never
spanking a child, 32 percent reported rarely spanking a child, and 32 percent reported often or
sometimes spanking a child).
258 This justification explains why the Child Wellbeing framework supports the parental
privilege but condemns corporal punishment in schools. Most (but not enough) states ban
corporal punishment in the educational setting. See RESTATEMENT supra note 255, at §8.1, at
Reporters’ Note Comment a (listing statutes). In the school context, there are no family integrity
concerns, and instead the child’s interests in dignity and bodily integrity are paramount and support
a complete ban on corporal punishment.
259 See, e.g., Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 109, at 1523-24; Cynthia Godsoe, Redefining Parental
Rights: The Case of Corporal Punishment, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 281, 284 (2017); see also Comm. on the
Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 8 of its Forty-Second Session, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/GC/8 (2007) (interpreting the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child to prohibit
all forms of corporal punishment, partly due to the potential harm to the child but primarily
because of the child’s dignitary interest).
260 See Diana Baumrind et al., Ordinary Physical Punishment: Is It Harmful? Comment on Gershoff
(2002), 128 PSYCHOL. BULL. 580, 582 (2002) (describing the consensus among social scientists that
harsh forms of corporal punishment that amount to abuse are detrimental to children).
261 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.136b(9) (2015) (distinguishing criminal child abuse from
reasonable corporal punishment); FLA. STAT. § 39.01(2) (2015) (distinguishing civil child abuse
from reasonable corporal punishment).
262 Compare Elizabeth T. Gershoff & Andrew Grogan-Kaylor, Spanking and Child Outcomes: Old
Controversies and New Meta-Analyses, 30 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 453, 457 (2016), with Baumrind et al., supra
note 260, at 285; Robert E. Larzelere et al., The Intervention Selection Bias: An Underrecognized Confound
in Intervention Research, 130 PSYCHOL. BULL. 289, 294 (2004).
263 See RESTATEMENT supra note 255, at § 3.24, comments e & g.
264 See, e.g., Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 109, at 1523-24; Godsoe, supra note 259, at 284.
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Maintaining the privilege on child wellbeing grounds does not represent
an endorsement of corporal punishment.265 To promote a no-hitting norm, the
state can use non-coercive methods, such as public education programs and
parenting programs that teach parents alternative methods of discipline. 266 But
the new framework highlights the risks of prohibiting corporal punishment
through coercive intervention.
Traditional constitutional values and principles also support the
privilege. 267 Many families who use corporal punishment do so because it
comports with religious or cultural beliefs.268 The privilege thus protects family
privacy and religious views by restraining courts and other legal actors from
imposing their own values and judgments about appropriate childrearing, while
simultaneously protecting children from serious harm. 269 This constraint on state
intervention in the lives of citizens embodies a respect for liberal values and
promotes pluralism, also a core commitment in liberal society. Unlike the
traditional rationales, however, the child wellbeing rationale supplies a critical
self-limiting mechanism to parental authority.
2. Third-party Contact and De Facto Parents
The law governing third-party contact and de facto parents provides
another example of the explanatory power of the Child Wellbeing framework.
Most parents reach informal agreements with other individuals about contact
with children, but when a parent refuses to allow contact, two kinds of plaintiffs
may seek court orders overriding parents’ decisions. The first is a third party,
such as a grandparent or sibling, and the second is an individual who has
functioned as a parent to the child, often called a de facto parent. The law has
developed in seemingly divergent ways to address claims by third parties and de
facto parents, affording considerable deference to parents in third-party cases,
and much less deference in de-facto-parent cases. The Child Wellbeing
framework clarifies that although lawmakers’ responses appear inconsistent, they
are coherent, both justified as promoting child wellbeing.

265 See, e.g., Com. v. Laskey, 15 Pa. D. & C.4th 416, 420-21 (Pa.Com.Pl. 1992) (“While the court
frowns upon the use of corporal punishment upon any child, we must nevertheless recognize that
… the Pennsylvania Legislature clearly intended to permit parents to use corporal punishment in
disciplining their children for misconduct without putting them in jeopardy of having criminal
charges filed against them.”).
266 Private parties can also play a role in promoting this norm. See AM. ACAD. PEDIATRICS,
POLICY STATEMENT: EFFECTIVE DISCIPLINE TO RAISE HEALTHY CHILDREN, 142 PEDIATRICS 1, 5
(2018) (advising pediatricians to help parents use non-corporal methods of discipline).
267 See supra text accompanying notes 52-57 (describing libertarian and family privacy
justifications for parental rights).
268 See Robin Fretwell Wilson & Shaakirrah R. Sanders, By Faith Alone: When Religious Beliefs and
Child Welfare Collide, in THE CONTESTED PLACE OF RELIGION IN FAMILY LAW 318-20 (Robin
Fretwell Wilson & Shaakirrah R. Sanders eds., 2018).
269 See, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 54 M.J. 489, 491 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (“In this area of law there
is an inherent tension between the privacy and sanctity of the family … and the interest of the
state in the safety and wellbeing of children. The affirmative defense of parental discipline resides
at the crossroad of these two significant interests.”); Paida v. Leach, 917 P.2d 1342, 1349 (Kan.
1996) (“[I]t would be undesirable to have each judge freely imposing his or her own morality, own
concept of what is acceptable, own notions of child rearing … on the circumstances of the
litigants.”).
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We start with third-party contact. Beginning in the 1960s, state
legislatures enacted statutes authorizing third parties to seek contact with
children over parents’ objections,270 diluting parents’ absolute right at common
law to control a child’s associations. 271 Every state now grants standing to
grandparents to make these claims, 272 and some states give standing to other
third parties, including non-family-members. 273 Although these statutes
implicate a parent’s right to make decisions about a child’s upbringing, the U.S.
Supreme Court, in reviewing a broadly worded statute, has held only that courts
must accord “at least some special weight” to the parent’s decision. 274
Despite the absence of clear guidance from the Court, lawmakers
increasingly have adopted a standard that is highly deferential to parents,
identifying only limited circumstances in which a court is authorized to override
a parent’s decision about a child’s contact with third parties. 275 Under the
deferential standard, a court can order contact only if it finds by clear and
convincing evidence that denying the contact would pose a substantial risk of
serious harm to the child. 276 By contrast, some states have adopted a less
deferential standard, authorizing courts to override the parent’s decision if the
court determines contact is in the child’s best interest. 277
Analysis in the Child Wellbeing framework demonstrates that the
deferential standard promotes child wellbeing more effectively than the bestinterest standard. 278 First, court-ordered contact with a third party overrides the
decision of the adult who bears full child-rearing responsibility, with little reason
270 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-4.2 (West 2018); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 752.011 (West 2015); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-17-5-1 (West 1997). For an overview, see Jeff Atkinson, Shifts in the Law Regarding
the Rights of Third Parties to Seek Visitation and Custody of Children, 47 FAM. L.Q. 1, 3 & N.11 (2013).
271 See, e.g., Ex parte E.R.G., 73 So. 3d 634, 645 (Ala. 2011).
272 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-4.2 (West 2018); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 752.011 (West 2015); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 23-3301 (West 2018); TEX FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.433 (West 2009).
273 These include siblings, former stepparents, and other persons. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §
19-7-3 (West 2016); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125C.050 (West 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1
(West 1993).
274 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 70 (2000) (plurality opinion); id at 2066 (Souter
concurring) (finding the statute sweeps too broadly because it authorizes a suit by any person at
any time). The case generated multiple opinions, and most justices did find that the Constitution
protects the right of a parent to make associational decisions for a child, but the plurality and
concurring opinions did not determine the extent of this protection and did not find that the
Constitution requires a state to adopt the more demanding harm standard. See Buss, supra note
224, at 282-84 (describing the multiple opinions). As Emily Buss has argued, the Court’s decision
is deeply problematic because it invites courts to second-guess parental decisions without any
evidence that this will benefit children or families. See id. at 284-87, 302-16.
275 See, e.g., Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431, 450 (Conn. 2002); Walker v. Blair, 382 S.W.3d 862,
870–871, 874 (Ky. 2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-409 (2013); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3104 (West
2015).
276 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 255, at § 1.80(b) (and listing other elements). A court cannot
override a parent’s objection simply because contact with the third party would benefit the child
or because the child might experience some distress at the loss of the contact. See id. at Comment
g. Twenty-one states have adopted this highly deferential standard. See id. at Reporters’ Note
Comment g.
277 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 255, at Reporters’ Note Comment g. These states do,
however, require that the third party rebut the presumption that the parent’s decision is in the
child’s best interest. See id.
278 This discussion relies on the work of Emily Buss, who has set forth in detail the reasons
favoring the highly deferential standard. See Buss, supra note 274, at 287-98; see also Buss, supra note
241, at 647-50.
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to believe that the court will make a better decision. A parent is better positioned
than a judge to assess what third-party contact, if any, is best for the child. In the
typical case, a parent’s knowledge of the child and affective bonds of attachment
will lead to a decision in the child’s interest. Further, allowing ongoing contact
over the parent’s objection likely will strain the parent-child relationship, the
stability of which is central to healthy child development. 279 Separate from the
substantive outcome, the deferential standard protects the child from the
predictable stress of a protracted and high-conflict legal dispute. 280 Finally, if the
intrusion allows contact with a third party (who lacks any responsibility for the
child’s care) over the parent’s objections, the parent may understandably feel
resentment, potentially affecting the parent’s enthusiasm for fulfilling those
obligations that society has imposed on her; in this way, the social welfare
benefits of encouraging parents to fulfill their obligations is compromised.
This analysis makes clear that child wellbeing is served by the deferential
standard, which overrides the parent’s objection only when the decision
threatens serious harm to the child. Of course, parents are not always correct in
their decisions, and in some situations the deferential standard may deprive the
child of the benefits of contact. But the standard’s self-limiting mechanism
provides protection if the child will be seriously harmed by the lack of contact;
then the court can override the parent’s judgment. In granting standing to third
parties, lawmakers generally aim to promote the child’s wellbeing, but the
contemporary framework clarifies that paradoxically this goal is far more likely
to be attained under a standard that is deferential to parents than under the
permissive alternative that purports to further the child’s best interest.
The traditional liberal justifications for parental rights also support
deference to parents in these contests. A deferential standard reinforces the
principle of family privacy and promotes the value of pluralism in our society.
Many parents choose to shield their children from certain influences and values
or to expose their children only to those views that are consistent with the
parents’ values. A pluralist society respects such decisions. And again, the selflimiting principle ensures that if the parent’s decision poses a substantial risk of
serious harm to the child, then the court can override the parent.
In responding to claims by de facto parents, in contrast, lawmakers have
typically not deferred to the objections of legal parents—and, perhaps
counterintuitively, this response also fits comfortably in the Child Wellbeing
framework. The common law did not distinguish among third parties and instead
treated all non-parents as legal strangers to the child. 281 Beginning in the 1980s,
however, as same-sex couples began to have and raise children together,
279 When a third-party petitions for contact, the parent has already decided that the child should
not have contact with the third party. Overriding this decision empowers a third-party to insert
him- or herself into the family. See Major v. Maguire, 128 A.3d 675, 687 (N.J. 2016); see also Troxel,
530 U.S. at 75 (noting that “the burden of litigating a domestic relations proceeding can itself be
‘so disruptive of the parent-child relationship that the constitutional right of a custodial parent to
make certain basic determinations for the child’s welfare becomes implicated’”) (Justice O’Connor
for the Court, quoting Justice Kennedy’s dissent, 530 U.S. at 101).
280 Litigation may include interviews by mental health professionals, judges, and other experts,
and the proceeding can create a loyalty conflict for the child, who may be asked to choose whether
to side with the parent or the third party. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 255, at § 1.80(b), cmt. a.
281 See, e.g., In re Ash, 507 N.W.2d 400, 402 (Iowa 1993); In re C.T.G., 179 P.3d 213, 216 (Colo.
App. 2007). Legal parents included biological, adoptive, or parents pursuant to the marital
presumption.
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advocates sought legal recognition for non-biological, non-marital adults acting
as parents in these relationships. 282 Courts began to adopt equitable and
common law remedies to recognize individuals who were parents in all but name,
concluding that they were de facto parents. 283 Legislatures recently followed suit,
enacting statutes to protect the relationships between children and adults who
live with the child and assume substantial responsibility with the consent of the
legal parent. 284
This trend toward widespread recognition of de facto parents promotes
child wellbeing, despite the costs imposed on legal parents. From the child’s
perspective, the adult who has been acting as a parent is a parent. 285 Allowing a
legal parent to exclude a de facto parent would disrupt one of a child’s central
relationships, which robust research shows would create a risk of serious harm
to the child. 286 Thus, the de facto parenthood doctrine is supported by the same
evidence that supports strong parental rights generally. 287 Unlike a third party
seeking contact with the child over a parent’s objection, the de facto parent has
fulfilled parental responsibilities and will do so in the future. 288 Further, the
recognition of de facto parents encourages individuals living with partnerparents to assume the significant responsibilities of raising a child, benefitting
both children and society. Finally, the recognition of de facto parents is
particularly important for children in families that do not fall into the traditional
norm of two married parents. 289 For all these reasons, it follows that a de facto
For a history of these efforts, see NeJaime, supra note 133, at 1193-1230.
See id. (describing this judicial recognition and noting the other names courts used, such as
functional parent and psychological parent).
284 Today, approximately half of the states treat de facto parents the same as legal parents. See,
e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 8-201, 1101 (West 2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (West
2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-15-60 (2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 501 (West 2018); NeJaime,
supra note 134, at App. C; see also UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT 2017 § 609. Individuals claiming this
status must satisfy a demanding standard. See, e.g., In re Custody of B.M.H., 315 P.3d 470, 478
(Wash. 2013).
285 Courts recognize this difference and thus distinguish the concerns set forth in Troxel. See,
e.g., Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 931 (Del. 2011) (noting that “[t]his is not a case, like Troxel where
a third party having no claim to a parent-child relationship (e.g., the child’s grandparents) seeks
visitation rights” and that petitioner who sought contact with her former partner’s adopted child
was “not ‘any third party.’ Rather, she is a … de facto parent”); McDermott v. Dougherty, 869 A.2d
751, 772 (Md. 2005) (distinguishing “pure third parties” from psychological parents and defining
“psychological parents” as “third parties who have, in effect, become parents”). For a discussion
of the constitutional dimensions of recognizing de facto parents, see Douglas Nejaime,
Constitutional Parenthood, STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (arguing that the protection of parents
under the Due Process Clause should not turn solely on biology (or adoption) and that
nonbiological parents also have a constitutionally protected liberty interest); Gregg Strauss, What
Role Remains for De Facto Parenthood?, FL. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (arguing that the de facto
parent doctrine may be constitutionally defensible as applied to adults who have truly acted as
functional parents but the doctrine allows for a broader application, which raises serious
constitutional concerns); Buss, supra note 241 at 654-68 (arguing that the Constitution does and
should protect parental authority when the identity of a parent is clear but that the state has a
proper role to play in deciding among claims to legal parenthood).
286 The stringent test for recognizing an individual as a de facto parent, see supra note 284,
ensures that only those individuals who have truly functioned as parents will be placed on a similar
plane as legal parents. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 255, at § 1.82(d) & cmt. K.
287 See supra text accompanying notes 235-__.
288 A court may require a de facto parent to pay child support. See RESTATEMENT, supra note
255, at § 1.82, cmt. k.
289 Marriage rates differ by both race and income. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., ON VIEWS OF RACE
AND INEQUALITY, BLACKS AND WHITES ARE WORLDS APART 28-29 (2016) (describing marriage
282
283
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parent need not show serious harm to the child if their relationship is severed:
the test presumes that disruption of a child’s relationship with a person acting as
a parent will harm the child. 290
In short, the interpretive and normative framework we offer clarifies
that child wellbeing is furthered by strong protection of parental rights in the
third-party-contact context but by less deference to legal parents in the de facto
parent context. These outcomes are wholly consistent: both rules draw on
substantial research demonstrating the harm to children of disrupting core family
relationships, and both allow state intervention only when the legal parent’s
decision poses a substantial risk of serious harm to the child.
3. Decisions about Medical Care
Contemporary doctrine regulating parental authority to make medical
decisions for children provides a third example of the explanatory power of the
Child Wellbeing framework. Here again, contemporary law defers to parental
authority but limits that authority if the parent’s decision poses a risk of serious
harm to the child or, in some instances, to public health. This approach
represents a recent reform of common law doctrine, under which parents had
near complete authority to make medical decisions for children, including the
right to decline medical treatment. 291 Today, a parent is not free to make
decisions that seriously threaten the child’s health, 292 and social welfare
considerations are also at play. As with the earlier examples, the Child Wellbeing
framework illuminates the current approach of the law and provides a guide to
courts deciding these cases in the future.
Parental authority to make medical decisions is justified largely for the
same reasons that parental authority generally is justified. 293 Restricting the ability
of the state to second-guess parents in this context protects children from the
disruption of state intervention and allows parents, with their greater knowledge
of their children’s needs, to make these decisions. 294 Absent evidence to the
contrary, a parent’s decision can be assumed to further the child’s wellbeing
because parents are motivated by love and concern for their children. And the
parent will often play a central role in ensuring the child follows the treatment,
and thus the parent’s agreement is critical. Deference to parental authority to
make healthcare decisions supports parents and may enhance role satisfaction as
rates by race and education and noting that Blacks are the least likely to marry, even after
controlling for education).
290 There are costs to the de facto parent doctrine, such as the potential for litigation to
determine whether an adult satisfies the standard, but the Child Wellbeing framework tolerates
these possible costs considering the importance of the relationship to the child.
291 See Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1115–16 (Del. 1991) (describing the common law
rule).
292 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 255, at § 2.30(b) (“A parent does not have authority to consent
to medical procedures or treatments that provide no health benefit to the child and pose a
substantial risk of serious harm to the child’s physical or mental health.”); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S.
584, 602-603 (1979) (recognizing parents’ broad authority over medical decisionmaking for
children but also noting that the “state is not without constitutional control over parental
discretion in dealing with children when their physical or mental health is jeopardized”).
293 See supra Part III.A.
294 See id.; see also Maxine Eichner, Bad Medicine: Parents, the State, and the Charge of “Medical Child
Abuse,” 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 205, 228-39 (2016) (describing the significant risks involved with
allowing state intervention in parents’ medical decisionmaking).
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they undertake the substantial responsibilities of raising a child. Finally, this
protection from state intervention is particularly important for low-income
families and families of color, who are at a heightened risk for state scrutiny and
oversight. Thus, legal doctrine on this issue demonstrates the convergence of the
interests of parents, children, and the state because, in the typical case, parental
authority promotes the interests of both the child and the state.
As in other decisionmaking contexts, parents do not have absolute
authority to make these decisions. Parental authority grounded in the principle
of child wellbeing is self-limited; parents do not receive deference if their
decision to pursue or refuse treatment poses a substantial risk of serious harm
to the child. For example, courts will order a blood transfusion over the parent’s
objection when the treatment is necessary to prevent serious harm to the child,
even though the parent’s decision is based on religious belief. 295 While the law
is solicitous of medical decisions based on parents’ religious beliefs, 296 the state
can intervene if the parent’s refusal to provide medical treatment poses a threat
of serious harm to the child’s health. 297
Similarly, concerns about public heath can limit a parent’s medical
decisionmaking authority, particularly the decision whether to vaccinate a child
against communicable diseases. Every state has adopted compulsory vaccination
laws, 298 which the Supreme Court has long upheld. 299 Although nearly every state
has enacted a religious exemption to these requirements, and a significant
minority has enacted philosophical exemptions, these exemptions do not apply
if there is an epidemic and the refusal to vaccinate the child creates a substantial
risk of serious harm to the public health. 300 Moreover, in light of recent
outbreaks of communicable diseases, particularly measles, some states have
repealed their religious or philosophical exemptions—further evidence of the
adoption of the Child Wellbeing framework. 301

295 See, e.g., In re Guardianship of L.S. & H.S., 87 P.3d 521 (Nev. 2004); Matter of McCauley,
565 N.E.2d 411 (Mass. 1991)..
296 Most states have enacted spiritual treatment exemptions from the obligation of a parent to
seek medical care for a child See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-201.01(A)(1) (West 2016); CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 300.5 (West 2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-1.1 (West 2016).
297 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944). Pursuant to these exemptions, the
state cannot initiate a child-protection proceeding for the sole reason that the parent is treating the
child with prayer alone. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.2-100(2), 16.1-228 (West 2017). But if the
parent’s decision to use only spiritual healing results in or threatens harm to the child that satisfies
the harm threshold, the state can intervene and order medical treatment against parental wishes.
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 255, at § 2.26 cmt. i.
298 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 255, at § 1.30, Statutory Note on Compulsory Vaccination
Laws.
299 See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (rejecting constitutional challenge to
Massachusetts’s compulsory vaccination law and holding that such laws are within the state’s police
power to enact legislation “as will protect the public health and the public safety.”); Zucht v. King,
260 U.S. 174 (1922) (rejecting equal protection and due process challenge to ordinance that
prohibited a child from attending school without proof of vaccination even though there was no
threat of an epidemic).
300 See i RESTATEMENT, supra note 255, at § 1.30 cmt. d & Statutory Note on Compulsory
Vaccination Laws.
301 See 2015 California Senate Bill No. 277, California 2015-2016 Regular Session (repealing
religious and philosophical exemptions); VT Legis 37 (2015), 2015 Vermont Laws No. 37 (H. 98)
(repealing philosophical exemption); Soumya Karlamangla & Rong-Gong Lin II, Vaccination Rate
Jumps in California After Tougher Inoculation Law, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2017 (describing a measles
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Other justifications reinforce the child wellbeing rationale for parental
authority to make healthcare decisions. Deference to parental authority
promotes pluralism and family privacy by respecting parents’ choices that are
rooted in religious or spiritual beliefs or cultural practices. But unlike traditional
rationales for parental rights, the contemporary framework constrains parental
authority and provides a workable limit, prohibiting healthcare decisions that risk
serious harm to the child or public.
4. Homeschooling
The legal regulation of homeschooling302—a widespread practice in the
United States—provides a final example for analysis in the Child Wellbeing
framework. 303 In this context, however, the framework provides more normative
guidance than interpretive clarity. In every state, parents may educate their
children at home, 304 but the law’s general endorsement of homeschooling is
controversial. While it has many passionate advocates, 305 homeschooling also
has many critics, with some opponents arguing that it should be prohibited or
significantly restricted. 306
States differ greatly in the extent to which homeschooling is regulated
to ensure that the child receives an adequate education. The new framework
rationalizes and supports the approach of the small minority of states that
authorize homeschooling subject to substantial regulation, including curricular

outbreak as the impetus for California’s repeal); Michael Specter, Vermont Says No to the Anti-Vaccine
Movement, THE NEW YORKER, May 29, 2015.
302 This section addresses homeschooling, but a similar analysis applies to state regulation of
nonpublic schools, supporting substantial regulation of these schools. In New York, for example,
an ongoing controversy centers on state regulation of yeshivas. See Eliza Shapiro, Do Students in
Yeshivas Learn Secular Subjects? Inquiry May Settle Issue, N.Y. TIMES A22 (Dec. 4, 2018). In response
to concerns about inadequate secular education, New York issued a guidance document in 2018
imposing far greater oversight on all nonpublic schools, including yeshivas. See N.Y. DEP’T. EDUC.,
SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENCY REVIEW AND
DETERMINATION
PROCESS,
http://www.nysed.gov/common/nysed/files/programs/nonpublic-schools/substantialequivalency-guidance.pdf.
303 Approximately 1.7 million children learn primarily at home—3.3% of all school-age
children.
See
U.S.
DEP’T.
EDUC.,
NAT’L
CTR.
EDUC.
STATISTICS,
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d17/tables/dt17_206.10.asp; U.S. DEP’T. EDUC., NAT’L
CTR. EDUC. STATISTICS: FAST FACTS, https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=91 (defining
homeschooling as “school-age children (ages 5–17) in a grade equivalent to at least kindergarten
and not higher than 12th grade who receive instruction at home instead of at a public or private
school either all or most of the time).
304 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.41 (West); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 2703 (West); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 388D.020 (West).
305
See,
e.g.,
HOME
SCHOOL
LEGAL
DEFENSE
FUND,
ABOUT,
https://hslda.org/content/about/.
306 See, e.g., MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE 136-37 (2010) (arguing that if
homeschooling means children “do not have adequate opportunity to develop liberal democratic
dispositions,” then the state should begin with a minimal intervention, such as requiring children
to attend afterschool programs, and then, if this is ineffective, the state could prohibit
homeschooling completely); Robin L. West, The Harms of Homeschooling, 29 PHIL. & PUB. POL’Y Q.
7, 9-12 (2009) (describing the potential benefits of homeschooling but arguing that it should be
regulated to ensure the education is adequate, children are safe, and that a broad range of subjects
are taught).
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requirements, teacher qualifications, and regular evaluation and reporting. 307
Allowing parents to choose to homeschool their children promotes child
wellbeing because parents are well-positioned to determine the educational
setting that best meets the needs of a particular child. Motivations to homeschool
are varied and include a desire to provide religious or moral instruction, as well
as concerns that available schools provide a substandard education or that a child
faces significant social challenges or physical danger. 308 Absent evidence to the
contrary, a parent’s decision should be trusted because of the parent’s intrinsic
motivation to make decisions that promote the child’s wellbeing. And deference
to parental decisionmaking encourages parents to assume the significant
responsibilities that accompany childrearing by allowing parents to inculcate
their values into the child’s education.
In the Child Wellbeing framework, the right to homeschool, like other
aspects of parental authority, is subject to a self-limiting mechanism. Thus,
parents are free to choose homeschooling only if the decision does not inflict
serious harm on children by providing them with an inadequate education. This
condition is satisfied in states with rigorous oversight of homeschooling,
ensuring that pre-determined educational standards are met by placing
obligations on both parents and the state. The cost imposed on parental
decisionmaking is justified by the serious harms to both the child and society
that accompany a lack of education. 309
Homeschooling presents a harder case for deference to parental
authority than the other examples. Even in states with rigorous oversight,
homeschooling may pose a risk to children as future citizens. Forgoing the
diverse social influences that school attendance often provides allows parents to
inculcate illiberal values more effectively than if the child were in school. 310 A
state can take some regulatory steps to mitigate this harm, such as imposing
curricular requirements. But ultimately the framework tolerates this cost to child
wellbeing and social welfare because of the intrusiveness of the state evaluating
parents’ world views to decide which are sufficiently illiberal to justify greater
state intrusion than, say, broad-based curricular requirements.
307 These states are in the distinct minority. The Home School Legal Defense Fund identifies
only five states that it categorizes as having “high regulation”—Massachusetts, New York,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. See Homeschool Laws in Your State, HOME SCH. LEGAL
DEF. ASS’N https://hslda.org/content/laws/. For one example of this regulatory approach, see
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 100.10 (setting forth the requirements for “home
instruction,” including the submission of an individualized homeschooling plan that details the
syllabi, course materials, and more; required review of the plan by the superintendent; required
courses for each grade level; teaching of certain subjects including citizenship and alcohol and drug
education; and regular submission of progress reports and standardized testing).For a defense of
state oversight and regulation, framed from the perspective of children’s rights, see DWYER &
PETERS, supra note 229, at 197-99.
308 See NAT’L CTR. EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION
2005, at 110 (2005) (reporting results of survey of parents and finding these as the top three reasons
for homeschooling).
309 See NAT’L CTR. EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T. EDUC., ANNUAL EARNINGS OF YOUNG
ADULTS (2016) (“In 2014, the median earnings of young adults with a bachelor’s degree ($49,900)
were 66% higher than the median earnings of young adult high school completers ($30,000). The
median earnings of young adult high school completers were 20% higher than the median earnings
of those without a high school credential ($25,000).”).
310 See EICHNER, supra note 306, at 136-37; West, supra note 306, at 10. To be sure, not all
schools provide diverse social influences.
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In contrast to the states that rigorously regulate homeschooling, many
states have limited or rarely-enforced regulation.311 These states can be charged
with grounding legal policy in a discredited conception of parental rights—the
notion that family privacy and pluralism justify parental decisions that seriously
harm children. To be sure, some homeschooling in these states may meet or
exceed educational standards, but no regulatory oversight ensures that it does.
This highly deferential regulatory stance is not compatible with the child
wellbeing rationale for parental rights. It sacrifices a core need of children,
compromises the future lives of homeschooled children, and imposes substantial
costs on society, which has an important interest in educated citizens. In these
states, the interests of parents, children, and the state do not converge. The
framework clarifies these deficiencies and provides guidance to lawmakers
formulating homeschooling regulation that is compatible with the child
wellbeing rationale for parental rights.
***
Applying the Child Wellbeing framework to the domain of parental
rights strengthens the rationale for these rights, while integrating parental rights
into the larger regulatory framework governing children’s lives. Parental rights
continue to be robust under contemporary law, for good reason. Today, parental
authority can be justified on the ground that it promotes child wellbeing, which
in turn promotes social welfare. In this way, the framework demonstrates that
strong parental rights are consistent with—indeed, integral to—the state’s
overriding purpose in regulating children and families. Largely integrating the
interests of parents, children, and the state resolves important challenges
confronting regulation in this area and provides a normative basis for deciding
future questions.
IV. CHILD WELLBEING AND CHILDREN’S RIGHTS
Children’s autonomy rights are understood conventionally to compete
with the state’s and parental authority. 312 In this Part, we challenge this
conventional wisdom, analyzing in the Child Wellbeing framework the pattern
of granting and withholding autonomy rights that has emerged over the past half
century. More specifically, we demonstrate that the view of children’s rights as
liberty interests that are inherently in competition with parental and state
authority is incomplete, in that it fails to recognize the importance of child
wellbeing in the selective conferral of particular legal rights and privileges on
children (and withholding of others). Autonomy rights are conferred on minors,
we argue, either when granting the right directly enhances the young person’s
311 The Home School Legal Defense Association identifies sixteen states as “low regulation.”
See Homeschool Laws in Your State, supra note 307. See e.g. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53G-6-204(2) (granting
parents complete control of curricular choices, evaluation, and “the time, place, and method of
instruction”; prohibiting education officials from requiring parents to maintain records, obtain
credentials, and give standardized tests).
312 See supra Part I.B.2. The rights and privileges discussed in this Part do not include rights
that inhere in children’s dependency, such as a right to financial support, or entitlements such as
the right to education. Instead, this Part focuses on rights and privileges that involve choices by
minors.
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wellbeing, or when the law’s restrictive stance toward children threatens the child
with serious harm as she matures. The framework also clarifies that the granting
and withholding of rights often aims to promote social welfare as well.
Moreover, judgments about children’s maturity (important in many contexts to
the decision of whether and when conferring the right will benefit minors)
increasingly are informed by developmental and other research. Finally, although
concern about racial fairness has not been front and center in this legal context,
it has become an important subtext, particularly in juvenile justice, where the
granting and withholding of rights functions to protect youth of color from state
power. 313 Although the modern framework crystalized in twenty-first century
juvenile justice reforms, we show that many late twentieth century children’s
rights doctrines embody features of the framework that more recently has
become prominent.
Of course, decisions about granting and withholding rights are not
always optimal and not all rights and privileges can be neatly analyzed in the
framework. Rights that might benefit minors are seldom conferred when
lawmakers and the public assume social welfare costs will follow. 314 But to a far
greater extent than has been generally recognized, the implicit, and sometimes
explicit, basis for conferring particular rights and privileges on minors, and the
“schedule” on which rights are conferred, is to promote child wellbeing and,
often, to benefit society as well.
A. Interpreting Children’s Rights in the Child Wellbeing Framework
As this Section demonstrates, the core elements of the Child Wellbeing
framework are at work in modern children’s rights doctrine.
1. Child Wellbeing
Although advocates have challenged the withholding of rights and
privileges from minors, it seems uncontroversial that children (particularly
younger children), may sometimes be incapable of self-interested exercise of
particular rights—and granting these rights would threaten harm to the child or
to others. Some level of maturity is required to drive a motor vehicle safely or
make a medical decision, for example, and it is assumed that both children and
society benefit from the law’s protective stance. Thus, the withholding of a right
or privilege until an age at which the child is presumed sufficiently mature can
reflect the assumption that the restriction promotes his or her wellbeing. Of
course, many adult rights and privileges are not granted until children reach the
age of majority and sometimes beyond. 315 But some of these restrictions as well

See infra t.a.n. _ to _.
Restriction of the right to vote to citizens age eighteen and older may reflect a view that
younger teenagers will make immature choices, although many teenagers are likely as capable of
exercising the right of political participation as are adults and could benefit from enfranchisement.
315 Two examples include access to alcohol, see, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 307 (criminalizing the
sale of alcohol to anyone below the age of 21), and the right to consent to sterilization, see, e.g., MD.
CODE, HEALTH § 20-102(c)(5) (“A minor has the same capacity as an adult to consent to …
treatment for or advice about contraception other than sterilization”).
313
314
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are justified on the ground that child wellbeing is advanced. 316 Restrictions on
the right to marry and on access to alcohol belong in this category.
When rights are granted to minors in contemporary law, one of two
interwoven rationales, both implicating child wellbeing, appears to be salient.
First, some rights directly enhance child wellbeing. The benefits to minors in
holding rights, exercising voice, and enjoying adult privileges increase as they
mature; not surprisingly most rights and privileges conferred on minors are
limited to adolescents, either expressly or functionally.317 The wellbeing of older
minors is enhanced, for example, by having the privilege to operate motor
vehicles, the right of political expression, the presumption favoring their
preferences in child custody disputes, 318 and the ability to make routine medical
decisions when parents are unavailable. These rights and privileges would have
little meaning for young children. Second, in some contexts, lawmakers
recognize that the law’s paternalistic rights-withholding approach itself inflicts
harms on children as they mature. 319 For example, the Supreme Court in granting
procedural rights to youths in delinquency proceedings acknowledged that the
law’s traditional approach failed in its promise to serve their interests. 320
Further, rights granted to minors—such as the right to consent to treatment for
substance abuse and to obtain contraceptives—can mitigate the harms of risky
adolescent behaviors and thereby promote minors’ wellbeing. 321
Sometimes, when rights are granted to minors, they are defined and
limited in ways that promote minors’ wellbeing, because it is assumed that,
immaturity may lead to impetuous choices in the exercise of an otherwise
beneficial right. For example, restrictions on minors’ driving privileges represent
efforts to define the privilege in a way that maximizes child wellbeing and
minimizes harms associated with immaturity. 322
2. Social Welfare
Our interpretive framework similarly invites inquiry into whether
promotion of social welfare has supported the granting and withholding of rights
See infra Part IV.B.2.
As we show in Part IV.B, many examples support this rationale for granting rights and
privileges. Only mature minors are authorized to make medical decisions independently, for
example, and often the right applies to decisions that involve conditions for which only adolescents
need treatment (the decision to terminate pregnancy, for example). Assumptions about maturity
and judgment also guide minimum age requirements for various privileges, such as those regulating
motor vehicle operation and access to alcohol.
318 In custody disputes, little or no weight is assigned to the views of very young children, but
adolescents’ preferences are virtually dispositive under normal circumstances and are subject to a
legal presumption in some states. See Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in
Family Law: State Courts React to Troxel, 35 FAM. L.Q. 577, 618 (2002) (describing the role of the
child’s preferences in custody disputes between parents).
319 The two rationales often are different only in emphasis. A teenager benefits when her
preferences for custody are given substantial weight and may be harmed if they are ignored.
320 See discussion, infra Part IV.B.1 c.
321 See discussion, infra Part IV.B.1 of Minors’ Consent Statutes and access to contraceptives.
322 See, e.g., INSURANCE INST. HIGHWAY SAFETY, HIGHWAY LOSS DATA INST., Overview: Young
Driver
Licensing
Systems
in
the
U.S.,
IIHS-HLDI,
https://www.iihs.org/iihs/topics/laws/graduatedlicenseintro; ANNE T. MCCARTT et al.,
INSURANCE INST. HIGHWAY SAFETY, Graduated Licensing Laws and Fatal Crashes of Teenage Drivers: A
National Study, 11 TRAFFIC INJURY PREVENTION 240 (2010).
316
317
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to legal minors, reinforcing the goal of promoting child wellbeing. The answer
is yes, but to a lesser extent than in the realm of juvenile justice reform. To be
sure, social welfare concerns are at work in rationalizing the withholding of many
rights until the age of majority; rights are not granted to minors if substantial
societal costs are anticipated. Social costs may be minimized by conferring rights
as a package with other markers of adult status, such as withdrawal of parents’
support responsibility. This approach has societal benefits as it is administratively
convenient and signals clearly to those who deal with young people that their
legal status has changed. Withholding some rights until the age of majority
ostensibly serves society’s interest in other ways. Conferring the right to vote at
age eighteen, for example, arguably promotes society’s interest in a mature
electorate more effectively than would a younger voting age. 323 But these
restrictions are justified largely on social welfare grounds with little attention to
child wellbeing. Many rights that are restricted to legal adults, however, arguably
do fit within the framework. The infancy doctrine in contract law and the
minimum age of marriage, described below, can be defended on both child
wellbeing and social welfare grounds. 324
Social welfare can also figure in the calculus of whether children should
be granted adult rights. A brief description of two examples highlights the
convergence of child wellbeing and social welfare. Minors’ Consent statutes
target conditions for which effective treatment benefits not only the minor but
the larger community as well. Many statutes aim to facilitate treatment for
substance abuse and STDs and to provide sexually active teens with the means
to prevent pregnancy, thereby promoting their wellbeing. 325 Lawmakers also
recognize that serious social costs are incurred if a minor fails to obtain treatment
for these conditions. 326 A second example involves the minimum age
requirements for obtaining a driver’s license (younger than age eighteen in all
states) and for obtaining alcohol (age twenty-one). This combination creates a
policy that aims to benefit adolescents, while minimizing the costs to society of
granting them the right to engage in a valued, but risky, activity. By separating
the minimum ages for driving and drinking, lawmakers recognize that young
drivers are more inclined toward risk-taking than older adults and will pose an
even greater threat to society if they have ready access to alcohol. 327
Finally, some rights benefit minors substantially with modest social cost.
For example, free speech rights benefit students and create a social benefit in
encouraging future citizens to engage in political discourse. As defined by the
Supreme Court, this right has minimal social costs, because student speech that
threatens the state’s ability to fulfill its educational function is not protected. In
general, both child wellbeing and social welfare likely play a significant role in
defining and limiting children’s rights. 328

323

See supra note 326.
See id.
325 For further discussion, see infra Part IV.B.
326 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 255, at § 19.02, cmt. a.
327 See ZIMRING, supra note 25, at 108-10.
328 See generally Emily Buss, Developing the Free Mind, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON LAW AND
EDUCATION (in press, 2019) (describing how according rights to students in school can contribute
to healthy development).
324
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3. Developmental Research
Because the maturity of minors constitutes a key consideration in
granting, withholding, and defining children’s rights, it is not surprising that
lawmakers in recent decades have turned increasingly to developmental science
to inform their decisions in this domain. Scientific knowledge provides a more
sophisticated understanding of minors’ capacities and vulnerabilities than was
available in earlier times, when these judgments were based on common sense
and intuition. Developmental research has enhanced understanding of
maturation in adolescence, allowing for more informed judgments about when
rights can promote minors’ wellbeing, when paternalistic restrictions inflict
harm, and when restrictions actually offer protection to minors and are justified
in a system that aims to further child wellbeing. Research can also clarify when
doctrines withholding rights from minors are not justified on this ground, and
can only be supported, if at all, on the ground that they serve some societal
interest and not the interests of children subject to the restrictions. Lawmakers’
inclination to draw on empirical knowledge suggests that children’s rights
doctrine increasingly is integrated into the contemporary framework.
Several examples evidence the growing importance of scientific
knowledge in this area. Research on adolescent brain development and on
decisionmaking in children and adults has been invoked to demonstrate that
adolescents are capable of making informed medical decisions. 329 These studies
have played a key role in abortion rights discourse and other reforms authorizing
minors to consent to healthcare treatment. 330 Lawmakers have also turned to
research that sheds light on the link between developmental immaturity and
children’s functioning in the justice system. For example, analysis of juveniles’
competence to assist their attorneys and to participate in legal proceedings has
been influenced by developmental and other social science research. Important
studies have found that younger juveniles are far less able to understand criminal
proceedings or make competent decisions as defendants than are adult
counterparts. 331 This research has influenced courts and legislatures to recognize
the importance of developmental maturity as a key factor in evaluating the
competence of minors to participate in delinquency and criminal proceedings. 332
Other key studies have found that juveniles have poorer understanding of their
rights in interrogation and are more vulnerable to coercive police tactics than
adults. 333 Growing evidence indicates that minors, under the pressure of

329 See, e.g., AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N., Amicus Curiae brief filed in U.S. Supreme Court in Hartigan v.
Zbaraz, 484 U.S. 171 (1987); AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N., Amicus Curiae brief filed in U.S. Supreme Court in
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); see also Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less
Mature Than Adults? Minors’ Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “FlipFlop,” 64 AM. PSYCHOL. 583 (2009).
330 See supra note 329; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 617-18 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the role of research showing that juveniles are mature enough to decide
whether to obtain an abortion without parental involvement).
331 See Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents’ and
Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 357 (2003).
332 Questions of competence in a criminal court have traditionally focused on mental illness
and disability. See id. at 334.
333 See Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 CAL.
L. REV. 1134, 1153-55 (1980) (finding that deficiencies in comprehending Miranda rights are
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interrogation are far more likely than adults to give false confessions.334 Courts
have cited this research in cases holding that juveniles failed to make knowing,
intelligent and voluntary Miranda waivers. Some states and the Restatement of
Children and the Law have relied on this research to create categorical restrictions
on rights’ waivers by juveniles. 335
Empirical research supports other restrictions on minors’ privileges,
even when it has not played a direct role in their enactment. Motor vehicle
accidents cause many deaths each year, and a high percentage of accidents
involve young and intoxicated drivers. 336 Statistics on the correlation between
motor vehicle accidents, alcohol, and drivers’ age was invoked in the debate
surrounding the Federal Highway Safety Act, leading Congress to set the
minimum age for access to alcohol at twenty-one. 337 Although childdevelopment research did not play a prominent role in the debates, the regulation
receives strong support from research showing that risk-taking behavior,
including fast driving and excessive drinking, peaks in late adolescence, and also
from more recent developmental brain research indicating that teenagers are
more inclined toward sensation-seeking and impulsivity than are adults. 338 Some
states have restricted the driving privilege for minors to minimize these risks:
common restrictions include limits on the number of non-adult passengers and
on night driving. 339 Limits on minors’ ability to drive while accompanied by peers
are supported by many studies showing that teenagers are more likely to engage
in risk-taking in the presence of peers. 340 Although this regulatory scheme
emerged in the late twentieth century, it is reinforced by recent research and
likely will gain even greater traction.
To be sure, developmental research has only begun to play a role in
shaping children’s rights doctrine, and other factors often are, and will be, more
important. Congress, in debating the proposed 26th Amendment lowering the
significantly related to age and intelligence and are substantial in youths under age 16 and severely
deficient under age 14).
334 See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2401 (2011) (discussing the risk of false
confession and citing amicus curiae brief submitted by Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth).
335 See, e.g., State v. Presha, 748 A.2d 1108, 1114 (N.J. 2000) (statement taken during custodial
interrogation of juvenile under age 14 is inadmissible in the absence of a legal guardian or parent,
unless the adult was unwilling to be present or truly unavailable; for older juveniles, officers must
use their best efforts to locate a parent or legal guardian before beginning the interrogation); In re
B.M.B., 955 P.2d 1302, 1312 (Kan. 1998) (requiring that parents, guardian, or attorney be given
opportunity to consult with juvenile under age 14 before interrogation); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.11
(West 1990) (parental consent required for Miranda waiver of juveniles under age 16; notice
required to parents of older juveniles); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-2101 (West) (1999) (presence
and advice of parent, guardian, custodian, or attorney of juvenile under age 16 required for
custodial admission or confession to be admissible); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 27-20-26 (West)
(2012) (counsel must be provided to child not represented by parent, guardian, or custodian at
custodial interrogation); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 255, at § 14.22(b), and Reporters’ Note
thereto (consultation with counsel required for juvenile ag 14 and under).
336
Teen
Drivers:
Get
the
Facts,
CTRS.
FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL,
https://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/teen_drivers/teendrivers_factsheet.html.
337 See PRESIDENTIAL COMN’N. DRUNK DRIVING, FINAL REPORT 10 (1983) (citing statistics
about the “direct correlation between the minimum drinking age and alcohol-related crashes” for
drivers ages 18-21).
338 See Scott, Duell and Steinberg, supra note 161.
339 See INSURANCE INST. HIGHWAY SAFETY, supra note 322; McCartt, supra note 322.
340 See INSURANCE INST. HIGHWAY SAFETY, supra note 322; Scott, Duell & Steinberg, supra note
161.
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voting age in federal elections from twenty-one to eighteen, emphasized the
maturity of young adults. 341 But if developmental research were dispositive,
lawmakers would likely confer voting rights on sixteen-year-old citizens. By this
age, adolescents are as capable of understanding and processing information as
are adults and of making rational decisions in neutral settings, like a voting booth.
At this point, research is unlikely to result in reform on this issue. 342 However,
to the extent that judgments about the link between child wellbeing and maturity
play a role in the granting and withholding of rights to minors, research will likely
be of growing importance. 343
4. Racial Equality and Children’s Rights
Concerns about racial fairness have played a less explicit role in the
conferral of children’s rights than in other domains. 344 Thus, this feature of the
Child Wellbeing framework is less prominent here than in other domains. And
yet, in some contexts, the granting of rights to minors can be understood as
serving a function similar to that of parental rights—protecting children of color
against overreaching by biased state actors. Due process and Fourth
Amendment protections in public school, if sufficiently robust, could serve this
protective role. Recent evidence indicates that students of color are more likely
to be subject to harsh discipline than other students; this inequity has raised
policy concerns and supports meaningful protection against corporal
punishment in schools. 345 It also has elevated concern about the school to prison
pipeline. Also, procedural rights conferred in police interrogation and in
delinquency proceedings have special value to youth of color who are likely more
vulnerable to coercion346 and more subject to bias by justice system actors. 347
Some reforms have been undertaken to identify contexts in which rights could

S. REP. 92- 26, at 5 (1971).
See supra note 326. Lawmakers may also anticipate high administrative costs in evaluating
readiness for political participation.
343 But see Emily Buss, What the Law Should (And Should Not) Learn from Child Development Research,
38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13 (2009) (cautioning against the use of research on children’s capacities as
locking in legal responses).
344 Susan Appleton pointed out that Brown v. Board of Education could be understood as a
children’s rights case grounded in racial fairness.
345 See U.S. Dep’t Justice Civil Rights Division & U.S. Dep’t Educ., Office of Civil Rights, Joint
“Dear Colleague” Letter. Jan. 8, 2014 (directing the tracking of disproportionality in use of school
discipline under the Obama administration and using corporal punishment policies, which allow
schools to physically punish students, as an example of a school policy that can raise disparate
racial impact concerns). But see https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague201812.pdf (withdrawing directive by Trump Administration).
346 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 255, §14.20(b) (“A minority youth particularly may be
instructed by parents to show deference to law enforcement officers for the youth’s personal
safety, and may be especially unlikely to feel free to terminate an interview.”).
347 In the case of the so-called Central Park Five, for example, law enforcement used coercive
and deceptive interrogation tactics against five youths of color to coerce them into falsely
confessing to an attack on a woman in Central Park in 1989. See Miriam S. Gohara, A Lie for A
Lie: False Confessions and the Case for Reconsidering the Legality of Deceptive Interrogation Techniques, 33
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791, 792 (2006); see also Sydney Schanberg, The Village Voice, A Journey Through
the
Tangled
Case
of
the
Central
Park
Jogger
(Nov.
19,
2002)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/12/12/conviction-in-jogger-case-isfor-attempted-murder/5a0127a5-4910-490b-baa5-502bd5e58250/
341

342
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provide special benefits to youth of color, 348 but commitment is tentative and
progress is limited to date. 349 Nonetheless, although race consciousness is muted
in the context of children’s rights, some rights accorded to minors can function
to promote racial fairness.
B. The Framework in Practice
In this Section we examine several rights and privileges held by minors
and argue that the interpretive framework we offer provides a logic and structure
to both the conferral and withholding of rights. As explained above, some rights
directly advance the wellbeing of affected minors, and (sometimes) social
welfare; and some rights indirectly advance wellbeing because the paternalistic
approach toward minors inflicted harms. We provide examples of both
categories. We then look at rights withheld from minors and analyze specific
legal restrictions on children, showing that these, too, often fit within the
framework.
1. Rights Granted to Minors
a. Health Care Decisionmaking
In general, parents have the authority to consent to medical treatment
for their children until age eighteen, and minors lack the authority make their
own healthcare decisions. In most medical treatment situations, it is assumed
that the interests of parents and children are aligned—that parents will seek
treatment needed by their children, and that children will share their healthcare
needs with their parents. But in some situations, the requirement of parental
consent creates obstacles to treatment. Lawmakers have recognized three
exceptions to the general requirement of parental consent, all directed at
adolescents.350 For each exception, the right granted promotes the minor’s
wellbeing and social welfare as well. For most, parental authority is not
undermined because parents likely would approve of the welfare-promoting
treatment.
i. Mature Minor Doctrine. Under the common law mature minor doctrine,
a minor capable of making an informed medical decision can give valid consent
to routine, beneficial treatment if no parent is available to give parental
consent. 351 The treatment ordinarily cannot be one that carries serious health
risks, except in an emergency, and it must offer potential health benefits for the

348 See Obama Dear Colleague letter, supra note 345. Corporal punishment has been abolished
in school districts in large cities. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 255, §_.
349
See:
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201812.pdf
(withdrawing the Obama Dear Colleague letter on tracking racial disproportionality in school
discipline).
350 These are embodied in the mature minor doctrine, minor consent statutes, and the right to
make reproductive health decisions.
351 See, e.g., Rowine Hayes Brown & Richard B. Truitt, The Right of Minors to Medical Treatment,
28 DEPAUL L. REV. 289, 294 (1979).
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minor herself. In other words, the treatment cannot be cosmetic, and it cannot
be for the purpose of benefiting another person. 352
Scrutiny of mature minor doctrine indicates that the authority of minors
to consent to treatment functions primarily to promote child wellbeing. Without
the mature minor doctrine, physician liability could arise on the basis of treating
a patient without valid (parental) consent, deterring physicians from providing
treatment to minors. 353 By removing this obstacle, the doctrine facilitates
beneficial treatment of the minor. That minors lack authority to consent to
cosmetic treatment and treatment that benefits another person reinforces the
doctrine’s underlying purpose of promoting child wellbeing. Although advocates
have heralded the mature minor doctrine as a victory for children’s rights, 354 it
does not apply if a parent is available, and it seems unlikely that courts developing
the doctrine were concerned with advancing minors’ interest in selfdetermination. Moreover, courts seldom recognize a right of mature minors to
refuse beneficial medical treatment, although adults have this right. 355 In general,
the mature minor doctrine fits comfortably in the framework as a doctrine
primarily directed at serving the wellbeing of minors that does not conflict with
parental authority or the state’s interest.
The mature minor doctrine is supported by contemporary research,
another convergence with the Child Wellbeing framework. The cases involve
minors age fifteen or older, an age at which research indicates that adolescents
are capable of making basic medical decisions independently. 356 The requirement
that the minor herself must be able to consent to treatment precludes application
to younger children. 357 Moreover, the requirement that the treatment be routine
and involve minimal risk limits the application to situations in which the mature
minor will understand the treatment choices and the consequences. 358 The
doctrine assumes that parents should be involved in more consequential medical
decisions for their children.
ii. Minors’ Consent Statutes. A substantial majority of states in the late
twentieth century enacted statutes under which minors are deemed adults for the
purpose of consenting to treatment for substance abuse and sexually transmitted
diseases, contraceptive services, 359 and outpatient mental health services. 360
352 See, e.g., Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (holding that a 15-year-old
could not consent to a skin graft for the benefit of his cousin who had suffered severe burns).
353 See supra text accompanying note _ (discussing rationale for mature minor doctrine).
354 This is particularly true when it served to underpin minors’ reproductive privacy rights. See
Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make Informed
Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEVEL. 1589 (1982); see also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647-48
(1979) (rejecting the lower court’s determination that the common law mature minor doctrine had
been legislatively overruled as to abortions and holding that the instant statute was unduly
burdensome on the exercise of a minor to seek an abortion since it did not permit even a mature
minor to obtain an abortion without parental consent).
355 RESTATEMENT, supra note 255, at § 19.01) and Reporters’ Note thereto (citing cases).
356 See id.; see also Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 354
357 Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 892A, Effect of Consent, Comment on Subsection (2)
(providing that a minor’s consent can be effective if the minor is “capable of appreciating the
nature, extent, and probable consequences of the conduct consented to”).
358 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 255, at § 19.01(d) and Reporters’ Note thereto.
359 For a discussion of contraception, see infra text accompanying notes 363-364.
360 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.025; GA. CODE ANN. § 37 7 8; MO. REV. STAT. §
431.061(4); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 32.003, 32.004; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1 203. In both cases,
some states place limitations on age or type of care that may be provided to minors.
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Typically the statutes designate no minimum age of consent, but given the nature
of the targeted conditions, only adolescents are likely to be afflicted or to desire
treatment without involving parents. The conditions are the product of risky
adolescent behavior or of emotional issues that may arise in this turbulent
developmental stage. Moreover, statutes typically presume that minors seeking
treatment are competent to give valid consent, a presumption supported by
developmental research when applied to adolescents. 361
Minors’ Consent statutes respond to contexts in which the law’s
paternalistic approach requiring parental consent was harmful to minors’
wellbeing. There is no evidence that legislatures gave much attention to minors’
autonomy interests in enacting Minors’ Consent statutes. Instead, the statutes
aimed to facilitate beneficial treatment that minors might otherwise not seek if
parental consent were required, due to the sensitivity of the covered
conditions. 362 Moreover, the conditions targeted pose risks to public health as
well as to the child’s wellbeing, and facilitating treatment offers societal benefits.
Analyzed in the framework, it is clear that Minors’ Consent statutes give minors
the right to make medical decisions to promote their wellbeing and to promote
social welfare. Moreover, while some parents might object to their child having
the right to seek treatment independently (as well as to the behavior that led to
the need for treatment), few would want their child to forego treatment.
iii. Reproductive Health Treatments. The right to obtain contraceptive and
prenatal services is often part of Minors’ Consent statutes and is justified on both
child wellbeing and social welfare grounds. Minors have a right to obtain
contraceptive services in almost all states as part of public health initiatives to
prevent teenage pregnancy. These statutes are not motivated by a concern that
minors enjoy a right of reproductive privacy, the foundation of adults’ right to
obtain contraceptives. 363 Instead, lawmakers recognize (grudgingly) that many
teenagers are sexually active and that ready access to contraception can avoid the
harms of unprotected sex. The research shows clearly that the personal and
social costs of teen pregnancy are substantial. 364 The state thus has an important
interest in protecting sexually active minors, and society as well, from these costs.
To be sure, while some parents likely support these laws, others may object to
their children’s ability to access contraceptives, and the parental rights of these
361 See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, Assessment of Patients’ Competence to Consent to Treatment, 357 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1834, 1840 (2007) (concluding that “to the extent that the patient … can clearly
communicate her decisions, understands the information about her condition, appreciates the
consequences of her choices … and can weigh the relative risks and benefits of the options, she
should be considered competent”).
362 For example, statutes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia expressly authorize
minors to consent to STD or venereal disease treatment. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.025; D.C.
MUN. REGS. tit. 22, § 600.7; FLA. STAT. § 384.30; TENN. CODE ANN. § 68 10 104; UTAH CODE
ANN. § 26 6 18.
363 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (recognizing a constitutionally
protected zone of reproductive privacy for adults); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)
(explicitly extending this right to reproductive privacy beyond marriage).
364 See REBECCA A. MAYNARD, The Study, the Context, and the Findings in Brief, in KIDS HAVING
KIDS: ECONOMIC COSTS AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF TEEN PREGNANCY 1-21 (Rebecca A.
Maynard ed., 1997) (documenting health and social risks for both adolescent parents and their
children more onerous than those experienced by adult counterparts: teenage mothers are more
likely to drop out of school and be relegated to low-paying jobs than other adolescents, and teenage
fathers also experience financial and educational costs; children of teenage mothers also do more
poorly than other children on many measures of child wellbeing).
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parents are correspondingly diminished. But lawmakers have concluded that the
benefits for teens and for society of pregnancy prevention trump the objection
of these parents, whose stance threatens harm to their sexually active children.
The Child Wellbeing framework enriches our understanding of a
minor’s right to terminate a pregnancy as well, although this right does not fit as
neatly in the Child Wellbeing framework as do other rights of access to
treatment. 365 In Bellotti v Baird, the Supreme Court held that a mature minor has
a right to make an abortion decision without involving a parent. However, the
Court also directed that a state could require the minor to demonstrate her
maturity and ability to make the decision. 366 The minor’s right to abortion
implicates a liberty interest in reproductive privacy that is analogous to that of a
pregnant adult. The decision to continue or terminate a pregnancy is both urgent
and peculiarly adult in nature, in that the minor who carries the child to term will
bear the responsibilities of parenthood. But the child-wellbeing principle lends
particular weight to minors’ interest in access to abortion. 367 The obstacle of a
parental consent requirement likely would lead some teenagers to delay abortion,
increasing personal and public health costs.368 Courts also note that pregnancy
and childbirth are riskier for teenagers than for adults, 369 and, as suggested above,
the consequences of having an unwanted child are particularly costly in
adolescence. 370 Teenage parenthood is virtually never beneficial, and the harm
seems particularly acute if the minor objects. 371 Although this justification is
seldom front and center, the minor’s wellbeing and liberty interests merge in the
context of abortion rights. Thus, concern for the welfare of the pregnant minor
and recognition that deference to parental authority may generate serious harm
are embedded in the Bellotti framework.
365 Minors’ right of access to abortion fits more squarely in the realm of constitutional liberty
interests held by citizens against the state (and in the case of minors, against parents), but, as
explained in the text, this right also is justified in part on the ground that it serves the wellbeing of
pregnant minors. See infra text accompanying notes 367-371.
366 For a minor not mature enough to make her own decision, the Court indicated that a
determination should be made of whether the abortion without parental consent or involvement
is in the minor’s best interest. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 663-64 (1979). In response, many
states have created judicial by-pass proceedings to determine the pregnant minor’s maturity. See,
e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-21-4; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.904
(West 2014); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-55; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.8; 18 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206 (West 2016); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.375 (West 2011). Other jurisdictions
authorize minors, like adult women, to consent to abortion without state-imposed restrictions.
These include Connecticut, Maine, and Washington D.C. See An Overview of Minors’ Consent Laws,
GUTTMACHER INST.,
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/overview-minorsconsent-law
367 Emily Buss makes a similar argument. See Buss, supra note 11, at 762 (arguing that allowing
adolescents access to abortion “allows them to continue growing up without taking on the massive
financial, emotional and social burdens of teen parenting”).
368 See Martin Guggenheim, Minors’ Rights: The Adolescent Abortion Cases, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV.
589, 641 (2003.
369 See Michael M. v. Sup. Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (acknowledging risks of teenage pregnancy
in upholding statutory rape statute).
370 See, e.g., Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642; see also MAYNARD, note 361 supra.
371 In many jurisdictions, judges typically order an abortion even when a minor is found to be
too immature to make her own decision, reasoning that the best interest of an immature minor
cannot be served by forcing her to bring the pregnancy to term. See Robert Mnookin, Bellotti v.
Baird: A Hard Case, in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM AND PUBLIC
POLICY 150 (R. H. Mnookin ed., 1985).
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b. First Amendment Rights in School
The Free Expression and Free Exercise rights of public-school students
also exemplify rights that benefit minors and promote social welfare. 372 Allowing
students to express their political views as maturing individuals in the school
setting offers substantial benefits both to students and society because it
prepares youths for political participation and other activities associated with
citizenship. Students’ interests are well served by providing a context for
expression in which they can learn lessons about civility and tolerance when their
ideas are tested. Further, lessons learned in an educational setting could improve
political discourse generally, a benefit to society. Arguably, many teenagers are
beginning to engage with and comprehend larger political and social issues and
are motivated to explore and debate with peers and teachers. Thus, although
speech rights are not formally limited on the basis of age, it is not surprising that
claims are brought exclusively by middle and high school students. 373 Courts
might be less likely to view the interest of younger children as substantial. 374
Another dimension of both Free Expression and Free Exercise rights is
compatible with our framework: Children’s rights in this setting are usually
convergent with those of parents, belying the account of inherent competition.
Recognition of students’ First Amendment rights often supports parents’
interest in inculcating their children in their own political values and religious
beliefs; the cases suggest that the views of students who have successfully
challenged school restrictions on speech align with those of their parents. 375
Conversely, when parents have favored restrictions imposed by the school,
courts have been less protective of student speech. 376 Also, parents have often
joined students in curricular and other challenges on the basis of shared religious
beliefs. 377 These constitutional challenges have had mixed success, but many

372 See supra text accompanying notes 100-103 (describing these rights); Buss, supra note 343,
at 57-61.
373 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409-10 (2007) (upholding suspension of high school
student for displaying pro-marijuana banner); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684-85
(1986) (upholding suspension of high school student for assembly speech with lewd innuendo);
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (upholding censorship of material
in high school newspaper); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 925 (2011)
(rejecting authority of school officials to punish eighth grade student for off-campus web posting).
374 For example, in Tinker, the younger Tinker siblings who, at age eight and eleven, participated
in the same anti-War demonstration at issue in the case as their fifteen and thirteen-year-old
siblings, were not petitioners. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 516
(1969) (Black, J., dissenting) (describing the protesting students); id. at 504 (describing the
petitioners); DAVIS, supra note 46, at 166; see also Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530,
1538 (7th Cir. 1996) (questioning whether Tinker extends to elementary school students).
375 See, e.g., John Garvey, Child, Parent, State, and the Due Process Clause: An Essay on the Supreme
Court, 51 SO. CAL. L. REV. 769, 785 (1978) (arguing that Tinker was really about “family rights”);
Bruce Hafen, Children’s Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations about Abandoning Youth
to Their “Rights,” B.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 646 (1976) (arguing (before Bellotti) that “none of the Supreme
Court’s children’s rights cases provide authority for upholding the exercise of minors’ choice rights
against contrary parental claims”).
376 Compare Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 275 (upholding censorship, citing principal’s concern about
offending parents); with Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504, 514 (permitting student speech, noting in facts that
parents held the same views).
377 See e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins Cty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1070 (6th Cir. 1987) (rejecting
objection of parents and children to textbook series); Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Prods., 68
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school systems accommodate parents’ and students’ religious beliefs in various
ways. 378
As this doctrinal description illustrates, the Child Wellbeing framework
aids interpretation of constitutional jurisprudence in this area. First Amendment
rights are generally conferred on students in contexts in which exercise of those
rights might be deemed beneficial to their development as citizens, but rights are
defined with limits that courts find appropriate to protect society’s interest in
education. Applying a cost-benefit calculus, the benefit to students of free speech
rights are substantial and the social costs are minimal. Usually parents support
and sometimes advocate for these rights as well.
We end this discussion on a critical note: If, as we argue, recognition of
free expression rights is justified on the ground that it promotes the interests of
both students and society in citizenship development so long as the state’s
educational function is not sacrificed, courts have been excessively restrictive in
deferring to school authority, often exaggerating the cost to the educational
process of student speech. For example, some courts have allowed punishment
of students for expressions on private social media not intended for school
dissemination, 379 while others, including the Supreme Court, have authorized
censorship by school authorities of innocuous student material in school
publications, where little burden on education is implicated. 380 Allowing students
freedom to express their opinions in venues such as school publications can
provide opportunities for experimentation in a setting in which instructive
guidance and feedback are possible. While some courts have been quite
supportive of student speech, 381 the Supreme Court often has been willing to
authorize the stifling of expression offensive to school authorities.382 These
policies may result in undesirable lessons about government repression of speech
and do little to offer positive citizenship lessons. Our framework thus offers
normative guidance for reforms in this area.

F.3d 525, 538 (1st Cir. 1995) (rejecting First Amendment claim by high school students and their
parents against compelled attendance at anti-AIDS assembly).
378 See e.g., Koenick v. Felton, 190 F.3d 259, 266 (4th Cir. 1999) (upholding state law authorizing
a four-day Easter holiday against Establishment Clause challenge and finding that “[t]he Board’s
desire to economize scarce educational resources that are wasted when classes are held on days
with a high rate of absenteeism provides a plausible secular purpose for the schedule); Westside
Sch. Dist. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 246–47 (1990) (applying state law to require high school to
provide student Christian club equal access to school facilities); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§
26.003—26.010 (Vernon 2002 (authorizing parents to petition on behalf of their children to add
or change a course, graduate early, or to withdraw from a class or other school activity that conflicts
with religious beliefs).
379 See Donniger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50-53 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholding suspension for offcampus posting targeting school principal as offensive and potentially disruptive). But see J.S. ex
rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 925 (3d Cir. 2011) (rejecting school officials’
authority to punish student).
380 For example, Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 275, can be criticized as heavy-handed, authorizing
censorship of innocuous material, foregoing instructional potential in official response.
381 See supra text accompanying note 100.
382 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 209-10 (2007) (speech advocating legalization of
marijuana); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684-85 (1986) (sexual innuendo).
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c. Procedural Rights in Delinquency Proceedings
Courts granting procedural rights to youths in the justice system, have
emphasized concern for their wellbeing, sometimes recognizing that the
paternalistic approach threatened harm to those it ostensibly aimed to protect.
In granting procedural rights to youths in delinquency proceedings, the Supreme
Court recognized that the rehabilitative model of the traditional juvenile court
inflicted harm on youths, and that procedural rights provided protection from
those harms. 383 In Gault, the Court observed that adjudicated delinquents seldom
received the promised services to support rehabilitation, and often were
confined in institutions that functioned like prisons. At the same time, the youth
faced adjudication without the tools that could aid her in defending against the
state’s charges. Thus, the aim of the court in granting procedural rights was to
promote the wellbeing of youth in the adjudicative process. 384
Concern for the wellbeing of youths in the justice system also has
influenced the way in which procedural rights are defined and applied. Some
children’s rights advocates hold that the rights of youths should be identical to
those of adult defendants. 385 But lawmakers increasingly have realized that
youths may have limited capacity to exercise their rights, and that their immature
choices can have harmful consequences. This concern, well supported by
developmental research, has led to reforms that protect juveniles through
restrictions limiting their freedom to exercise and waive procedural rights. For
example, adults can freely waive their Miranda rights in police interrogation, but
some states have imposed restrictions on minors’ freedom to waive these rights,
either altogether or by requiring consultation with counsel. 386 This constraint is
383 See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing In re Gault). To be sure, a juvenile court adjudication
implicates the youth’s liberty interest much like the adjudication of guilt in a criminal trial,
indicating the need for protections under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. But
the Court was moved to grant juveniles rights in part because of the harms inflicted by the
paternalistic regime. See infra text accompanying note 70.
384 See generally, Emily Buss, The missed Opportunity of Gault, U. Chi. L. Rev 39 (2003).
385 See e.g., Tamar Birkhead, Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice for Juveniles, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1147,
1490-1492 (2009) (contending that arguments against waiver of rights are not supported by
empirical evidence); Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum, 51
HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1282 (2000) (arguing for right to waive as implicit in Gault). The National
Juvenile Defender Center, for example, assumes that juveniles have the right to waive counsel in
delinquency proceedings but advocates that waiver must follow consultation with counsel. See
NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., ENSURING ACCESS: A POLICY ADVOCACY TOOLKIT (2018),
https://njdc.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Ensuring-Access.pdf. Other scholars contend
that youth need a completely different process. See Emily Buss, The Missed Opportunity in Gault, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 39 (2003).
386 The Restatement of Children and the Law requires consultation with counsel as a condition
of waiver for younger juveniles. § 12.22 Consultation with Counsel for Younger Juveniles. A few
courts have prohibited waiver altogether for younger juveniles or unless advised by counsel. See,
e.g., Matter of Welfare of D.S.S., 506 N.W.2d 650, 654 (Minn. 1993) (stating that a juvenile may
only validly waive her right to counsel after that right is satisfactorily explained to her by a nonadversarial attorney or judge); State v. Doe, 621 P.2d 519, 304-05 (N.M. 1980) (holding that a
juvenile facing a delinquency petition cannot waive the initial appointment of counsel to defend
her); State ex. rel. J.M. v. Taylor, 276 S.E.2d 199, 204 (W. Va. 1981) (holding that a juvenile’s waiver
of right to counsel cannot be knowing and voluntarily waived unless the waiver is made on the
advice of counsel). For more examples, see American Law Reports, Validity and Efficacy of Minor’s
Waiver of Right to Counsel – Cases Decided Since Application of Gault, 101 A. L. R. 5th 351 (2002)
(updated weekly; last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
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justified on the ground that minors, particularly youth of color, 387 are particularly
vulnerable to coercive police tactics and that younger teenagers often lack
comprehension of the meaning of Miranda warnings. In general, youths are far
more likely than are adults to waive their Miranda rights in interrogation 388 and
to confess to crimes, sometimes falsely. 389 Also, in delinquency proceedings,
juveniles in most states do not have the right of self-representation, although
adult defendants have a constitutional right to waive counsel and represent
themselves. 390 Moreover, some jurisdictions go further and strictly limit or
prohibit self-representation by juveniles, acknowledging that immaturity
precludes competent waiver of counsel. 391
In general, procedural rights in the justice system aim to protect
juveniles, like adults, from the power of state prosecution and from wrongful
deprivation of liberty. But lawmakers confer these rights on minors and define
them with an aim to promote their wellbeing. This protection is particularly
critical for youth of color, who disproportionately intersect with the justice
system. In recent years, reforms have been guided by developmental research
showing that youths are more vulnerable than adult counterparts and less
capable of exercising their rights in a self-interested way. In this domain as in
others, the new framework provides an interpretive guide that clarifies the
rationale of children’s rights.
2. Rights Withheld from Minors
The Child Wellbeing framework provides interpretive tools that clarify
why other rights, outside the justice system, are withheld from minors as well.
As we have shown, the conferral of rights in recent decades has enhanced
minors’ wellbeing in many settings. But paternalism continues in many modern
laws, and sometimes the underlying premise is that children’s interests are well
served by restrictive regulations or surrogate decisionmakers. Moreover,
restrictions can also promote social welfare. Two examples—restriction on the
right to marry and the infancy doctrine in contract law—demonstrate that often
the withholding, as well as the granting, of rights fits within the framework.
Restrictions on minors’ right to marry provide an interesting example
of a right withheld from minors out of concern for their wellbeing—a concern
387 Supra text accompanying note _ (describing how youths of color are taught compliance with
authority, particularly law enforcement). See also Restatement, supra note 255, at §12.21, Comment
h and Reporters Notes; Ta-Nehishi Coates, Between the World and Me 14-20 (2015).
388 See Jodi L. Viljoen et al., Legal Decisions of Preadolescent and Adolescent Defendants: Predictors of
Confessions, Pleas, Communication with Attorneys, and Appeals, 29 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 253, 261 (2005)
(finding of defendants questioned by the police, only 7.96 percent of those aged 14 and under
remained silent); Grisso et al., supra note 331, at 353-356 (laboratory study finding that children 15
years or younger are more likely than older teenagers to comply with authority and confess to an
offense).
389 See discussion in Restatement, supra note 255, at § 12.22, Reporters Note to comment h;
Viljoen et al., supra note 388, at 261.
390 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (recognizing criminal defendants’ right to waive
counsel); see also supra note 327.
391 See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-201 (2016) (“[T]he child shall be represented by counsel
at all critical stages: detention, adjudicatory and disposition hearings; parole or probation
revocation proceedings; and post-disposition matters.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-(H) (2009)
(“The child shall be represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings on a delinquency
petition,” and if counsel is not retained, “counsel shall be appointed for the child.”).
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that is informed by ample research. 392 Under common law, relatively young
minors were permitted to marry, primarily to avoid their children’s
illegitimacy. 393 But, although the right to marry is a fundamental constitutional
right for adults, the law has become more, not less, restrictive in the era of
children’s rights. 394 In recent decades, the minimum age of marriage has
increased in many states, 395 a trend that is best justified on the ground of child
wellbeing. Developmentalists concur that most adolescents lack the maturity to
establish a stable marriage or raise children competently, and other research finds
many harmful consequences associated with teenage marriage, including
disruption of education and social development, and high divorce rates. 396 Thus,
it is apparent that deterring teenage marriage furthers social welfare as well as
that of minors themselves. Lawmakers have responded by restricting a right that
minors once held and also by limiting the parents’ authority to consent to their
minor children’s marriages.
The infancy doctrine in contract also restricts minors’ freedom with the
purpose of serving their wellbeing. Under the doctrine, minors can renounce
most contracts, making them incapable of entering enforceable agreements. 397
This restriction limits minors’ freedom of contract, but it is understood to serve
their interests by protecting them from entering ill-considered agreements. 398 In
this context, children are presumed to be vulnerable to overreaching adults and
to their own poor judgment. The infancy doctrine serves as a deterrent, signaling
to adults who might be tempted to deal with minors in a commercial setting that
the contract cannot be enforced against the minor. The doctrine also reinforces
392 See Guggenheim, supra note 230, at 942 (noting that New York’s raising of the age of lawful
marriage from fourteen to eighteen was touted as a children’s rights victory, even though the legal
change actually further restricted those rights, as, while “[a]dult rights are organized around the
principle… of liberty… [c]hildren’s rights… mostly presume[e] children ought to be denied
autonomy.”).
393 See, e.g., State v. Ward, 28 S.E.2d 785, 786 (S.C. 1944) (“The common law establishes the
age of consent to the marriage contract at fourteen years for males and twelve years for females
….”).
394 Compare Ragan v. Cox, 210 Ark. 152, 158 (1946) (describing recent Arkansas law raising
marriage to 18 for males and 16 for females from the common law 14 and 12), with Encinas v.
Lowthian Freight Lines, 69 Cal. App. 2d 156, 159 (1945) (noting that in California, males can
legally enter into a contract of marriage at 21, and with parental consent at 18, versus 18 and 16
respectively for females); Norvell v. State, 193 S.W.2d 200 (Tx. 1946) (noting that Texas law states
that males under sixteen and females under fourteen shall not marry).
395 See TAHIRIH JUSTICE CTR., UNDERSTANDING STATE STATUTES ON MINIMUM MARRIAGE
AGE AND EXCEPTIONS, https://www.tahirih.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/FINAL-Oct2018-State-Statutory-Compilation.pdf (2018) (most states now require that both parties be at least
18 to marry without parental consent or judicial approval, though many have statutory exceptions
which can lower that age, sometimes including in cases where the minor female becomes
pregnant.).
396 See Vivian Hamilton, The Age of Marital Capacity: Reconsidering Civil Recognition of Adolescent
Marriage, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 1817 (2012); Gordon B. Dahl, Early Teen Marriage and Future Poverty, 47
DEMOGRAPHY 689, 691 (2010) (describing substantially higher divorce rate, younger age of
childbirth, and lower educational attainment of women who marry before age 19).
397 This doctrine has its roots in English common law. See DAVIS et al., supra note 46, at 11517.
398 See e.g. Kiefer v. Fred Howe Motors, 158 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Wis. 1968) (“The underpinnings
of the general rule allowing the minor to disaffirm his contracts were undoubtedly the protection
of the minor. It was thought that the minor was immature in both mind and experience and that
therefore he should be protected from his own bad judgements as well as from adults who would
take advantage of him.”); DAVIS et al., supra note 46, at 115-17.
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parental authority in a context in which the risk of parent-child conflict of
interest appears to be minimal.
***
In this Part, we have shown that the rationale for granting and
withholding of rights often fits comfortably in the Child Wellbeing framework.
This analysis brings greater coherence to the doctrine and clarifies the underlying
logic of dispersed legal reforms often adopted in a piecemeal fashion. Children’s
rights are sometimes understood primarily as expressions of the legal
personhood of children as individuals with liberty interests that trump the
authority of parents and the state over their lives. This Part has shown that this
understanding is incomplete. This is not to say that lawmakers make optimal
judgments about rights granted and withheld. It seems probable that rights will
not be granted to minors if doing so seems likely to incur any substantial social
costs, even if the benefits to minors would exceed those costs. Moreover,
lawmakers likely sometimes resort to paternalistic views about minors, declining
to extend beneficial rights and privileges, even though the social costs are
minimal. Finally, other political and social attitudes likely often shape legislative
and judicial judgments about granting or applying children’s rights. 399 But our
analysis has shown that, in a way insufficiently understood, the conferral and
withholding of rights to minors can be rationalized on the basis of child
wellbeing.
Children’s rights doctrine is thus consistent with the legal regulation of
children and families discussed in Parts II and III. Taken together, these Parts
support our claim that the competitive triadic framework of state, parents, and
children is outmoded and that the Child Wellbeing framework better describes
the current state of the law. Concern for child wellbeing increasingly defines the
state’s role in regulating youth crime, and is reflected in recent investments in
family support and marginal efforts to reorient the child welfare system away
from its crisis-orientation; but it also goes far to justify parental authority and
illuminate the patterns by which children’s rights are granted and withheld.
Further, we have shown that the advancement of society’s interests, a goal that
has been obscured historically in the regulation of children, has often converged
with and strengthened child wellbeing. In each domain, to varying degrees,
observers and (sometimes) lawmakers have identified racial bias and inequity in
the law’s relationship with children and families of color as a threat to the
legitimacy of the regime and have elevated this concern as a policy goal. Finally,
developmental science, which shapes the state’s role in contemporary juvenile

399 There is evidence, for example, that judges’ anti-abortion attitudes may distort their
determinations of minors’ maturity to make abortion decisions. See, e.g., Ex parte Anonymous, 803
So.2d 542, 547 (Ala. 2001) (upholding denial of an abortion without parental consent for a 17year-old student who worked part-time to save for college, and who had considered alternatives
to abortion and researched the procedure); In re Jane Doe, 566 N.E.2d 1181, 1184-85 (Ohio 1991)
(upholding denial of an abortion without parental consent for a 17-year-old student who worked
and planned to go to college, even though a physician testified that she understood the risks,
because she had had a prior abortion as a result of pregnancy with a different man and had
discontinued her birth control). Traditional views about parental authority could also lead courts
and legislatures to reject beneficial children’s rights.
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justice and, increasingly, investments in family support, is likely to become more
important in rationalizing parental rights and children’s rights doctrine.
V. ANTICIPATING CRITICISM
In this Part, we address potential criticism of the Child Wellbeing
framework. We remind the reader that the framework is largely interpretive,
describing the reasoning and goals that animate recent reforms to the juvenile
justice system and arguing that the conceptual framework that has shaped these
reforms can inform our understanding of the structure and logic underlying
parental rights and children’s rights. We anticipate two types of criticism:
arguments that the framework is descriptively inaccurate and arguments that,
even if it is accurate, the framework is normatively problematic and should be
challenged rather than embraced.
Some readers may challenge the descriptive accuracy of the framework,
contending that we are too quick to find coherence across areas of legal
regulation and are imposing order where none exists. On this view, the legal
regulation of children is extraordinarily complex, and we have sacrificed accuracy
to find common themes linking the three domains. Relatedly, readers may argue
that we overstate the integration of the interests of parents, children, and the
state, and that in some contexts there is an inherent conflict. Homeschooling,
for example, may be acceptable educationally, but allows parents to inculcate
illiberal values, making deference to parental authority a greater threat to social
welfare and child wellbeing than we acknowledge. In this account, protecting the
stability of the parent-child relationship sacrifices the child’s need to develop
autonomy and society’s interest in ensuring children are exposed to a range of
ideas. Similarly, minors’ right to access abortion necessarily conflicts with
parental authority.
These are valid concerns, but they misapprehend the aim of our project.
As we note at several points, the framework does not explain and resolve every
question about the legal regulation of children. 400 It emphasizes unifying themes
across many domains, but it is not a topographical map incorporating all laws
and policies. It is in the nature of a project like this to be categorical, and some
nuance is surely lost when painting with a broad brush. One value of the new
framework, however, is that it identifies these common themes—themes that
are clearly driving regulation in some areas and embedded and only faintly visible
in others. In so doing, we provide a blueprint to guide reform-minded
lawmakers. And although the depiction of integrated interests does not describe
every issue or case, the framework provides the tools to identify and narrow the
set of hard cases in which tension among parents, children, and the state is likely
to persist. There is value in understanding that, more often than is commonly
acknowledged, there is an integration of interests.
A second descriptive criticism is that we present our framework in a
vacuum, without accounting for the political context of lawmaking and
enforcement, which may trump or at least complicate considerations of child
wellbeing. The sweeping, punitive juvenile justice reforms in the 1990s are but
one example of politics subverting a concern for the wellbeing of youth in the

400

See supra text accompanying notes 35 & 251.
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justice system. 401 And access to abortion and contraception are persistent
political flashpoints, often distracting from considerations of child and
adolescent wellbeing. 402
To be sure, our framework does not account fully for political and social
forces that shape lawmaking. But while some issues, such as abortion, involve
deep value clashes, many others do not. And the approach, with its dual focus
on child wellbeing and social welfare, and its incorporation of child development
knowledge, accommodates political differences quite well. This is evident in
bipartisan support for recent juvenile justice reforms and for investments in prekindergarten.403 Even the politically sensitive issue of Medicaid expansion has
gained support across the political spectrum, at least in part due to the evidence
about its effectiveness and efficiency. 404 Finally, as we explain above, even
minors’ access to abortion, while controversial, is at least partly justified in terms
of minors’ wellbeing and social welfare. 405 In the absence of these interests, it is
possible that the Bellotti Court might have ruled differently. In short, while a
concern for child wellbeing will succumb to political forces at times, attention to
social welfare and developmental science can help steer the debate towards child
wellbeing.
On a related issue, critics may be skeptical generally of the upbeat
account of the Child Wellbeing framework, and particularly unconvinced that
racial fairness is becoming a key policy concern. On this view, the article
minimizes the pernicious influence of racial inequity in contemporary regulation
or exaggerates the extent to which lawmakers recognize and aim to ameliorate
this injustice.
As we have acknowledged, progress is at an early stage. In the juvenile
justice system, youth of color have benefited together with their white peers
from developmentally based reforms that have minimized institutional
confinement and shifted resources to community programs that support healthy
maturation. But racial disparities in the justice system have not changed. The
system remains racialized and lawmakers have only begun to seriously confront
these pernicious problems. Progress in the child welfare system is limited as well.
Thus, we acknowledge that while our framework identifies the reduction of racial
inequity as a key policy goal, we are far from attaining that goal. This reality
enhances the importance of the contemporary rationale for strong parental rights
to shield families of color from intrusive state intervention and of procedural
protections in the justice system and in schools.
Readers may also question whether lawmakers should embrace our
framework. One concern is that defining and promoting child wellbeing can be
an uncertain and complex business, given the indeterminacy and capaciousness
of the construct.406 To a considerable extent, child wellbeing is grounded in
See supra text accompanying note 72-__.
Cf. Reva Siegel, Prochoicelife: Asking Who Protects Life and How—and Why It Matters in Law and
Politics, 93 IND. L.J. 207, 210-21 (2018) (contending that many supposedly pro-life states do not
adopt policies that would clearly promote life, including health care, income assistance, and
workplace accommodations for pregnancy and caregiving).
403 See supra Part II.A & B.
404 See supra text accompanying note __.
405 See supra text accompanying notes 370-371.
406 For a classic analysis of the indeterminacy of children’s best interest, see Mnookin, supra
note 242, at 226, 229-30.
401
402

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3448689

CONCEPTUALIZING LEGAL CHILDHOOD

68

values about which there may not be consensus; it is also culturally contingent.
Thus, policies and doctrines justified on this basis may reflect lawmakers’
personal biases and political preferences. Although some areas of state regulation
have clear, largely uncontested goals, 407 others predictably will involve value
contests or disagreements about priorities. Is it better for a child to remain with
a parent who sometimes strikes the child or for the child to live apart from the
parent and never be hit? Is it more beneficial for a child to experience a sense of
belonging in a family or to grow up with egalitarian values? And so on. Further,
even when the objective is uncontested, it is not always clear how to achieve the
goal. Many approaches to parenting can be effective, and social science research
does not—and perhaps cannot—determine the “best” approach to raising a
child. Views about what children need, beyond the basics, have shifted over time,
and often there is little consensus among experts or parents. 408
These concerns are legitimate but exaggerate the challenge posed by the
indeterminacy of legal regulation aimed at promoting child wellbeing. Solid and
uncontested scientific research has established several key lessons about child
development. We know that a strong, stable relationship between a child and
caregiver—often, but not always, a parent—is essential to child development,
especially in the first several years of life. 409 We know that ongoing brain
development in adolescents can lead teenagers to make impulsive, risky
decisions, heavily influenced by peers, and that most youths outgrow these
tendencies. 410 We know that teenage pregnancy and substance abuse undermine
prospects for healthy adulthood. 411 We know that families need economic
resources to enable the healthy development of children. 412 And we know that
early intervention and access to treatment for a broad range of conditions are
both more effective and cost-efficient than ex-post crisis intervention. 413
Regulation in the framework is built on these well-supported, foundational
insights. To the extent the legal regulation of children raises questions of
contested values—as it often does—then the social science evidence can help
frame, although ultimately not resolve, the debate. 414
Relatedly, a reader might question our confidence in the use of science
in the Child Wellbeing framework. It is sobering to consider that Progressives
also professed confidence in science. To be sure, scientific evidence is not always
reliable. Biases can distort even the most scrupulous research, and findings often
are not replicable. 415 Even if the studies are reliable and neutral, moreover, they
407

health.

These include the reduction of juvenile recidivism and promotion of children’s physical

408 See EMILY OSTER, CRIBSHEET: A DATA-DRIVEN GUIDE TO BETTER, MORE RELAXED
PARENTING, FROM BIRTH TO PRESCHOOL __ (2019) (describing the conflicting and often limited
evidence for numerous parenting choices, such as whether to sleep train an infant). For a
discussion of the historically contingent nature of parenting advice, see generally ANN HULBERT,
RAISING AMERICA: EXPERTS, PARENTS, AND A CENTURY OF ADVICE ABOUT CHILDREN 360-70
(2003).
409 See supra text accompanying notes 235-236.
410 See supra text accompanying notes 161-__.
411 See supra text accompanying notes -__
412 See supra text accompanying note __.
413 See supra text accompanying notes __.
414 See Clare Huntington, The Empirical Turn in Family Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 227, 281-91
(2018).
415 See id. at 272-81.
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often cannot be translated readily into legal policy, because scientific findings,
while informative, are usually narrow and seldom apply directly and
comprehensively to complex legal issues. 416 Finally, knowledge based on
research is not static; it will evolve and our understanding of child development
and other relevant issues will evolve. 417
These concerns about the state of scientific knowledge and the
challenges of translating this evidence into legal rules argue for caution in
applying research to legal questions. Incorporation of scientific research should
be limited to well-established and broadly accepted bodies of research in social
and biological science. Moreover, as the body of scientific knowledge that
informs the law grows, legal policy should reform accordingly. And the question
is “Compared to what?” Grounding regulation in scientific knowledge is likely
to be superior in many contexts to relying on unsupported common sense and
intuition, which is at least as likely to be distorted by lawmakers’ biases.
A final and serious criticism is that the framework we offer facilitates
intrusion by the state in the lives of vulnerable families, despite its contrary
normative commitment. Our argument in Part II—that the framework points to
a more active state role in supporting families—has potential risks. A lesson of
the Progressive era is that the state, when justified by the goal of promoting child
wellbeing, can impose an overarching view of acceptable parenting on all
families. For example, potentially beneficial state programs designed to promote
children’s health in low-income families often involve significant intrusions on
family privacy. 418 More generally, a system of state support increases the contact
between families and the government, raising the chance that, in engaging with
families, state actors will look for and find problems. 419
These risks are serious, but not fatal. In the new framework, judges and
state legislators do not have free rein to intervene in the lives of children and
families in the name of child wellbeing, because robust parental rights continue
to protect families from even a seemingly well-intentioned state. The
contemporary rationale for parental rights, described in Part III, together with
the constitutional justification based on liberal principles, provide a bulwark
against intrusive state intervention. This check, combined with heightened
concern about racial and class biases, supports voluntary programs that empower
parents rather than coercive interventions that require adherence to any one set
of parenting practices. Some of the most successful programs bear these
characteristics, 420 and a strong regime of parental rights and vigilance about
implicit biases should encourage the state to pursue similar efforts.

416 See Joan S. Meier, Dangerous Liaisons: Social Science and Law in Domestic Violence Cases, 70
RUTGERS U. L. REV. 115, 117–19 (2017).
417 See Buss, supra note 343.
418 See KHIARA M. BRIDGES, REPRODUCING RACE: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF PREGNANCY AS A
SITE OF RACIALIZATION 41-74 (2011) (describing a prenatal program for low-income women that
requires participants to divulge an extensive amount of information, including immigration status,
interactions with the child welfare system, any violent relationships, and much more); Wendy A.
Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: Women, Race, Poverty, and Support, 25 YALE J.L. & FEM. 317, 331-40
(2014).
419 See ROBERTS, supra note 91, at __.
420 See supra text accompanying notes __ & 206 (describing home-visiting programs, which are
voluntary and seek to empower, not direct, parents; further describing the extensive and strong
evidence for these programs).
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In short, the framework carries risks, but it seems more promising than
alternative models of regulation. Again, the question is, “Compared to what?”
In the early Progressive era, law and policy embodied a naïve view of childhood,
combining robust protection of parental rights that lacked inherent constraints.
Some more recent proposals by scholars would strictly limit parental rights,
thereby ceding substantially broader authority over families to the state, 421 a
questionable move for the reasons we have articulated. The framework we
identify benefits from the growing body of scientific knowledge about children
and families and recognizes that child wellbeing and social welfare are
interwoven, thus providing a more stable basis for regulation than the earlier
Progressive model.
Notwithstanding the understandable concerns discussed in this Section,
we endorse the new approach, while also arguing for care and caution as the
framework continues to shape the direction of legal regulation of children and
families.
CONCLUSION
To address the complexity, seeming incoherence, and instability in the
legal regulation of children, we have proposed a conceptual framework that
makes sense of this area of the law and unites various strands of legal regulation.
Our approach embraces and reimagines the state interest in child wellbeing first
articulated in the Progressive era. We have shown that child wellbeing continues
to be the core animating principle of legal regulation. But our framework also
strengthens this principle in three important ways: in modern regulation,
lawmakers draw on a wide body of scientific knowledge about child and
adolescent development as well as considerable empirical studies about effective
policies. This makes it possible to advance child wellbeing with greater
sophistication, nuance, and confidence than during the earlier period, when
lawmakers relied largely on intuition and observation. Further, legal regulation is
bolstered by a clear understanding that promoting child wellbeing generally
furthers social welfare. Finally, lawmakers are beginning to appreciate the
importance of addressing the multiple ways that racial bias and inequality
permeate the legal regulation of children.
This framework is clearest in the early twenty-first-century sweeping
reforms of juvenile justice, but it also offers interpretive power and normative
guidance for a broad swath of regulation. The framework highlights and
encourages nascent reforms to family support policies. It elevates a robust
contemporary justification for parental rights. And it provides a logic and
consistency to children’s rights doctrine. It thus offers an integrative regulatory
scheme, clarifying that not only the role of the state, but also parental rights and
children’s rights, are defined and shaped by a unifying interest in child wellbeing.
This underlying coherence contrasts with earlier regulatory models that pitted
the state, parents, and the child in competition for control over children’s lives.
The framework also identifies areas of regulation that do not promote child
wellbeing, supplying a guide for future law reform. In short, as we have shown,
the Child Wellbeing framework both explains the law’s approach to the legal
regulation of children and provides normative guidance for the future.
421

See supra text accompanying notes 229-230.
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